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Abstract
Over the past decade, several European Union (EU) member-states have expanded the
process. of decentralisation by granting further autonomy to subnational regions. This
recent push for devolution is described by Michael Keating (1998) as new regionalism,
the subnational answer to globalisation. Regions around Europe are now more
accessible to one another to share commonalities across trans-national networks which
in turn can help foster a greater sense and desire for autonomy (Keating 1998: 89).
Furthermore, sub-state nationalism can consequently affect a region's desire for
integration within Europe. Traditionally, European integration public opinion studies
have remained focused at the national and individual levels, rarely taking the regional
level into account. This dissertation attempts to break this mould and demonstrate that
public opinion towards European integration can vary as much within member-states as
it does between them. Through the use of quantitative investigations of public opinion
data, this study reveals that several factors which contribute to 'new regionalism' also
contribute to variations in regional EU support. These factors include regional contrasts
within the realms of economy, politics and identity. In addition, this research notes that
individuals may perceive certain national evaluations from within the regional context.
Furthermore, the relationship between regional assertiveness and European integration
is also analysed. While it is demonstrated that most regional political parties tend to
favour European integration, this is not often the case amongst the public of these
assertive regions. Regions where assertion is high and identity is stronger will less
likely support European integration. The results of this research demonstrate that the
nature of public opinion in Europe is possibly more complex than initially thought.
Moreover, it builds on previous research of public opinion towards European integration
by adapting to the continuous change in the multilevel structure of Europe taking into
account the contextual dynamics of which Europeans shape their opinion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is one of the largest experiments with democracy the modem
world has yet seen. Its uniqueness lies in the reallocation of national sovereignty in
certain areas of policy to a new and higher level of governance. The history of the
European Union began as an economic venture by six countries (Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) to merge the industries of coal and
steel in the 1950s and has slowly progressed into a 27 member-state free market zone as
well as residing over many social and cohesion policies. What began as an elite project
soon evolved to include the participatory role of the European public through direct
elections to the European Parliament from 1979. European citizens are now in even
greater control of the integration process through means of both direct action, such as
European parliamentary elections and referendums, and indirect action in how the
public correlates the issue of integration with the approval of their national government.
Additionally, European issues can be seen having an impact on national politics in many
realms including the Europeanisation of the balance of power within political parties
(Poguntke, Aylott, Ladrech and Luther 2007), influencing positions of political parties
within manifestos to incorporate integration (Pennings 2006) and even shaping national
elections (Kriesi 2007). The importance of public evaluations on the question of
integration has lead to a substantial amount of research on how Europeans assess the
European Union. Why do individuals support or oppose European integration? This
dissertation aims to answer this question by accounting for the multilevel context in
which the citizens of Europe evaluate integration. Specifically this research focuses on
regional-based explanations to investigate European integration support.
Over the past few -decades, several EU member-states have expanded the process of
decentralising the national government by granting additional autonomy to subnational
regions. This recent push for devolution has been described by Michael Keating (1998)
.as new regionalism, the subnational answer to globalisation. The global ising world
creates a unique situation never before presented where the common market constructs a
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new environment for Europe's regions. Regions around Europe are economically and
politically pitted against one another while simultaneously being more accessible to
share commonalities across trans-national networks which in turn can help foster a
greater sense and desire for autonomy (Keating 1998: 89). New regionalism recognises
the importance of the central-state, thus autonomous demands are more likely to calI for
a strengthening of regional governance stopping short of full independence. These
demands are made in the form of regional assertiveness, defined by Pieter Van Houten
(2000: 2) as when "regional political actors demand changes in the distribution of
competencies between the national and regional level of government, in favour of the
regional level". A new subnational level of governance is contributing to a multilevel
structure where autonomy is being pulled from the nation-state from above as weIl as
below. This dynamic is often recognised in the European integration process where the
phrase a "Europe of the regions" is frequently used to describe the aspiration of a
Europe without national boundaries.
Attitudes towards European integration vary widely between countries, something that
has been broadly discussed within academic literature. Figure 1.1 illustrates the
working concept of this research; regions within countries can vary as much as between
countries. The graph on the left of Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of individuals
sampled within each of the first 15 EU member-states seeing national EU membership
as a "good thing". The variation ranges from the most pro-EU countries of
Figure 1.1: National vs. Regional EU Support levels
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Luxembourg and the Netherlands where just under 80% of those surveyed VIew
membership as a "good thing" to the least supportive countries, the United Kingdom
and Austria, where less than 40% of those questioned view membership positively. In
comparison, the right section of the graph observes the variation of EU support within
the regions of a single member-state, Spain. Here the autonomous communities of
Madrid and Valencia display higher levels of EU support where just under 80% of those
questioned observe Spanish membership as a "good thing" while under 50% of those
surveyed in Galicia stated EU membership as a "good thing". This graph demonstrates
that opinions can vary as much between the regions of a country as they do between
countries. Figure 1.2 takes the example of the Spanish autonomous communities a step
further, observing temporal variation in addition to spatial variation. It is evident that
aggregate support levels amongst the selected communities do not remain similar over
time. While the overall trends are roughly comparable from 1986-2005 variation levels
of EU support are only minimal in the early 1990s and 2000s indicating that regional
variations have been evident for the past two decades yet are frequently overlooked. As
the role of governance changes within the European Union, individuals are likely to
evaluate the political world based on the multileveled political space around them. The
multi leveled theme of analysis addressed in this dissertation and the consideration of
regional explanations will present an onset for future investigations of public opinion
towards European integration.
Does the phenomenon of new regionalism have any impact on the way the European
public evaluates integration? Should we expect, for example, the Catalans and the
Basque of Spain or the Welsh and the Scottish of the United Kingdom to share the same
reasons for supporting or opposing EU membership? Regions within a single country
c~ have as many, or more, differing characteristics as countries have between each
other. Some may be wealthier than others, some may have more political autonomy and
some may even speak a different language. Many explanatory variables explored at the
individual and national aggregated levels such as political, economic and cultural ..
indicators also contribute to the rise of new regionalism and regional assertiveness.
This gives an incentive to understanding how these variables may affect opinion
towards integration at an additional level below that of the nation-state.
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Figure 1.2: Regional EU Support Levels in Spain 1986-2005
1985 1990 1995
Year
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Note: Data is taken from Manheim Eurobarometer Survey in addition to Eurobarometer Surveys 60.1
(2003),62.0 (2004) and 63.4 (2005). Other possible responses are "bad thing" and "neither good nor
bad thing". Spain mean includes all 17 autonomous communities.
This dissertation will build on the works of previous researchers. A great deal of these
earlier studies established many of the fundamental explanatory variables commonly
used when explaining support for European integration. I believe that the impacts of
these variables are more complex than utilised in previous research. Much of the
existing literature has ignored the nested structure in which the public may formulate
their evaluations. Individuals generate evaluations based on the context of their
surroundings. This may come in the form of the opinions of others in his/her
community or observations gathered from the environment of the territorial region or
country in which he/she lives. A single variable can have different effects at different
contextual levels.
In addition to expanding public opinion research into a multilevel context including the
subnational region, I will also evaluate new regionalism's role in influencing EU
support. It is possible that new regionalism is generating a new sense of identity at the
subnationallevel. As elites introduce the issue of further autonomy at the regional level
individuals may be beginning to recognise the regional distinctions that foster their
demands. If the public starts to create evaluations at the regional level, what
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implications does this have on EU support? Are demands for devolution or
independence within a region an obstruction to European integration? The dynamic of
new regionalism may present a new dimension to understanding opinion towards the
European Union.
Defining the Region
The definition of region can mean various things. It can range from the simplest of
geographical areas such as a valley in the Alps or expand to greater geographical
vicinities such as a continent. When observing regions in the context of new
regionalism the region is more clearly defined as a territorial unit below that of the
nation-state. Like most territorial units what defines the region's boundaries can be
complex. In some instances the natural world can create the beginning and end of a
region's boundaries with a clear line of separation from other territories in the form of a
. river, mountain or perhaps valley. In other areas the boundaries of the region are much
more complex. Culture can playa significant role in defining the region. Language,
religion and ethnicity are all common attributes that define a commonality between
peoples of a specific area. In some cases however the cultural region can be different
from that of the physical region.
An additional definition of region serves more of a political and/or administrative
purpose. While these regions may be bound to geographical andlor cultural boundaries
they are recognised by the national and European levels of government for reasons of
administrative functionality. In Europe, there is no true standard for defining regions
within the member-states. The European Union established the Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) system to provide a consistent classification of
territorial units for the production of regional statistics. The three levels of the NUTS
system range from the lower localities (NUTS III) to larger grouped collections of these
localities (NUTS I) which are the largest EU administrative units below the nation-state.
These units however are still ambiguous as they do not necessarily comply with each
member-state's administrative regions. I
I Not all countries are Classified in each of the NUTS categories. In addition, there are some countries,
such as Luxembourg and Ireland, that are entirely categorised as a NUTS I region.
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For the purposes of this dissertation I will base my classification of the region beginning
with Van Houten's (Van Houten 2003: 124) definition where the region is the
"administrative level immediately below the national state". Van Houten's work
provides an excellent basis for the definition as it explores the reasons behind regional
assertiveness, a theme explored in this dissertation and a reaction to new regionalism
that run~ parallel with Keating's (1998) work. This definition works unambiguously in
federal states like the Lander in Germany or even the Autonomous Communities of
Spain. Here the region is properly administered by a body of governance residing over
the localised policies of the region and is clearly the highest government authority
below the central-state. This definition however is unclear in non-federal states such as
the United Kingdom where the territory of England is divided into nine separate
administrative regions in addition to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Initially
created by the UK government to serve statistical purposes it may seem that
assertiveness can be documented within some of the English regions. In 2000 the
region of Greater London became the first and only English region to have an elected
body of governance. In 2004 a referendum on devolution occurred in the region of the
North East. Though the referendum failed, its occurrence did demonstrate the
possibility of devolution within English regions.
In order to capture the elements of new regionalism I will therefore also include existing
administrative units where no elected assembly exists. Therefore, the region will be
defined meeting one of three classifications:
1. The highest directly elected administrative region below the nation-
state
2. Or, if no elected regional body exists, the highest level regional
authority below the nation-state. These regions may have authorities
appointed by local or national governments.
3. Or, if neither of the two above classifications fit, the highest levelled
administrative region below the nation-state as defined by the EU
NUTS system.
The imperfection of the above definition can be accredited to the asymmetrical context
of subnational regionalism that exists throughout Europe. Even more complex, regional
authoritative powers can be asymmetrical within the same country. The United
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Kingdom again displays a perfect example of this in the British process of devolution.
Scotland enjoys its own parliament with a number of taxation and devolved powers,
Northern Ireland maintains an assembly with certain devolved powers while Wales has
a lesser autonomous assembly and most English regions have no autonomy or elected
body of regional governance. This uneven balance of autonomy exists in other
countries such as Spain where Catalonia and the Basque Country have additional
powers compared to most other autonomous communities. This imbalance of
subnational governance can give a better understanding of the role multilevel
governance plays in formulating public opinion towards European integration. Will the
public in those regions where regional politics is stronger be more inclined to support a
new European level of governance?
Explaining Public Opinion towards European Integration
The explanations for public opinion towards European integration can be divided into
four fundamental themes of analysis designed to extend our understanding of public
OpInIOn into a regional context. These themes are the effects of regional political
parties, regional economic and political indicators, identity and lastly regional
assertiveness. I will give a brief explanation of each theme, leaving a detailed review
for the following two chapters. This section will outline a more general understanding
of determinates of EU attitudes from previous literature and how a number of these
factors are intimately linked with regional differences, where this research will expand
the prior literature.
Regional Political Parties
The multilevel governance structure created by the European Union presents a series of
ne'Y channels of access for subnational actors to participate in policy making at the
European level of governance (Hooghe and Marks 200 I; Marks, Haesly and Mbaye
2002). As integration deepens, regional elites find themselves playing a larger role in
not only the policy making process but also implementing European policy at the ..
regional level (Keating 1998). This interaction also allows for regional political actors
to take credit for bringing European policy and structural funding to assist regional
development (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002). Regional political parties can often be
regarded as "single issue" parties where ideology does not bind the regional political
family but rather the commonality is the push forregional autonomy (Hix and Lord
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1997). Regional party acceptance of European integration is one of the key elements of
the new regionalism (Keating 1998).
Previous research has indicated that the effects of party positions towards European
integration can have a strong influence over the public (Ray 2003b; Hooghe and Marks
2005). Leonard Ray (2003b), for example, demonstrated that the cueing effect can be
stronger when the national level variation of EU support amongst political parties
increases. In addition, the closer one feels towards his/her party the more likely he/she
will be affected by the party's European position. As regional political parties increase
support, due to the extension of multilevel governance discussed above, it is reasonable
to investigate the positions of both the parties and their supporters on integration
support. Within the European Union regional parties and their influence undoubtedly
vary in terms of influence and strength of support. In addition most regions have no
regional specific party at all. Where these parties do however exist it is possible that
the inclusion of these parties in regional, national and European politics contributes to
an overall strengthening of the regional context when individuals evaluate European
integration.
Regional Economic and Political Indicators
Utilitarian and economic explanations of support have been a primary basis for analysis
of EU public opinion studies. Some scholars, such as Eichenberg and Dalton (1993:
512), examined the EU support influence of objective macroeconomic indicators such
as national GDP and employment figures, attempting to capture a nation's economic
well-being. Though most of their variables did not display statistical significance they
did indicate the possibility that individuals in stronger economies are more likely to
support EU integration. Others scholars, such as Gabel and Whitten (1997), found that
it was the "subjective" economy, an individual's perception, rather than the "objective"
economy that best explains support for integration. They found that positive
perceptions of the economy led to higher levels of EU support. Regional economies
tend to vary in terms of wealth not only across Europe but also within countries. In
addition, it is realistic to expect individuals to evaluate their perceptions of the economy
within the context closest to them.' As the region is the closer community to the
2 Anderson (2006) found that multilevel governance minimises the effects of national economic
conditions when voting contributing to this concept.
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individual, helshe may develop more awareness of the employment circumstances and
regional growth observed on a first-hand basis at the regional level rather than at the
national level.
Anderson (1998) states that subjective evaluations of national democracy largely
contribute to one's perception of integration while similarly Kritzinger (2003: 226)
displayed that political judgment of the nation-state can lead to diverse evaluations of
the EU where support can be a symbolic protest against the "dominant values of the
nation-state". As will be noted throughout this dissertation, strengths of regional
governance are asymmetrical throughout the EU. Some regions have higher levels of
autonomy while other regions, in some instances even within the same country, have
fewer capabilities of self-governance. Therefore, this regional variation likely
contributes to an individual's perception of democracy and the acceptance of a
multilevel governance system thus affecting European support levels.
Identity
The relationship between how individuals perceive themselves and support for the
European Union is frequently discussed in the previous literature. Paasi (1991) stated
that regions are first formed out of territorial space then progress through political
motivation to create regional institutions. At this point symbols take shape to fuse the
members of the region together. Subsequently a creation of a regional culture develops,
or is emphasised, assisting in creating a recognisable identity of those within the
region's borders. Identity can thus come in the form of historical identity through
language and culture or simply a political identity through attachment to territory andlor
political institutions.
Previous research has demonstrated that identity can have varying effects on integration
support. Some assert the existence of multiple identities while others claim European
identity comes at the cost of losing national identity (Munch 1996). The effects of
regional identity on levels of European support however have yet to be fully developed
on a European-wide basis. . Cultural and political history varies greatly within the
regions of the European Union. Levels of identity and attachment to the regions are
also likely to vary and have differing effects on public support of the EU. This
dissertation will build upon the preceding EU public opinion literature by expanding on
the effects of regional identities. Overall, it is expected that stronger regional identities
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will likely lead to higher levels of EU support however in some regions the EU may be
perceived as a threat to the regional identity.
Regional Assertiveness
The previous three themes are each components to what can contribute to eventual
regional assertiveness. Where Keating (1998) notes the key difference between the new
regionalism with regionalism of the past is that the majority of regionalist movements
stop short of demanding full independence. Levels of assertiveness can vary across
Europe from regions which still demand an independent nation-state to regions which
have no demand for any degree of autonomy. Movements for regional autonomy can
have a profound effect on the regional public and their support for European integration.
This dissertation attempts to begin where previous literature on EU public opinion has
overlooked. The levels of support in these assertive regions can give insight to the
public's support of a multilevel governance system. Individuals within regions of high
assertiveness can see European integration positively as a means of achieving autonomy
through the weakening of the nation-state. In contrast it is possible that these
individuals see integration as yet another level of governance threatening the autonomy
of the region. As regional assertiveness is on the rise and decentralisation occurs within
the member-states of the EU, the consequences that regional assertiveness and
decentralisation have on public evaluations of integration becomes more eminent.
Data and Methods of Analysis
The research conducted in this dissertation will attempt to make wider generalisations
about regional variation and support of European integration across the EU. Much of
the previous literature when attempting to gain a regional understanding of variation of
EU support tends to carry out the analyses on a case study basis observing the regions of
only a few selected countries. While these studies are useful for gaining knowledge of ..
EU support within the sample populations analysed, it is difficult to gain a sense of the
regional effects on integration support across the wider population of the European
Union. Many of these studies employ qualitative investigations through such methods
as free-flowing interviews and focus groups. These methods provide excellent insight
into why individuals mayor may not support European integration. However, given the
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small sample size of such interviews and the likelihood that each is unique makes it
problematical for comparison and making generalisations about the wider EU
population. The research in this dissertation will seek to overcome the issues of using
large samples, where the effects of the relatively few assertive regions can be weakened,
and small samples which fail to identify the primary differences between regions and
countries. In this section, I will briefly describe both the sample populations chosen for
the analysis in addition to the quantitative methodologies and data used to reach
conclusions about regional explanations ofEU support.
Dynamic public opinion studies of the European Union can offer unique challenges due
to the continued enlargement of its membership. What began as a six state organisation
soon merged to include three additional members in the 1970s. The 1980s and mid-
1990s eventually saw the addition of six more member-states bringing the total to 15.
The turn of the new millennium saw a further 12 states join, mostly compromising of
the newly democratic Central and Eastern European countries, bringing membership to
its current total of 27 states. This demonstrates the complexity of public opinion studies
as the target of comparison is continually changing.
This dissertation will examine public opinion towards European integration using the
original 15 member-states referred to as the EUlS.3 These countries include Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. There are two main
advantages when selecting the EUIS over the current 27 state population. The first
consideration reflects upon the amount of data available for a full investigation. Part of
the analysis looks into the effect of regional political parties over a 30 year time frame.
Party data for the newly' Central and Eastern European member-states is severely
limited with little or no data available. Furthermore, the unique political history of the
new member-states will likely contribute to an abundance of conclusions that may not
be comparable to Western Europe. This exceptional account of regionalism in the new
member-states merits its own analysis. The findings of this dissertation can perhaps
become a stepping stone for a further investigation to include all of the 27 European
Union members.
3 Those that joined prior to 2004.
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The EU 15 contains a high number of subnational regions creating a large sample size to
account for regional variation of EU support amongst the population. This will allow
greater ease of understanding the effects regional differences have on influencing
European integration opinion. For example, are individuals within regions with higher
levels of regional identity more likely to support EU integration? Another example asks
whether individuals within wealthier regions are more likely to support integration?
The effects of federal versus centralised systems of governance on integration opinion
will also be examined at the national level.
The large cross-national population dealt with in this dissertation demands sufficient
data to produce inferences on individuals within regions of the 15 member-states. To
achieve this, quantitative methodologies were chosen as the most applicable approach to
reaching conclusions on regional effects on public opinion towards European
integration. The quantitative tools involved include OLS regression, ordered logistic
regression, as well as multilevel modelling. One of the key features of this dissertation
is the use of the multilevel models which take into account the nested, contextual
structure of the data. An additional feature is the utilisation of the wide range of data to
reach conclusions on public attitudes towards integration. The data involved in the
analysis of the European public is the Eurobarometer survey, a cross-national biannual
survey consisting of a sample size adequate for representing the national and regional
populations of the European Union. The case study analysis of the United Kingdom,
explained below, will investigate data taken from the 2005 British Election Study
(BES). Data on the regional political parties will be based on both the Chapel Hill
expert survey and the Comparative Manifestos Project. Lastly, all economic data used
in the analysis was made available by Eurostat. Further descriptions of the methods and
data used will be outlined in Chapter 4.
Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is structured into 9 chapters, this introduction being the first.
The second chapter presents the relevant literature and academic debates on explaining
public opinion towards European integration. The chapter will highlight the various
explanatory themes including the use of economic, political and cultural indicators.
What will be noted is that the primary units of analysis in previous public opinion
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research remain at the individual and nationally aggregated levels while a very limited
amount of work has included the regional level. Furthermore, while the majority of
public opinion research is quantitative based, where most regional level analyses have
been investigated, qualitative methodologies have been applied on a regional case study
basis. The lack of a cross-national regional contextual analysis still remains prevalent in
Europeanyublic opinion research.
The third chapter will develop a theoretical approach to explaining the differences
between regions and furthermore discussing the relevance of European subnational
regions in the modem era. Michael Keating's (1998) new regionalism will be
introduced explaining the reasons why many of Europe's regions are pushing for further
autonomy from the nation-state. Multilevel governance is also a key theme in the
chapter where regions find themselves becoming involved in the policy making process
of the European Union. Lastly, the chapter discusses where both new regionalism and
multilevel governance can influence the public's perception of European integration.
The fourth chapter introduces the methodological tools of the dissertation. The chapter
will discuss the relevance of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in public
opinion research and present the reasons the statistical methods applied were chosen for
the course of this investigation. A description of the statistical methods of OLS
regression, ordered logistic regression and multilevel modelling will be included. The
various data sources used to measure public attitudes in addition to regional political
party positions on European integration will also be described.
The analytical chapters of the dissertation are chapters 5 through 8. They are designed
to address the themes outlined above of regional political parties, economic and political
indicators, identity and regional assertiveness. While many of the concepts involved in
these chapters have been investigated previously within the national and individual
contexts, these chapters uniquely expand public opinion research by considering the
regional dimension of these explanatory variables. Furthermore these chapters
recognise the components of new regionalism, exploring the effects regional distinction
in terms of politics, economy and identity has on the public's support of the European
Union.
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The analysis begins with Chapter 5 investigating regional political parties. The chapter
will examine the regional party family and seek to assess their position towards
European integration in relation to the other major party families. The chapter will then
go on to investigate the relationship between decentralisation, cultural identity and
integration support. Lastly, regional party positions will be compared with the positions
of their supporters to determine if the European issue is as significant to the party
supporters as it is the parties.
Chapter 6 will present a cross-national analysis of the EU15 usmg the multilevel
random intercept model in order to account for the nested, contextual structure in which
individuals evaluate European integration. The chapter will focus primarily on
economic and political indicators at both the national and regional levels. Furthermore,
economic and political evaluations will be analysed within a multilevel context to
determine at which level evaluations that influence integration support are generated.
The seventh chapter will further the analysis relating to the strengths of identity and
regional assertiveness. The variables of national and regional attachment will be tested
using a random slopes multilevel model. This will allow the possibility of analysing the
effects of both attachment variables on a regional basis. This multilevel model will
present the complex effects of identity on European integration and its variation within
regions of the same country. Lastly regional assertiveness will be explored to determine
if regional demands for autonomy present a roadblock to the public'S acceptance of
European integration.
Chapter 8 will attempt to tie the themes investigated within the previous three chapters
into a case study investigation of the United Kingdom. An ordered logistic regression
model will compare the effects of economic, political and identity indicators within
Scotland, Wales and England. This chapter will give insight to not only the complicated
nature of British attitudes but in addition contribute to understanding how evaluations of
devolution have influenced EU support.
Lastly, Chapter 9 will form a broad discussion summarising the conclusions of the
dissertation.
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Chapter 2
European Integration and Public Opinion: A Review of
the Literature
Introduction
The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate the multilevel contextual structure in
which individuals formulate their evaluations of European integration. It will build
upon previous research to gain a stronger sense of why individuals either support or not
support the European Union. This chapter is a review of the prominent literature
addressing explanations of public attitudes towards European integration.
Studies of European public attitudes evolve nearly as much as the European Union
itself. As the nature of the European Union moved from a more elitist project of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the institutional structure of today,
public attitudes increased in importance as European citizens were included in the
integration process through direct elections of the European Parliament in addition to
national referendums on integration in several member-states. Indirectly governments
must answer to their domestic public for positions in the European arena. As public
awareness of Europe increased so did research into explaining citizen attitudes towards
integration.
This literature review will evaluate the prominent research written on explaining public
attitudes towards European integration. It will provide a background on what research
has already explained and where gaps still remain to be filled. No single model for
explaining public support of European integration exists. The unique feature of EU
public opinion studies is that research quite often snowballs from the works of earlier
literature, each researcher finding new ways to build upon and assess the public's
evaluation of the European Union. Themes of explanation have varied from economic
indicators to levels of cultural identity. While the themes of the previous literature may
seem to already answer the question 'why do individuals support or not support
. European integration', much of this literature overlooks the multileveled contextual
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environment in which individuals evaluate the European Union. This is where the
research of this dissertation builds upon the literature reviewed in this chapter.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the more conventional theories of explanations
of public support towards European integration. As mentioned above, European
integration began with what was regarded as as an elitist project while the public
remained mostly detached from the process. Most of these established theories examine
the means in which national elites pressed integration through the roles of the
Community's institutions. Such theories include functionalism, neofunctionalism and
intergovernmental ism. I then go on to discuss theories of public attitudes towards
integration, starting with what is known as affective support including Ronald
Inglehart's theories of post-materialism and cognitive mobilisation. Next the chapter
moves on to utilitarian explanations focusing on economic costs and benefits analysis.
Following I consider the effects of domestic political explanations. Lastly I review the
influence of cultural explanations towards integration.
Conventional Theories of Integration
The study of European integration has been conducted by political scientists even prior
to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Following the
Second World War, realism, a theory progressed by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau in
the first half of the 20th century, became the leading concept and the predominant
explanation of international relations. The emergence of realism pushed the study of
European integration to diverge into different directions. The two main standpoints that
developed were neofunctionalism (Haas 1958) and intergovernmental ism (Hoffmann
1964). It is important to take into account that in the beginning of the evolutionary
process of integration, it was primarily seen as an elitist project. Public attitudes were
less likely to be considered. Although neither theory concentrates on the question of
public attitudes, it is essential to recognise these theories which created the foundations
of how researchers explain integration. Starting with these foundation theories
facilitates' the ability to comprehend the progression of European integration studies
through the past half century.
Neofunctionalism is derived out of its preceding theory of functionalism. The concept
of functionalism had been fashioned by one of the originators of European integration
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thought, David Mitrany (1943). The great irony of Mitrany is that he was not a theorist
of European integration but primarily concerned with the arrangement of international
order. After the failure of the League of Nations scholars debated the cause of its
breakdown and how to create a world order system that would not fail. Mitrany's
response was proposed in his distinguished pamphlet, a Working Peace System (1943).
Mitrany described that states would surrender a certain amount of sovereignty to
international organisations when faced with the inability to solve particular problems.
Each international organisation would take control over the authority of a specific area
of interest. Functionalist theory goes on to explain that the realms of welfare are
maximised through international cooperation, thus "the domain of legitimised politics
gradually expands while that of power politics gradually contracts" (Groom 1975: 95).
States would one day find themselves entangled within a matrix of international
organisations, thus relying on one another in a system of peace. According to
functionalism however, the states would remain as the primary actors in negotiating and
bargaining at this quasi-international level. Functionalism therefore strengthens the
conception that integration is an elitist affair to be left out of the hands of the public.
Although this approach was not intended to explain European integration it is not
difficult to recognise the qualities it possesses that do make functionalism a useful tool
for explanation.
The functionalist approach can be seen as a pragmatic method in political studies due to
its flexibility in that it was never established for any particular organisation. This could
lead to a limitless number of spheres in the world that could be structured at the
international level. Functionalism maintains that there is no need for a preset
constitution because the framework of the organisation will be modified as its function
evolves over time (Groom 1975). This approach can also be seen as utopian where
functionalism may be successful in administering areas such as the railways but would
be less successful in managing systems of production such as finance and trade, where it
would be required to alter the fundamental logic of these areas (Rosamond 2000) .
..
Because European integration mostly deals with organising production systems,
functionalism would need to be altered.
Starting with the work of Ernst Haas (1958), neofunctionalism soon became the
dominant theory in explaining the initial success of the ECSC.·· This revision of
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functionalism demonstrated that states were not the only actors in the international
arena, a contrast to the realist theories of the time. Elites within states would be needed
to promote integration for pragmatic rather than altruistic reasons (Rosamond 2000).
Pressure would thus be placed upon political leaders by these elites on behalf of one or
several interest groups. This demonstrates that the concept of the 'state' is more
complex than originally suggested by realists. Haas (1958) formed his approach on the
foundation of two key concepts: spillover and supranationalism. Leon Lindberg,
another notable contributor to neofunctionalism, described spillover as "a situation in
which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original
goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in tum create a further
condition and a need for more action, and so forth" (Lindberg 1963: 10). Integration
would begin in technical areas, particularly certain sections of the economy such as the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and eventually progress to a further spillover, such
as a common monetary policy. Essentially, the integration of one sector would require
the integration of other sectors in order for the first sector to achieve its total goal
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). In order to maintain the order of these sectors a new
supranational level of management would be needed to assume the former
responsibilities of the independent states. The Commission therefore became the
supranational authoritative body that neofunctionalists expected interest groups to then
bargain with against, national governments (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). Although
neofunctionalists concentrate a great deal on actors below and above the nation-state
level, they were more interested in understanding reasoning of these collective actors
than that of the masses (Rosamond 2005). While neofunctionalism seemed to be useful
in explaining the success of the ECSC in the 1950s, notably due to the dedicated High
Authority President Jean Monnet and his thrust for integration at the new supranational
level, the 1960s would bring forth a competing approach to integration in the form of
intergovernmental ism.
The 'empty-chair' crisis of 1965-1966 left European scholars in doubt of which
..
direction European integration would take. Haas (1975) himself observed that regional
integration theory was becoming obsolete for explaining Western Europe. However, it
could still potentially be used for explaining other regions. The counter argument to
neofunctionalism, known as intergovernmentalism, was shaped by Stanley Hoffmann
(1964; 1966). Intergovernmentalists took on ,a more realist approach to European
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integration. Contrary to the supranational direction of neofunctionalists,
intergovernmentalists share the notion that it is the national governments of the
member-states that control the character and pace of integration. While Hoffmann
(1964: 93) argued that national governments could be pressured by interest groups,
governments often made integration decisions that these groups were opposed to based
on political calculations that were driven by domestic concerns. Supranational
institutions would only increase if state governments believed it to be in their best
national interest, thus governments have much more autonomy than given in the
neofunctionalist viewpoint. In recollection of the success of the Single European Act,
Andrew Moravcsik (1993) took intergovernmental ism a step further in conceiving
liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik called upon the idea that states were playing
what Robert Putnam (1988) called two-level games. In the first stage, there is a demand
for EU policies from different domestic and social actors. Each of these actors has
economic interests and depends on the national governments to promote these interests
in EU policy-making. In the second stage, EU policies are then supplied to these
domestic actors through intergovernmental bargains, which can be reflected in treaties
or budget agreements (Moravcsik 1993). Fundamental to the liberal
intergovernmentalist approach is that the position of the national government is based
on a balanced standpoint of economic interests from within the state. This meaning that
the national government's single position in an international bargain attempts to reflect
each of the multiple interests within the state. These subnational interests can come
from an array of actors including that of regional authorities and elites. Opinions of the
mass public are largely left out of both intergovernmental ism and liberal
intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik (1998) did later conclude that public opinion, in well
organised economic interest groups in particular industries such as farmers, may be
influenced by political actors. Nonetheless, the intergovernmentalist approaches focus
little on the public's influence in the direction of European integration. The lack of
public attention within integration theory would however soon change.
Early theories of European integration focused very little on public OpInIOn, as
demonstrated by the leading approaches of functionalism and intergovernmental ism.
Conceivably the key reason why theorists tended to shy away from including public
attitudes in their approaches was within the nature of early integration itself. It was
widely viewed that integration was an elite driven process. Decisions were made with
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little publicity, behind closed doors and by individuals that did not hold accountability
to elected representatives thus making it an "elitist game" (Middlemas 1995: 612). This
disconnection of the public from the European decision making process compelled
scholars to take public attitudes for granted. This analysis is what Lindberg and
Scheingold (1970) referred to as the "permissive consensus". Haas (1958: 16) went as
far to state that it was as "impracticable as it is unnecessary" to include public opinion
and attitude surveys in integration research.
While it can be easily said that the early integration process of Europe was elite driven,
by the post Maastricht era it would be much harder to omit public attitudes from one's
approach. The Treaty on European Union in 1992 brought with it a series of
referendums to the member-states. The public was able to demonstrate its attitude
towards a union with a 'yes' or 'no' vote. The opposition shown in a defeat in Denmark
and a marginal victory in France displayed that perhaps the public was not as willing to
go along with a project that was once solely in the hands of the elites. More recently
with the first rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001 by the Irish and the rejection of the
European constitutional treaty in 2005 by the French and Dutch show that the public has
the ability to determine the speed and to what extent integration can progress. These
direct demonstrations of the variance of public attitudes throughout Europe have
supplemented the reasoning for a new direction of study that takes public opinion into
account. Fritz Scharpf (1997) explains that the public can be used to establish a point of
legitimacy for the EU. Scharpf demonstrates that through the use of democratically
elected officials and consultation of the public over public policy matters, the public can
be shown as a form of input legitimacy. Furthermore, meeting public needs and
assuring that policy tracks public opinion and attitude can be seen as a form of output
legitimacy (Scharpf 1?97). Although public opinion had not vastly influenced the
research of scholars until the 1990s, there are a limited number of studies completed
prior to the post-Maastricht era.' The remainder of this chapter will focus on previous
studies of public opinion and European integration. I will begin by exploring the
..
primary works on integration and public opinion by discussing affective support for
European integration, mostly contributed by Ronald Inglehart. Subsequently I will
explain utilitarian explanations, domestic political explanations and lastly describing
cultural explanations.
IMost notably the works of Karl Deutsch et al. (1967) and Ronald Inglehart (1967; 1970a; 1970b)
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Affective Explanations of Public Opinion
Due to the permissive consensus it was not until the late 1960s that scholars notably
began examining public opinion in relation to the European Union. Researchers needed
a starting point in explaining basic theories of public support and found David Easton's
(1965: 175) model of citizen support to be valuable. Easton argues that at the core of a
democracy's legitimacy is the strength of which citizens trust the government to make
the right decisions for its population. This trust comes in the form of citizenry support,
Easton argues, and can be categorised into two forms of support: diffuse and specific
support. Diffuse support refers to an individual's previously established outlook; where
the individual evaluates an item for what it is or represents to himlher and not by the
item's output. Therefore a less desirable outcome will not alter the individual's
standpoint because the individual's political emotion is multifaceted. In contrast to
diffuse support reflecting on the individual's fundamental nature of political sentiment,
specific support reflects solely on the citizen's reflection of the system's output. This
support is based on the direct functioning of the government and can be short-term
dependent upon the government's output. Soon after, adopting Easton's concepts of
public support, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) formed two new terms of support that
were specified to the explanation of public opinion and European integration. Their
terms of affective and utilitarian support look rather similar to the works of Easton and
have been used by European integration scholars through the subsequent years.
Affective support can particularly be understood through works of Ronald Inglehart
(1970b; 1971; 1977; Inglehart and Rabier 1980; 1990) in formulating cognitive
mobilisation and post-materialism.
Prior to public opinion studies within European integration the permissive consensus
was the dominating understanding of European mobilisation The shift from an elite
driven project towards a project conducted within the public sphere was something that
simply did not happen in a short time-span. Ronald Inglehart (1970b) developed the
theory of cognitive mobilisation which explains the process of citizens gaining political
resources ,and skills that prepare them to deal with the complexities of politics and
develop their own decisions (Dalton 2005). Inglehart explains that mass support comes
in the form of a two-step process, the first step being cognitive mobilisation itself.
Here, the individual's capability in political comprehension is increased in order to
"receive and interpret messages relating to a remote political community. As such,
cognitive mobilisation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development of
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support for a European Community" (Inglehart 1970a: 47). Inglehart then goes on to
explain that in order to make any sense of commitment towards integration, one must
simply become aware of it (Inglehart 1970a: 47). The second step to mass support is
the internationalisation of values. It has been shown that elites are more likely to favour
the idea of European Integration (Inglehart 1970a; Gabel 1998a). According to
Inglehart, it is the elite leaders and media that individuals will gain their knowledge of
integration from and because the leaders and media have a favourable opinion, this
sentiment will therefore be reflected in the opinion of the public. Thus not only will
more educated groups be more likely to hold an opinion on integration, their opinion
will most likely be a favourable attitude towards integration as well (Inglehart 1970a).
Furthermore, Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Gabel (1998c) employed the concept of
participation in political discussion. They discovered that those who participate more
frequently in political discussion are more likely to have a favourable attitude towards
integration. Inversely those who discuss politics less frequently are more likely to have
a more pessimistic view of integration. The more frequent an individual discusses
politics, the more likely he/she will gain cognitive skills to develop a better
understanding of the integration process.
Using Eurobarometer surveys to display the relationship between voter turnout and
several different variables, Inglehart and Rabier (Inglehart and Rabier 1980) were able
to explain the differences between cognitive and political mobilisation. They added that
cognitive mobilisation is related to an individual's predisposition to understand politics.
Possessing cognitive skills leads to the ability to process information about remote
political objects. Political mobilisation however refers to external influences, such as
political parties or political campaigns, which can help motivate an individual to act
politically. Furthermore they found in their study that those who demonstrate higher
levels of cognitive skills were more likely to favour a common market (Inglehart and
Rabier 1980).
Inglehart's second focus on public attitude variations focused on the importance of
-
values and emotional attachments in what he referred to as post-materialism (Inglehart
1970a; 1977; 1990). Inglehart concluded that an individual's attitude towards European
integration is largely reflective on his/her political values as opposed to the policies in
which the European project promotes. These political values are shaped throughout the
- 22-
individual's life by means of their socio-economic environment. Inglehart goes on to
explain that the public can be divided into two categories: materialists and post-
materialists (lnglehart 1971; 1977; 1990). Those who are more concerned with
economic well-being and security would fall under the materialist definition. Older
generations, those who were more likely to have undergone periods of economic
instability and war are more likely to be labelled under this social group. Since the
Second World War, however, Western Europe has seen an era of further economic
development and stability as well as peace. Therefore younger generations, who are
more likely to be within this post-materialists group, are searching for more of a sense
of belonging moving beyond materialistic needs.
Post-materialists are more likely to have a "cosmopolitan" identity when evaluating
European integration (Inglehart 1977: 322). As Janssen (1991) describes Inglehart's
post-material individual, "their contempt for the nation-state drive post-materialists to a
preoccupation with the sub- or supra-national levels of government" (Janssen 1991:
445). The issue of European integration can be seen as a decisive issue between
materialists and post-materialists. Materialists primarily see the nation-state as the
principal provider of their needs. Therefore materialists recognise European integration
as a threat. Post-materialists however, as mentioned above in Janssen's statement, will
more easily identify i~tegration as a means for achieving their post-materialistic goals.
Post-materialists view the cooperation of the member-states in relation to integration as
promoting the idea of a community that upholds post-materialist values.
Inglehart (1977) argued that this' post-materialist shift in values will also lead to higher
political participation by the public in Western democracies. This participation may not
necessarily take place in the voting process but the public will more likely demand a
stronger role in the decision making process. In tum this will develop a nation with
higher political skills, thus fulfilling the prerequisite for further political participation.
Inglehart (1977) furthers his participation argument explaining that with the assistance
..
of the advent of technological media, individuals are better able to gain higher
educational levels,
Further examinations of post-materialism have been made by connecting the theory
with traditional political ideology. Inglehart 0 (1984) attempted "to link the post-
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materialist debate with preVIOUSworks investigating public opimon and political
ideology made by Inglehart and Klingemann (1976), where it is sought that most
individuals within Western democracies can willingly place themselves on a left-right
political ideology scale. Inglehart (1984) claimed that the very idea of left-right
political ideology examined previously was progressively changing over time. The
definitions of what constitute left or right ideology for the greater public were evolving
to include the elements of post-materialist values. Van Deth and Guerts (1989)
conducted an analysis attempting to link the post-materialist debate with voting
behaviour through an examination of political party preferences within the Netherlands.
The models they produced showed little strength in post-materialist values affecting
one's party preference while the dominating factor remained one's placement within the
traditional left-right ideological scale. They did however conclude that one's placement
on the traditional scale was largely dependent upon one's materialist or post-materialist
values thus Inglehart's concept still has important consequences on voting behaviour.
When examining public support of European integration, the effect of one's placement
on the traditional ideology scale may be extremely complex. Post-materialist values
such as culture and identity, which contribute to the growth of new regionalism, may
give a better explanation to public support of integration than the traditional ideological
scale and will be explained further in the chapter.
The definition of post-materialism when applied to European integration has been
contended notably by Joseph Janssen (1989; 1991). Janssen heavily criticised
Inglehart's theories over the nature that both the nation-state and EU take when being
evaluated by the public. Inglehart (1977) maintained that post-materialists reflect on the
nation-state as a source of material output while the European Union was in contrast
seen as moving beyond materialistic goals. Janssen (1989) argued the contrary in that
the nation-state can be seen as being fostered around non-economic goals while the very
essence of the European Union is focused on purely economic means. Consequently
Janssen (1991) suggests that Inglehart wrongly identifies the nation-state as materialistic
..
and the European Union as post-materialistic. In addition he questioned Inglehart's
post-materialism by critiquing the definition of "integration". Janssen (1991) revealed
that the very meaning of "integration" changes overtime and attitudes towards
integration are often too vague to interpret. Through his study he attempts to explain
cross-national differences and the formation of individual attitudes. He argued that
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distinctive national attributes are an important determinate in integration support
showing a wide general support of the EU in most member-states with the exception of
Great Britain. Testing Inglehart's theories, Janssen's (1991) model, controlling for
education levels, displayed very little evidence that post-materialist values contribute to
public evaluations of the European integration process. This doubt over post-
materialism's influence on public EU support may have encouraged scholars to examine
variations of public EU attitudes in more utilitarian and elite influenced variables which
will be reviewed in the subsequent sections. It is however quite possible that the
concept of post-materialism still has much to contribute in explaining variations of EU
public support. The process of new regionalism may contribute to post-materialism's
influence on European integration evaluations. Janssen's (1991) study focused on
aggregate support at the national level, the level in which Inglehart explained maintains
the materialistic values for the individual. Post-materialist values however may be
stronger in regions where individuals are looking beyond the nation-state and towards a
subnational level of government, a concept Janssen may have overlooked by
investigating aggregate variations of support at only the national level. In regions where
there is higher support of a multileveled governance system, where individuals are
looking beyond the nation-state through support of both regional and European levelled
governance, post-materialist values may be a stronger contributor into explaining
variations of EU public support. If Janssen claims the meaning of integration is
changing over time, the growth of new regionalism and the expansion of multilevel
governance may redefine the meaning of integration on a regional basis.
Utilitarian Explanations of Public Opinion
It is of no surprise that economics is considered to be one of the largest factors in the
p_ublic's decision for'support of European integration. After all, the EU is a
development rooted to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which began to
link the coal and steel markets of Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries. By
observing treaties and other EU agreements a great number of these progressiv€
movements in European integration have been made in terms of economics. Such
examples include the ECSC Treaty of 1951, The EEC Treaty of 1957, the Single
European Act (SEA) of 1986 and the Treaty on European Union in 1992. These large
advancements in integration, that are perhaps most recognisable by the public, assist the
EU citizenry to reflect on the integration process in economic terms. With the
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scepticism of post-material values affecting European support, scholars began to study
the influence of utilitarian expectations in explaining public attitudes towards European
Integration. This section of the chapter will focus on utilitarian support and what Gabel
(1998b) describes as cost-benefit explanations. Utilitarian support can be described as
an individual's perception of direct costs and benefits of membership of a certain
community (1998b).
After the signmg of the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht in 1992, and
subsequent to the uncertainty of the role of post-materialist values affecting public
opinion towards integration, utilitarian explanations took the forefront of integration
public opinion studies. One of the first to pioneer this model of study was Eichenberg
and Dalton (1993). Eichenberg and Dalton shaped their theoretical framework from
theories of economic voting. Their theory explains that the economic conditions and
goals of the nation-state as well as evaluations of the national government in turn affect
public opinion towards the process of integration at the supranational level. They focus
on the following macroeconomic objective variables adapted from the work of Michael
Lewis-Beck (1988): Gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rates and inflation
(Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 512). Lewis-Beck (1988) previously demonstrated
through a comparative study of five European nations that personal economic
conditions have no effect on an individual's voting behaviour. However, Lewis-Beck
(1988) did reveal that macroeconomic conditions, in regards to the nation-state as a
whole, did contribute to one's voting behaviour considering politicians being
responsible for the economic management of the nation-state. With respect to Lewis-
Beck's macroeconomic explanations, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) tested a similar
model. GDP measures the overall wealth of a country and should positively affect
support for integration the larger a state's GDP. Unemployment and inflation measure
economic difficulties of a country and should therefore reflect a negative relation on
support as these figures increase. They found that the effects of both GDP and
unemployment were in the hypothesised direction, however, were weaker in statistical
..
significance than the inflation rate. They also took a step further in examining net
returns from the EC budget however this failed to show statistical significance.
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) concluded that the political economy, including
international export variables, is the most significant factor in predicting support for
. European integration. In contrast McLaren (200~) demonstrated the aggregate effect of
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member-states having a large positive budget balance, that is countries that receive
more from the EU than pay in, on levels of EU support. She found that individuals
living in countries with a high positive budget balance were more likely to have more
favourable evaluations of the European Union.
In contrast to Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) several works have been developed that
focus on micro- rather than macro-economic variables (Gabel and Palmer 1995;
Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998c). These variables, as Gabel and Palmer
(1995) explain, are where different EU citizens from different socio-economic
circumstances become subjected to different costs and benefits from integration policy.
Microeconomic variables focus on issues such as income, occupational skills and
education. Economic liberalisation and the free-movement of goods and services affect
different occupations at different levels in an international system such as the European
Union (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998c). Gabel and
Palmer (1995) hypothesised that citizens will weigh the costs of economic benefits
promoted by the European Union in accordance with occupational, wealth and intra-EU
trade levels. Thus, the citizens of the EU will determine their support for integration
depending upon their calculation of their own personal cost benefits analysis. In
obvious terms, if the costs outweigh the benefits one is to receive as a result of
integration, one is less likely to give their support.
Gabel and Whitten (1997) later completed a study that contradicts Gabel and Palmer's
(1995) claim. Through a statistical study using ordinary least squares regression (OLS),
Gabel and Whitten (1997) demonstrated that it is the "subjective" economy, as
perceived by the EU citizens, and not the "objective" economy as measured by
economic indicators that influences support for integration (Gabel and Whitten 1997:
92). Consequently, EU support draws on the public's perception of their personal and
national economic welfare. Both Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Gabel and Whitten
(1997) consent that it is the economy that drives levels of support for EU integration but..
differ on the measurement of the economy. Rohrschneider (2002) and Kaltenthaler and
Anderson (2001) both further explored this argument and concluded that individuals
conduct rational calculations of either their own personal economic benefits or their
country's economic benefits to determine support for integration. They stressed that
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positive evaluations of the costs and benefits analysis would increase support for
integration.
Gabel (1998c) argues that national competitive advantages wither away as a result of
integration. Integration allows the flow of goods, capital and labour to move easily
across borders. As a result, the support of different occupational skills groups will vary
dependent upon their ability of competing with labour from the various members of the
EU as well as weighing their benefits from the economic integration process. Gabel
(1998c) explains his theory through the human capital hypothesis. Therefore, skilled
workers should be more likely to show support for integration as their skills and
education levels are more effective in an international market compared to those of
unskilled labourers. Referendums on entry to the European Union have also been
observed (Jenssen 1998). Jenssen, Pesonen and Gilljam (1998) noted that individual
characteristics, such as education or skill levels as mentioned by Gabel (1998c), are
strong predictors on how an individual evaluates the economic costs of being a member
of the European Union. The conclusion of this evaluation can then be used as a
predictor for support on the referendum.
Utilitarian support may seem sensible to use in explaining support for European
integration however the results of these studies vary widely therefore making the
strength of utilitarian support inconclusive. Much of this variation may be explained in
the choice of control variables used with the analyses. These theories also stop short in
explaining the variation of integration support over time. It is stated that since the
Maastricht Treaty support for - European integration has declined (Ciftci 2005;
Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) thus utilitarian variables may lack explanation of this
phenomenon. Most utilitarian studies also hold a nation-state bias, meaning they rarely
take into account any economic disparities that may occur throughout an individual
member-state. Duch and Taylor (1997) argue that micro-economic variables can be
misleading in understating the comparative advantage level at the regional level. They
go on to explain that economic variations within a nation-state may be much more
significant than at the international level. Anderson (1998) examined political
variables, such as evaluations of national and supranational institutions, in addition to
economic variables through a multivariate analysis. He discovered that economic
variables were interceded by political variables, thus political variables should be taken
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into account to better explain integration support. Regional disparities and economic
evaluations have lacked in much of the previous literature. While the effect of regional
economic well-being on integration support should be investigated it may be possible
that individuals base their national economic evaluations within the context closest to
them, the region. The research of this dissertation attempts to investigate this
possibility.
Domestic and Political Explanations of Public Opinion
As mentioned throughout this chapter, scholars debate where and how citizens gather
information to help determine their position on European integration. Information on
the European Union is mostly provided by domestic sources, such as the media or
through national politics, and can lead to a void in enough sufficient information for
individuals to make an independent evaluation. Anderson (1998) describes the process
of filling this information void as using "proxies". Anderson continues to explain that
domestic political evaluations act as proxies to evaluate integration. Examples of
domestic political evaluations are national government support, appraisal of government
institutions, the media and party influence. Some researchers may disagree with this
statement and assume that government support has no relation to support of the EU,
rather support is a trend driven by the political elites (Duch and Taylor 1997).
However, Anderson (1998) argues that countries that have positive evaluations of
national institutions and government will more likely lead to a positive evaluation of
European integration.
The European Union may still not be familiar to many of its citizens. Its institutions,
policies and powers are still not commonly known to a large amount of the public
(Anderson 1998). Because EU citizens may find the integration process too
complicated and too distant they may be unable to form independent attitudes towards
the EU (Janssen 1991). This may be due to the lack of information provided by the EU
to its citizens. Without a fundamental source of promotion the public will obviously be-
less aware 'of the functions of the Union. As a result, citizens will then form opinions
based on what knowledge they have previously become familiar with. Anderson (1998)
reveals that individuals use proxies in helping shape opinions about European
integration. One such proxy would be domestic government support because citizens
are more familiar with the political structure of their state as opposed to that of the EU.
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Anderson builds his national-proxies model using political-institutional variables such
as party support and party cue and concludes that they are notably effective m
explaining variation in EU support. Anderson (1998: 576) would expect one to
"construe a picture of the EU by using information about political parties, the domestic
political system and those who govern it" all within their national context.
Anderson (1998) concludes that in countries that have positive evaluations of national
institutions and government will most likely lead to a positive evaluation of European
integration. In contradiction, by examining public support towards EU institutions,
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) found that EU support is highest when citizens view EU
institutions positively and their national institutions poorly. This approach can be
viewed as a political costs and benefits analysis. If a national government seems to
perform negatively while the EU institutions meet a citizen's satisfaction, then the cost
of moving authority to the EU will not exceed the benefits. Kritzinger demonstrated
that support for the EU can be a symbolic protest against "the dominant values of the
nation-state" (Kritzinger 2003: 226). For Kritzinger, the concept of individual support
is based upon two approaches. The first is that individuals who have fewer ties to the
national political order have less commitment to politics of the nation-state and are
more likely to take chances with political forms at different levels (Kronhauser 1959).
The second is that those with stronger ties to the national political system have a greater
psychological limit that must be overcome before protesting against the national
political institutions (Rohrschneider 1990). Therefore a positive evaluation of the EU
and a negative evaluation of the political nation-state can occur simultaneously. In
addition, McLaren (2007) found that it is perceptions of EU institutions rather than
national institutions that can lead to euroskepticism, although perceptions of EU
institutions may be influenced by national institution perceptions.
Kritzinger (2003) statistically compared national government perceptions with attitudes
towards EU integration in four EU member-states: France, Germany, Italy and the
United Kingdom. In all four member-states negative perceptions of the national
-
government were associated with positive attitudes towards EU integration. When
evaluating the national economic factor however, France and the United Kingdom
showed higher support for EU integration in stronger economic conditions whereas
Germany and Italy showed negative support for EU integration (Kritzinger 2003).
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Although this factor appears to be an economic indicator it can in fact still be regarded
as a political indicator where the opinion can be seen as a sign of trust in economic
management. The French and British are more likely to trust their national governments
to manage the economy during periods of weak economic performance whereas
Germany and Italy are more likely to trust the EU. Therefore it can be argued that
"support for the EU depends strongly on the performance of the nation-state"
(Kritzinger 2003: 236).
Several studies have also examined the influence of political parties influencing
integration support (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren
1994; Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh 1995; Ray 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2002;
Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002; Ray 2003a; Dalton 2005; Gabel and Scheve 2007;
Hooghe 2007; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). Franklin, Marsh and
McLaren (1994) examined the influence of opposition parties affecting integration
support. They noted that opposition parties may be less enthusiastic about supporting
the government's position in a European referendum when mobilising against the
government gives the chance of an embarrassing defeat if the electorate chooses to take
the position of the opposition. Ray (2003b) tested the strength political parties and their
position on European integration have on influencing support for the European Union.
Ray found that political party support did have a statistically significant effect on
support of integration however this effect varies by individual. Issue importance and an
individual's attachment level to a party were shown to influence the strength of the
correlation between the party's and supporter's European position. Gabel and Scheve
(2007) found that intra-party dissent within a political party can lead to variation on
support of European integration amongst party supporters. This effect held true even in
highly pro-European parties. This perhaps suggests that party supporters do not
necessarily take cue from the overall party position but rather from particular party
elites. Through his analysis of party positions towards integration, Jolly (2007)
demonstrated that regional parties can be just as pro-European as the major parties thus
do not act like the "fringe" party family which some may consider them as. Further
-
analysis should be taken to investigate the regional party voter. This dissertation will
attempt to investigate if regional party supporters are as aligned with their party's
position towards integration as the major party supporters.
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The concept of socialisation has also contributed to the examination of public attitudes
towards European integration. The notion behind socialisation reflects upon the time of
entry an individual's country became a member-state of the EU. Individuals within
countries that have been member-states for a longer time period are more likely to have
become familiar with the conception of integration. The more time one has had to
evaluate the benefits of EU membership, the more likely he/she is to positively evaluate
European integration (Inglehart 1977). The effects of socialisation were tested by
Bosch and Newton (1995) in a temporal analysis where they found that for each
additional year an individual's country has been a member-state the likelihood of that
individual's support for the EU slightly increases. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996)
re-examined this effect by arguing that time of entry into the European Union reveals a
country's political history and enthusiasm for membership which overall influences
public attitudes towards integration. Their analysis focused on comparing levels of
public EU attitudes when grouping countries by era of becoming a member-state.
Public attitudes within the original six member-states displayed high levels of EU
support as these countries began the integration process while individuals within these
countries have had the longest amount of time to reflect on membership benefits.
Individuals within the countries which joined in the 1970s (Denmark, Ireland and the
UK) display lower levels of EU support as governments of these countries were more
reluctant to initially join the integration process. Individuals within those countries that
joined in the 1980s (Greece, Portugal and Spain) showed high levels of EU support as
membership represented democratic stability. In addition, Kaltenthaler and Anderson
(2001) found further evidence of the strength of socialisation with similar results when
applying their concept to support of the common currency.
Lastly, the influence of the media on public support for integration has also been
examined. Carey and Burton (2004) found through an investigation of the 2001 British
Election Study that the United Kingdom's highly biased media does influence British
public attitudes towards the European Union though much of this effect is conditional
on partisan preferences. Where an individual receives strong EU positional messages
from their media source and preferable political party, the effect was strongest. In
comparison the effect was partial on individuals receiving mixed messages from both
media source and party. Schuck and de Vreese (2006) examined the effects media
coverage has on public evaluations of EU enlargement in Germany. They found news
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coverage to be balanced in terms of risk and opportunities of enlargement and
furthermore that individuals were influenced by the positions of the news article they
read. This effect however was found to be modified by political knowledge, where
media influence was strongest on those individuals that were less knowledgeable.
Furthermore de Vreese and Boomgarden (2006) found that media sources need to be
consistent in both their tone and amount of coverage to influence public opinion. When
exposed to consistent positive or negative reports of enlargement, individuals are likely
to follow similar positions. When individuals are exposed to less frequent coverage
with mixed stances they are less likely to be influenced.
Domestic political explanations hold a convincing argument in rationalising public
support for integration however most theories fail to take regional politics into account.
With the gradual shift towards decentralisation in several member-states over the past
decade regional politics has greater reason to be included in the model for political
explanations of public support for integration. While domestic political explanations
may seem favourable to some, more recently scholars have moved to explore to a
deeper emotional analysis in cultural explanations.
Cultural Explanations of Public Opinion
The trend of cultural analysis in explaining public support for integration has seen an
incline in studies in recent years. While economic integration may seem favourable to
some it still does not affect one's deep or emotional commitment to his/her identity.
Moving from an economic based alliance to a more full-bodied union can prove
complicated to some through policies such as open borders. In some cases, identity can
prove to show more significance than economic factors in determining support for EU
integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004). For nationalists, "the nation is the sole criterion
for legitimate government and of political community" (Smith 1992: 61). In recent
decades a peak of nationalism can be seen in Europe through the rise of far-right
nationalist parties including Le Front National in France and the British National Party-
(BNP) in Britain. Nationalist parties, not all being far-right, have also played significant
roles within nation-states at the subnationallevel. Subnational parties have been created
within member-state regions to promote their cultural identity and seek further
autonomy within their region.
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European identity, or the lack of, is another issue scholars have examined in relation to
its influence on public support of integration. Some scholars write that the problem of
creating a common European identity is that Europe as a whole lacks key elements such
as a common language, symbols and political history that all citizens can identify with
(Milward 1992; Smith 1992). At the same time, nation-states themselves have a
collection of history and cultural links that citizens will more easily identify.
Nationalistic movements within member-states makes integration progression seem
bleak. Europeans will have to be able to recognise a dual-identity in order for
integration to continue. As Van Kersbergen (2000: 9) states "European integration
depends on a 'double allegiance', consisting of a primary allegiance to the nation-state
and its political elite and a secondary or derived allegiance to the EC or EU". Smith
(1992) writes on the concept of having dual loyalties. He divides the concept of
'identity' into two categories: the individual and the collective. Individual identity is
situational, depending upon the situation that the individual is being identified, for
example if one goes abroad (Okamura 1981). Collective identity is tied to the examples
of national and religious identity. They are "not subject to rapid changes and remain
durable even when large numbers of individuals no longer feel their power" (Smith
1992: 59-60). The collective identity seems to be the more persistent of the two. It is
the collective that most Europeans live amongst and the collective that is more likely to
influence one's ideologies. Marks (1999) however has written that it is possible for
some to have different identities at the same time, while Diez Medrano and Guttierez
(2001) demonstrate this idea in the example of a Catalonian feeling both Catalonian and
Spanish. This idea should theoretically be able to be carried over into a European
identity. Inglehart and Rabier (1980) add that individuals with higher levels of
cognitive and political mobilisation are more likely to express stronger levels of
European identity. These levels of stronger European identity remain consistent when
compared to national or regional identity.
Cinnirella (1997) completed a study to observe the relationship between national and
European identity. To do this he compared survey data taken by British and Italian
.
University students. Amongst the British students he found a negative correlation
between British and European identity. The more British one feels then the less like
he/she will express a European identity. British identity was also higher than European
.identity. Amongst the Italian students Cinnirella found a positive correlation between
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Italian and European Identity. In addition, Italian students were more likely to display a
dual identity than their British counterparts in expressing both Italian and European
identities.
Deflem and Pampel (1996) conducted a study using Eurobarometer surveys testing the
hypothesis of persistent national differences against socio-demographic factors, such as
occupation and income, and ideological factors, such as political ideology. They found
that national differences were more significant than socio-demographic and ideological
factors. In other terms, they believed that the differences in support for European
unification are created by the countries themselves. This study however does not
account for minority, regional or subnational identification that is suppressed by the
nation-state variables as a whole. Huici, et al (1997), used a self-developed
questionnaire to compare identifications with one's region, nation-state and Europe in
relation to European integration. The survey was distributed to students in Scotland and
Andalucia and concluded that only for Andalucian students was European identification
positively correlated with national (British or Spanish) identification although there was
no negative relationship for Scottish students. Although the survey does not represent
the regional populations as a whole it still demonstrates that EU support relating to
identification can vary in different regions of different member-states. The sample
population of university students can also lead to biased results given that Inglehart's
theory of cognitive mobilisation, further education being a large contributor to this,
leads to greater EU support.
Not many scholars have been able to conclude a negative link with national identity and
EU support on the individual level. MUnch (1996) wrote that European identity is being
created at the expense of national identity. MUnch also predicts that as integration
intensifies in the future, national identity will intensify as well. Carey (2002) however
was able to demonstrate a negative link using Eurobarometer survey data and testing a
three-level hypothesis model of national identity. The first hypothesis is the
measurement of intensity that one has to hislher nation. Here, the "stronger the bond
that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of
measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics" (2002: 391).
The second concept is the terminal community hypothesis (Peters 1991). The terminal
community is the highest level of governance that one will form hislher allegiance to.
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In the example of the Catalonian, he/she may find Catalonia, Spain or the European
Union as the terminal community. The individual will therefore consider a balance of
government authority depending on their notion of terminal community. As Carey
(2002: 392) states "people who believe in a shared European identity see the EU as the
terminal community and are more likely to recognise the authority of the EU to make
public policy". In contrast those that feel no European identity will regard either the
nation-state or the region as their terminal community, therefore more likely not
supporting EU integration.
The third concept is the cultural threat hypothesis. Much of this concept can be
attributed to McLaren's (2002) argument that EU opposition may also be related to the
fear and hostility of a perceived threat from other cultures. This can be demonstrated in
the rise of ultra-right wing political parties as mentioned above. While these parties
focus on a fascist-like ideology, other political parties in regions have been created to
preserve national identity from within the nation-state. While most are not
fundamentally like the ultra right-wing parties, these parties attempt to either
accomplish more self autonomy or preserve their identity, such an example would be
Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales). As Carey (2002) explains, those who fear "their
language being used less, or their national identity and culture becoming less distinct,
are expected to hold a more negative view of the European Union" (2002: 392).
Although more likely to contain regional factors than other models of explanation of
integration support, the majority of cultural/identity studies hold a nation-state bias.
Carey (2002) included in his study an examination of the sub-nations of the United
Kingdom. He finds that as English identity increases, support for integration decreases.
Conversely, as Scottish, Welsh and Irish identities increase, support for integration
increases as well. This demonstrates the complex nature of cultural explanations and
suggests that nation-states are not homogeneous in opinion.
Conclusion
This chapter has laid out various core models of explanation for public support of
European integration. I have demonstrated that like the European Union itself,
integration studies have evolved in order to adapt to the Union's changing nature. In the
initial years of the Union's existence, primarily from the 1950s through the early 1970s,
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integration analyses followed the permissive consensus. As the public began to take a
greater role in the integration process, studies began to include perceptions of the
general public. However, as mentioned throughout the chapter, the consideration of
regional variation in European integration public opinion is rarely taken into account.
Many of the themes already investigated on European public opinion can be examined
keepingthe regional context in mind. This can be demonstrated for example through
regional considerations of both objective and subjective economic indicators. Regional
disparities of wealth and employment may have a considerable effect on an individual's
evaluation of integration. Furthermore, an individual's evaluation of the economy may
not necessarily be reflective of the nation-state as a whole. It is possible that an
individual assesses these evaluations within the closer contextual surrounding in which
he/she lives. These regional evaluations of the subjective economy may then be used to
interpret the costs and benefits of European integration. Regional contextual
considerations can also be expanded towards political and cultural indicators. Each of
these themes will be investigated further in the dissertation.
This literature review has brought us one step closer to understanding why individuals
mayor may not support the European Union. While the literature provides a great
foundation to understanding the research question further analysis can be made
accounting for the multi leveled structure in which European citizens live. Over the past
decades, several of the European Union's member-states are becoming increasingly
decentralised. In addition, regional elites are promoting this progression through what
Michael Keating (1998) calls new 'regionalism. A multileveled system of governance is
extending through the EU member-states allowing for regions to not only gain
competences of self-government but take part in the European integration process as
well. Do the public and elites of these regions attempting to gain autonomy view the
European Union as a friend or foe to their cause? The following chapter will outline the
fundamentals of both new regionalism and multilevel governance.
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Chapter 3
Looking Beyond the Nation-State: Regional
Mobilisation within the European Union
Introduction
The previous chapter observed how, and to what extent, public attitudes have been
examined within the research of European integration. I demonstrated that as the
European Union evolved from an elitist project to incorporating the public the
methodology of integration studies also evolved. Moreover, the primary variables
chosen to explain public support changed as the Union integrated further. Most
researchers however maintained their level of analysis at either the individual or
national aggregated level, neglecting what perhaps can be seen as Europe's other great
phenomenon, the rise in political mobilisation of the 'third-level' (the region).
While Europe has been slowly integrating over the past 50 years, numerous regions
within member-states have mobilised for greater autonomy. Michael Keating (1998)
labels the most recent of these trends new regionalism, where regional mobilisation, the
process in which regional demands are made for further autonomy, began in the late
1960s and 1970s but fully realised in the 1990s with the escalating amount of
decentralisation taking place in many EU member-states. It is the regional reaction to
modernity and globalisation, where regions are confronting the international market as
the role of the state is alleviated by the first-level of the EU (Keating 1997; 1998).
While previous regional movements in the centuries prior demanded full independence
from the state, the modern regional mobilisation of the latter half of the 20th century
aims for greater autonomy without separation acknowledging that the nation-state is still
important in performing certain economic and political functions that protect and foster'
their particular regional societies (Tierney 2005: 171). Furthermore decentralisation
throughout the EU member-states has been an asymmetrical process. Whether it is
devolution in the United Kingdom in Scotland and Wales or the creation of autonomous
communities in Spain, there is no systematic procedure of decentralisation within
Europe thus creating uneven powers of autonomy from region to region.
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This chapter will concentrate on the significance of subnational movements of
autonomy and the creation of a multilevel system of governance in the European Union.
Itwill begin with an historical look at the waves of regional mobilisation from the post-
war era to the most current wave of new regionalism in the 1990s. It will examine the
concept of the region through such aspects of territory and identity. Furthermore this
chapter will address the multilevel structure of governance created within the EU and its
effects on expanding regional participation in policy making at both the European and
national levels. This chapter will provide a clearer understanding of the significance of
subnational regions in modem political life and how this may ultimately contribute to
public evaluations of European integration.
The Contemporary Progression of Regionalism
Issues of regionalism and subnational pursuits for higher levels of autonomy have
occurred since the creation of the nation-state system with the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648. The centuries thereafter were witness to the long process of European states
attempting to realign their boundaries in a more advantageous form, whether it was with
regions of common culture or similar economies in adjacent territories. By the late 19th
century, as the nation-state became more centralised, Europe faced a significant surge in
the number of subnational regions attempting to regain the autonomy they once
possessed. These movements were largely politically mobilised on the basis of
language and culture where many of the European nation-states found themselves
relinquishing minimal amounts of autonomy for appeasement. After the First World
War a second wave of regionalism took place mainly in Eastern and Central Europe as
old empires began to collapse and former subnations were seeking to find their
terr~torial space within the new European system. The occupation of Nazi Germany and
the outbreak of the Second World War however allowed little advancement for these
regionalist movements. By the end of the Second World War Europe found itself once
again trying to rebuild itself from the ashes of devastation.
The destruction of Europe as a result of the war left the European governments in a state
of despair as they sought out methods of rebuilding. The central state would be required
to playa larger role than previously in managing the restoration of its territory. The
state took responsibility in directing and planning the course of public and private
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investment from the economically sound regions to the poorer and more
underdeveloped regions (Keating 2001: 217). Keating (2001) goes further into
describing that following World War II, the governments of Western Europe's policies
were aimed at exploiting the under-utilised resources of the poorer and declining
regions by integrating them into the national economic, social and political systems.
Celia Applegate (1999) illustrates how modernization theory dominated the historical
discourse in explaining the disappearance of regions after the Second World War in
three realms, economics, politics and culture. Regions were doomed to disappear as
they became engaged into nationally based markets and regulated by the central-state
and became homogenised from the effects of labour and capital mobility. National
political institutions grasped more control of territorial divisions in the nation-state
where national parties would gain more influence. A collective culture was also born
through a common language and educational and artistic institutions creating a national
culture thus giving a rise to nationalism of the nation-state (Applegate 1999: 1163).
The post-war modernisation policies of the Western European states were impassive in
regards to territorial politics. The aim was to create an economically vibrant state
throughout the national territory even if it requires disregarding the political and social
objectives of its subnations. This consequently generated greater resentment on behalf
of the subnational territories fostering them to convey their demands within the context
of a territorial framework (Keating 1998; 2001). The late 1960s and 1970s saw rise to
cultural revivals of many regions and minority nationalities in Western Europe, similar
to those experienced in the late 19th century. The origins of this next wave of
regionalism are complex but a common theory derives that it was initiated by several
groups of the educated youth rejecting the newly formed mass commercial culture and
"cultural imperialism" of the United States. This in tum can cause strong links to
rediscovering a community based on political organisation against the imperialistic
centralised government with regional languages and culture seen as the centrepiece
(Keating 1988: 170-171). Moving from the cultural to the political however proved
more difficult as attempting to establish strong regional governance lead to an
imbalance of regional autonomy across Western Europe. The central governments did
concede a limited amount of autonomy notably in Belgium and Spain (post-Franco) and
to a lesser extent in France and Italy. While these regionalist movements did achieve a
limited amount of autonomy they failed to establish a strong base for mobilisation as
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much of the regionalist themes were being employed by the social democratic left,
particularly in Italy (Keating 2001). By the 1980s, as decentralisation slowed down,
regional governance across Western Europe differed accordingly to the institutional and
cultural attributes of each state. By the 1990s the European circumstances would alter
incredibly due to the ongoing steps of integration. The Single European Act (SEA) and
Treaty on European Union (TEU) facilitated incredible changes to the dynamics of the
market and state. In response to these radical changes a new wave of regionalism would
emerge reflecting this new European circumstance.
The New Regionalism
Recent decades have presented yet another challenge to the states and subnations of
Europe in globalisation. The confrontation of globalisation tends to imply the decline in
significance of borders and territory, where even the foresight of a borderless global
economy can exist (Ohmae 1995). Multinational corporations, rather than the state, are
seen as playing the fundamental role in the globalised world, dictating the direction of
capital with minor limitations of borders and territory. Anderson and O'Dowd (1999)
label this thesis as the "strong" version of globalisation demonstrating that it places its
primary emphasis on economics and technology and secondary emphasis on culture.
"Weak" versions of globalisation incorporate "inter-nationalisation" where state
governments still maintain a pivotal role in internationalised governance and the
direction of the markets (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999: 599). By the late 1980s with the
SEA in place, Europe was taking a large step towards a borderless Europe while
creating a stronger supranational government, demonstrating elements of both strong
and weak globalisation. The social and economic definition of territory was once again
changing not just within the framework of the state but from the context of the
European Union level as well.
The new wave of regionalism, which had been inaugurated by this time, could no longer
be contained by the state through minimal decentralisation as it was in the past. ..
Globalisation, with the single European market, diluted state government abilities to
manage their spatial economies. The state is losing its ability to control investors in
investing in a preferred developing region. If the Transnational corporation finds the
available region for investment unfavourable, they now have the ability to leave the
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country altogether for a more favourable region (Keating 2001: 217). The state is losing
power and authority from three directions. As Keating (1998: 73) summarises:
[First] from above by internationalization; [second] from below by regional
and local assertion; and latterly by the advance of the market and civil
society, eroding its capacities in economic management, in social solidarity,
in culture and identity formation, as well as its institutional configurations.
This has produced a new regionalism marked by two linked features: it is
not contained within the framework of the nation-state; and it pits regions
against each other in a competitive mode, rather than providing
complementary roles for them in a national division of labour.
It is important to stress that the state is not becoming irrelevant in new regionalism but
merely losing its monopoly on managing the functional space within its territory. The
state continues to perform important political and economical duties which subnational
movements of new regionalism acknowledge (Tierney 2005: 171). This is what
distinguishes subnational movements of new regionalism from regionalism of the past.
The new environment introduced by the European Union is creating a new role for
subnational actors In administering development and modernisation within their
territories, as well as beyond the nation-state, which does not necessarily include
separation from the nation-state. As Schmitt-Egner (2002: 188) defines it, "new
regionalism pursues a range of policy changes (e.g., increased decentralisation,
federalism) to enhance the autonomy and stature of the region without destabilising the
state". The new regional element is not to challenge the state's power but rather exploit
the new global and European situation by redistributing the state's managerial abilities
from within. While independence movements do exist in several regions,· public
opinion within these regions tends to veer towards enhanced autonomy and
representation within the state over secession (Tierney 2005: 172-176). This reasoning
enhances the significance of the central state. As Tierney (2005: 177) adds, even if
secession was possible, it would be essential to maintain good relations with the larger
state due to its previous economic and social association with the region. Furthermore
historical ties of identity and loyalty may exist between state and region.
Recent examples of decentralisation in new regionalism include the Scottish parliament
and Welsh Assembly in the United Kingdom as well as higher degrees of autonomy
granted to the regional governments of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country in
. Spain. In these few examples policy is increasingly taking shape within the framework
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of the subnational territory. Defining the functional territory in which this shift in
power takes place is a crucial task in new regionalism. As Keating (1998) notes, the
elements of new and old regionalism still coexist. While the state's power is being
redistributed within, as a reaction to the new global and European markets, elements of
subnationalism, similar to those in the late 19th century as well as the late 1960s and
70s, help circumscribe the regional territory. The above mentioned examples each
contain 11 subnational culture that assists in defining the regional territory for not only
those within the region, but for those outside it. Furthermore, although these particular
subnational movements may have roots in an ethnic culture, ethnicity is not what
altogether defines culture. The following will define what is meant by region through
the creation of identity within a territorial space.
Defining the Region within the New Regionalism
Defining the region is a complex process of confining territorial space and political
components into a single meaning. The obvious starting element is the concept of
territorial space. In Keating's (1998: 79) words, "a region is constituted from a
territory, whose significance is given by its functional and political content. It is also an
institutional system, in the form of a regional government, or a set of administrative
institutions operating in the territory". Furthermore, this territorial space is shaped by
the patterns of political meaning fostered by regional mobilisation and the functions that
the region is to perform (Keating 1998: 80). More than simply a physical territory, the
region is established by institutions providing specific functions over a given territory, a
functional space. The size of this functional space is still ambiguous however. There is
no distinction from an urban locality, such as a city like Barcelona, and a larger regional
community, such as Catalonia.
Peter Schmitt-Egner (2002: 181-182) defines region accounting for the size of a
functional space. As he explains, a region is "a spatial partial unit of medium size and
intermediary character whose material substratum is based on territory". Furthermore-
Schmitt-Egner carefully explains the components of the definition. Space signifies that
it is a determined physical territory defining its inner and outer boundaries. It is
described as medium-sized, indicating that units exist that are larger and smaller. Lastly,
function describes that the region serves an intermediary between the larger and smaller
units. Subsequently, Schmitt-Egner (2002: 182), explains that this territory is beyond
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the notion of space. It is dependent on time and the people that occupy it through
political and social interactions, thus it is a historical conception that separates it from
simply being space-oriented. In addition Paasi (1991) explains that regions are first
formed out of territorial space however once there is a regional consortium within the
territory that has the political motivation to create institutions, symbols take form to fuse
its members. Subsequently a creation of a regional culture develops assisting in
creatinga recognisable identity of those within the region's borders.
Identity plays a crucial role in the construction of the region. Karl Deutsch (1953)
explained that identities are created within a given territory through common culture
and experiences that are reflective of the social and economic contact amongst
individuals within its society. It defines the individuals who are a part of the society to
those who are excluded. Regional identities are not pre-given phenomena but rather
evolve in relation to patterns of social-economic development. This identity can be
developed through cultural and political institutions, social mobilisation and the
progression of governance (Painter 2002). Anderson (1983) argues that community
identity is an illusion created by human imagination. Most community members,
whether in a community the size of a small town or that of a large country, never have
full social communication with each member. Therefore, an imagined identity is
created to enable a social or political association of the community as a whole. In the
minds of each member is an imagined community which one identifies with.
Furthermore, Anderson argues, communities are distinct not by the accuracy of this
imagined identity, but by the style in which it is imagined.
Identity arguably can be categorised within two definitions, cultural identity and civic
identity. Michael Bruter (2005) examined the concept of an evolving European identity.
Although his examination was restricted to identity creation at the European level,
several similarities can be observed to the creation of identity at the regional level.
Through the analysis of survey data Bruter claimed that Europeans are identifying with
the concept of a mass European civic identity more so than that of a cultural identity.
This can be seen as a result of the cultural barriers that exist between the nation-states
that make up the European Union. For Bruter (2005: 12), cultural identity is "the sense
of belonging an individual feels towards a particular political group". In contrast, civic
. identity is "the identification of citizens with a political structure, such as a State, which
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can be defined as the set of institutions, rights and rules that preside over the political
life of the community".
Language, religion and ethnicity are each common forms of an ethos that helps
distinguish a cultural identity within a community. As noted earlier, a majority of
subnational movements in the late 19th century based their mobilisation on cultural
identities such as these. By the late 1960s and 1970s, with the beginning of
decentralisation, these cultural identities were revived as a politically mobilised group
able to exploit the new functions of policy making at the regional level. While ethnicity
is mentioned as a component of cultural identity, it is dangerous to build an identity
purely on ethnicity. As Keating (1997) notes a purely ethnic identity has the potential to
prevent social cooperation and solidarity. It prevents social integration of individuals
who are not part of the ethnicity yet live within the region. A cultural identity however
allows minority individuals within the region, as well as those who immigrate into the
region, to assimilate into the culture. An example can be seen in the case of Catalonia
and the Catalan language. While Castilian is the official language of Spain, and Catalan
is a high-status language, students in Catalonia are required to have knowledge of both
Castilian and Catalan. This is to allow the inclusiveness of the large number of
Southern Spaniards who have immigrated to the region while Catalonians are still able
to function with their own language (Keating 1997). Schrijver (2004) sites the case of
Wales when demonstrating how culture may not necessarily define a region's territory
until after regionalism. Cultural identity in Wales is vastly split between those who use
Welsh as their primary language in the North and those who speak only English in the
South. Welsh regionalism however encouraged the inclusion of Welsh symbols for
inhabitants to identify with, including road signs in both Welsh and English, in addition
to the regional political party Plaid Cymru.
Giving the region functional power fosters priorities to be set. It allows a political role
in which the region is part of the political process contributing to the formation of
policy from its own regional viewpoint (Keating 1998: 82). The creation of institutions
to influence policy fosters a civic identity. Through examining the autonomous
communities of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, Martinez-Herrera (2002)
demonstrates that through the process of decentralisation and regional state building,
citizens are identifying more with their respective region than previous years. This
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indicates that decentralisation and the creation of regional institutions do foster a
political identity with the region. Furthermore, this does not necessarily imply an
identity rejection of the central-state as it still performs essential functions that the
regions rely on. In tum it is possible that a multi-political identity may be created with
both the central and regional states. Gary Marks (1999: 85) argues that regional
attachment can be measured by the patterns of institutional competencies that exist
within the subnational regions. Higher levels of regional attachment are noticeable in
nation-states that have a more federal-like system in regards to its regions. However,
higher levels of national attachment were measured in nation-states that have a more
unitary structure. This demonstrates that civic identity can correlate with identifying
with the region.
When carrying out a quantitative analysis on public opinion it is difficult to bring all the
above pieces of what makes a region into creating a unit of analysis. Therefore, I must
first simply define the region on grounds of a more territorial aspect then examine the
effects of the above mentioned definitions such as identity to see how they relate to
supporting the European integration process. To do this, I build my definition on the
work of Pieter Van Houten (2003) as simply the administrative territory below that of
the nation-state. As I explained in Chapter 1, such a simple definition can still remain
complex. The example within the United Kingdom is noted where England is broken
into nine regions which have no elected body of government, with the exception of
Greater London, but are done purely for administrative purposes. As the European
Commission recognises these as regions I will also do so. Therefore, the definition of
"administrative region" is very important in that the territory does not necessarily
require an elected assembly of government. Subnational actors however can still exist
and in all regions can play a vital role in the multilevel governance structure of the
-European Union.
The Region and Multilevel Governance in Europe
Hooghe and Marks (2001) argue that national governments no longer monopolise EU-
level policy. Therefore a new 'multilevel' model of governance may be a better
alternative to view the decision making process which includes three characteristics.
First, the decision making powers are shared by several actors at different levels of
'governance rather than at the national level. For example while national governments
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still do remain as actors, the Commission, Council of Ministers and European Court of
Justice act as independent supranational institutions. Second, collective decision
making amongst states looses a significant amount of control for individual national
governments where most decisions are a zero-sum character. Third, the multilevel
governance model rejects the belief that subnational actors are nested within national
arenas exclusively. Rather, subnational actors operate in both national and
supranational arenas thus creating trans-national associations (Hooghe and Marks 2001:
3-4).
Multilevel governance has been classified into two categories by Hooghe and Marks
(2003; 2004), Types I and II. Type I multilevel governance is based on the foundations
of federalism, where power sharing amongst governments is operated at only a few
levels and is primarily concerned with the relationship between the central-government
and the non-intersecting tiers of government either below or above it. The unit of
analysis within Type I multilevel governance is the individual government rather than
individual policy. More specifically Type I jurisdictions are highlighted by non-
intersecting memberships which are typically territorial units such as the nation-state,
region or locality. In Type II multilevel governance jurisdictions are not limited to a
few levels but rather can operate across levels as they are not territorial specific.
Jurisdictions are task specific focusing on the policy rather than government. Actors
can be both public and private and can collaborate or compete in multiple policy making
arenas (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 17-22). This dissertation will be primarily concerned
with the role Type I multilevel governance has on public perceptions of European
integration. This is not to undermine the importance Type II multilevel governance has
on policy making but derives from the concept of new regionalism where regional
actors have called for further autonomy in regional governance. This research
concentrates on the public's recognition of the decentralisation process and how they
correlate this with the European integration process. Type I multilevel governance
deals specifically with territorial units which can foster identification with the region.
Although Type II multilevel governance may deal with regional issues, its complex
nature may not advance the public's identification with the region as strongly as Type I.
Stephen George (George 2004: 115) explains that multilevel governance is
.distinguished once national governments surrender authority to supranational agents
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which in tum shifts the governmental balance of resources. This inevitably affects
subnational actors as they may find their resources they once used to gain autonomy
from the central-state have dissolved. George goes on to explain that subnational
actors will amend this balance through a number of strategies demonstrated by Hooghe
and Marks (Hooghe and Marks 2001). These entail taking a more direct participatory
role in EU policy making including, setting up their own offices in Brussels, forming
direct links with Commission officials, participating in the Committee of the Regions
and demanding formal channels of access to representatives within the EU. These
responses thus create a dynamic that pulls authority away from the central-state (George
2004). In this depiction of multilevel governance the European Union encourages a top-
down approach by creating channels of access to regional actors. Charlie Jeffery (2000)
however criticises the top-down model of multilevel governance within the European
policy arena. Jeffery explains that the multilevel model may not be as much of a top-
down flow of Europeanisation as explained above. Through the example of Germany,
Jeffery describes how the German Lander have been at the forefront of influencing
German European policy. The Lander have taken into consideration that European
policy lays within the domestic sphere of policy rather than the international sphere.
Furthermore in accordance with Rhodes (1997) the increase of decentralisation within
European member-states increases the role subnational actors will play in the national
arena in influencing European policy.
In both explanations of top-down and bottom-up multilevel governance subnational
actors have gained significance in the policy making process. Sutcliffe (2002)
examined the role subnational actors in Scotland played in influencing European
structural funding in two periods. The first was in the mid-1990s when several Scottish
regions were under Objective 1 status and the second from 2000-2006 when the regions
were in a transitional status coming out of Objective 1 status. I He found that
subnational actors were involved in the decision making process of receiving structural
funding though they had only marginal participation. Sutcliffe however found that
where Scottish subnational actors had a greater role was in the process of
implementation of the policy created. This example shows though still limited in the
,I Objective 1 regions are those within the European Union most in need of EU regional policy and are
generally recipients of EU structural funding. To qualify for objective 1 status the regional GDP per
capita must be below 75% of the EU average.
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policy making process subnational actors have a significant function in the multilevel
governance system.
Implementation of regional policy may have a significant role in the public's evaluation
of European integration. It is the point at which the public can witness on first hand
account the benefits of which the European Union may provide for them and their
region ." Multilevel governance has created a unique position for regional actors.
Conceivably as the public takes note of the role their regional actors are playing in the
European integration process and their ability to bring benefits to the region, the
regional public may be more inclined to support the integration process. Regional
political parties are one of the primary beneficiaries from multilevel governance where
they have found new resources within Europe and the multileveled system of
governance to influence policy. The European integration process has been recognised
by some regional nationalists as an alternative to secession (Llamazares and Marks
2006). Regional political parties can use the multilevel system to strengthen political
influence and promote themselves to the regional public.
Regional Political Parties
Political parties can be a strong factor influencing public opinion towards European
integration (Ray 2003b;' Hooghe 2007; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). This
is understandable as the intergovernmental nature of the integration process is
controlled by the opinions of political parties that make up the national governments.
Therefore the integration issue is often used as a political debate within member-states
between parties of the government and parties of the opposition. The dynamics of
regional parties however take their own unique place in the integration process.
Traditionally opposed to a united Europe, regional parties often resented the concept of
a third-tier of governance. This is hardly surprising as regional parties are normally
founded upon the concept of granting more autonomy, or independence, to the region."
The idea of supporting an additional level of government can be seen as
counterproductive to the party cause. This was the mainstream viewpoint of most
regional parties through the 1970s. By the mid-1980s however many regional parties
began to change their position on Europe. The EU became realised as a means to
promote self autonomy for many regional party actors. European integration
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transformed from a negative notion into a recognition that the EU and multilevel
governance could benefit the region both economically and culturally while
simultaneously moving policy making powers away from that of the nation-state
(Keating 1998: 163).
The development of multilevel governance explained above has allowed regional actors
to playa vital role in the European policy arena. The most prominent area of European-
regional cooperation lies within the process of implementation in which the European
Commission relies heavily on regional actors (Keating 1998). This interplay of
multilevel governance allows for regional actors to present their interests to Europe and
the region as well as taking credit for bringing EU subsidies to help economic
development of the regions (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002). The European Union
also provides an additional election battle ground for regional parties to compete as well
as additional resources provided to the parties assisting their domestic and regional
capabilities (Lynch 1996). Decentralisation however holds its limits on regional
political parties. Jolly (2007: 24) found that regional political parties were less likely to
compete in the more highly decentralised regions. Here, beyond a certain threshold of
decentralisation, the nation-state may actually meet the demands of autonomy-oriented
regional citizens. Regional parties are strongest where ground is still yet to be gained in
terms autonomy. Within these regions, regional political parties are likely to promote
European integration as advantageous for the region. Regional political parties
therefore may playa highly instrumental role in determining public EU support.
Regional political parties are shown to be one of the largest beneficiaries from European
integration. The European Union and multilevel governance have transformed the
politic,al stage on which regional parties participate. Convincing the regional public to
support the development of European integration has now become a crucial strategy to
assure the party's endurance and polices are met. In addition, different parties seek
different stances on the regional position in Europe. Some seek full independence,
some a more federal-system within the nation-state, while others seek to simply protect
their regional institutional rights as in the German Lander (Keating 1998). This
variation between regional political parties can perhaps create variation in support levels
amongst the European regional public.
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Conclusion
This chapter has described the dynamic change in the nature of the European policy
making structure over the past few decades. Both the European Union and new
regionalism have created a significant challenge to the traditional supremacy of the
nation-state. New regionalism describes the challenges regions are facing in the new
globalised and competitive world. Economic and political needs can vary greatly within
a country by region. Additionally, in order to remain competitive in the globalised
world policy decisions are more widely becoming made by actors at the level closest to
understanding the needs of the region. In many regions elites are requesting additional
autonomy as the answer to this challenge. The European Union also helps foster this
notion through the enhancement of the multilevel governance structure.
New regionalism has developed on the recognition of variation between regions. Each
region may have a different economy, employment situation, cultural history, historical
language, etc. All these variables can contribute to predicting levels of regional
autonomy demands (Van Houten 2003). Although the variation in these factors may
lead to certain levels of regional assertiveness it may also be likely that each region will
view the European Union differently. Some regions where unemployment may be
higher when compared to the rest of the nation may see it as a means of increasing
labour production where the central-state has failed. Cultural minority regions may see
Europe as a means of protecting their identity which is constantly pitted against the
majority culture of the nation-state.
Multilevel governance has created a unique situation for both the elites and the public
within Europe's subnational regions. Regional elites are gaining more access to the
policy.making arena. The European Union provides them with new channels in which
they can partake at the European level of decision making in addition to gaining greater
influence on national positions on Europe. This increase in participation may be seen as
fostering regional demands for greater autonomy from the nation-state causing an
increase in decentralisation throughout the EU. New regionalism and multilevel
governance are facilitating a new recognition of the regional level in politics, economy
and identity.
As these changes occur within the multilevel composition of the European Union
limited research has been made to account for regional variations of public attitudes
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towards European integration. Most investigations into regional public attitudes
towards the European Union have been conducted on a case study basis within only a
few countries. Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) however attempted to include the
regional level within their Elf-wide investigation of Euroskepticism using a multilevel
model. They found that although the variation at the regional level was limited, it still
contributed to a better overall model fit into explaining Euroskepticism. For Lubbers
and Scheepers the region was only used as a level of analysis included in the multilevel
model. They did not attempt to explain regional variation but only accounted for it
within their model.
Individuals may no longer be usmg the contexts of their country as a means of
evaluating the European Union but looking upon the costs and benefits of integration at
a level much closer to them. New regionalism can bestow the public recognition of
regional distinctiveness in terms of politics, economic differences and identity.
Multilevel governance can demonstrate the significance the region plays in politics and
authority as well as increasing the role of regional political parties in modem political
times. The transformation of regional politics occurring within the European Union
provides an incentive to explore regional variations of public attitudes towards
integration. This dissertation will attempt to explore the concepts presented in this
chapter and their impact on public evaluations of European integration.
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Chapter 4
Approaching the Public: Exploring Data and
Methodologies
Introduction
Choice of methodology can be the most imperative for any researcher. The strength of
one's conclusions rests on whether the best methodological tools for analysis were
applied. In this chapter I intend to explain my methodological choices and defend the
case that I have chosen the best possible methods for exploring my questions of public
support of European integration at the regional level. As will be explained, the selected
methodology for my research is quantitative based, using large datasets exploring both
the opinions of the European public as well as surveys designed to capture the positions
of regional political parties.
The analytical chapters of this dissertation each vary in terms of the statistical method
used to explore the research questions at the subnational level. Due to this variance, the
research may also be viewed as an exploration of various statistical methods
contributing to public opinion research. This chapter is divided into three main
sections. I begin by reintroducing the research and explain why quantitative methods
were chosen over other qualitative approaches. I then go on to describe the different
datasets used including Eurobarometer and the British Election Study. Thereafter, I will
give a brief description of the chosen statistical methods, such as logistic regression and
- '
multilevel modelling, and briefly explain how each is utilised in the dissertation.
Qualitative vs. Quantitative Methods and Data
This research asks the question if public opinion towards European integration varies as
much within countries as it does amongst them. I use the region as the subnational
territorial unit below that of the nation-state and attempt to produce a broader
generalisation on the dynamics of regional public opinion towards integration
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throughout the European Union. I In addition I attempt to gain a better understanding of
public opinion where regional assertiveness towards further subnational autonomy
exists. Selecting the proper methodology to make these conclusions takes careful
deliberation of both the questions being asked and the data available. In simple terms,
data can frequently be grouped into the two categories of qualitative and quantitative.
As noted in Chapter 2, public opinion research in politics is a rather new area of
research conceivably becoming most reputable from the late 1960s through the works of
David Easton (1965) and Ronald Inglehart (1970b; 1970a; 1971; 1977). The timing of
the development of public opinion research and its evolution thereafter came when the
advancement of statistical methods was reaching new heights. Statistical methodology
allowed the examination of more observations through the use of survey data thus better
enabled researchers to make wider generalisations of a larger public. Furthermore,
advancements in data collection allowed for the possibility to gather larger and more
accurate population samples.
Chapter 2 highlighted that the vast majority of EU public OpInIOn research is
quantitative based. There are however instances where qualitative methodologies have
been used to gain insights into the public's support of European integration. Menendez-
Alarcon (2000) examined Spanish interpretations of the integration process through the
extensive use of individual interviews concluding that the EU has not surpassed the
importance of the nation-state in Spanish opinion. Diez-Medrano (2003) combined the
use of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies in his research analysing EU
public opinion in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Diez-Medrano primarily
used qualitative data such as interviews and analyses of prominent newspapers to
capture .media interpretations. While qualitative in nature, he presented several of his
. data findings in quantitative form. In addition to qualitative sources Diez-Medrano also
presented additional statistical findings from the Eurobarometer survey within the
respective countries of research.
I While a study of all 27 EU member-states was considered, I have decided to limit this research to the
original EUIS. The historical context of the new member states is extremely different both in terms of
regional mobilisation and Europeanisation. This variation, when compared to the original 15, may
produce an abundance of unique conclusions that warrants' a separate continuation of this dissertation
research. ..
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The above examples of EU public opinion research are fruitful in their conclusions and
contribute to the overall discipline. However they display one shortcoming from the use
of these data. Menendez-Alarcon (2000) and Diez-Medrano (2003) were limited to the
number of case studies examined in order to remain practical. While qualitative
methods have demonstrated their usefulness in explaining opinion in Spain in addition
to Germany and the United Kingdom, a wider generalisation cannot be made about the
dynamics of the general European public. Surveys conducted European wide such as
Eurobarometer have given researchers the ability to draw conclusions on the European
Union public as a whole. Qualitative and quantitative methods have both strengths and
weaknesses. The research question at task and the population to be investigated are the
starting points when making the decision on methodological approaches.
Ihave chosen to use quantitative methods for the research within this dissertation. An
argument can be made for a qualitative aspect within the data used for this analysis.
Each survey can be considered to be a quasi-interview where a respondent is asked a
series of questions relating to his/her opinion on a range of topics. This qualitative
element however cannot be expanded as the respondent is not often given the
opportunity to elaborate on his/her opinions in order to maintain a standardised set of
responses for comparison across a larger sample population. At this point the
quantification of the responses becomes more vital allowing for the observation of
opinion trends across a given population.
There are several sample populations that I intend to work with to get a better
understanding of regional public opinion. Chapter 5 analyses the effects of regional
party politics within the EU15. Chapter 6 investigates the dynamics of regional political
and economic evaluations amongst the EU15. In Chapter 7, the sample population is
. restricted to member-states which contain elements of regionalism so to not dilute the
effects in which regional assertion may have upon public EU support/ Finally Chapter
8 deals with an individual case study and deeper analysis of regional public opinion
towards integration within the United Kingdom. Given the size of the sample
populations analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 qualitative data and methods would be
slightly more problematic when making conclusions for larger population sizes.
Chapter 8 is potentially the only chapter within this dissertation in which qualitative
2 These countries are Belgium, France, Germany, italy, Spain and United Kingdom. More detail on the
selection of these countries is explained in Chapter 7.
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methods and data would be practical in addition to the quantitative analysis of survey
data. Focus groups and/or interviews of members of the public and party elites may
give further insight to the dynamics of regionalised British public attitudes towards the
EU. I however believe that I have found adequate and sufficient data in the British
Election Study which captures an accurate image of British public opinion thus
qualitative methods for this section of my research will not be necessary.
Selecting the Appropriate Datasets
Creating or searching for the best datasets for any quantitative based research can be a
long and complicated process. In some instances it may be practical for the researcher
to conduct his/her own survey thus containing questions specific to the research of
interest. Self-conducted questionnaires however are noticeably easier to carry out when
dealing with smaller sample populations. When dealing with larger populations, such as
the European Union, researchers will less likely have the financial means and time to be
able to carry out a large survey. Fortunately a number of large surveys produced by
European research organisations exist to help alleviate the difficulties of carrying out
such a large task. The largest shortcoming however analysing large surveys is that the
researcher may discover it difficult to find specific questions relating to his/her topic of
interest. The perfect survey rarely exists and as a consequence the researcher must seek
out the survey which best works in accordance with the population and questions to be
analysed. In this dissertation I use surveys to observe the opinions of two population
types. First and most important are the surveys relating to the opinions of the public.
Second, I use surveys relating to political party positions on integration.
Observing the Regional Public
. There are three principal sample populations that will be analysed in this research. First
is the overall population of the EU15, second the population of six countries where
regional assertiveness exists and third the population of the United Kingdom. The basic
criteria of which I selected the chosen surveys are as follows:
• Inclusion of question(s) measuring support for the European Union and/or
European integration'
3 The most critical question(s) from the survey which wiil act as the dependent variable within the
analysis. .
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• Survey accounts for proper subnational territorial units
• Inclusion of additional questions measuring several explanatory variables"
After reviewing the European Values Study (EVS), the European Social Survey (ESS),
the European Election Study (EES) and Eurobarometer, it was determined that
Eurobarometer best matched the above criteria thus was the best survey to represent the
opinions of the European public in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Eurobarometer is a series of surveys first launched in 1973 on behalf of the European
Commission initially led and administered by Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-Rene
Rabier. All survey results are published by the Public Opinion Analysis Sector of the
Commission. Eurobarometer contributes to two types of surveys, the Flash and
Standard surveys. The Flash survey is ad hoc and is conducted upon request of the EU
institutions and typically targeted at specific populations on specific topics. The
Standard Eurobarometer is conducted biannually in the autumn and spring of each year.
The Standard Eurobarometer allows for observing trend dynamics by the inclusion of
reoccurring themes such as opinions towards integration, identity and economic
evaluations over the course of time. In addition, Eurobarometer also produced the
Mannheim Trend File, a single file combining each of the most important trend
questions of the surveys conducted between 1970 and 2002.5
The sampling method for Eurobarometer is based on a multistage random probability.
First primary sampling points (PSU) are selected from a stratification of distribution of
the national resident population in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. These
PSUs are proportional to the national population size as well as population density and
are selected from each administrative region within the country. Next, a cluster of
addresses are selected at random from each PSU. All interviews are conducted
identically and face-to-face in the respondent's horne." In this dissertation the
Mannheim Trend File and Eurobarometer 63.4, conducted in the spring of 2005, will be ..
4 These variables include measurements of democratic satisfaction, economic evaluations, national /
regional identities, etc. The explanatory variables will be explained in more depth per chapter.
S All public opinion survey data including Eurobarometer and the British Election Study were obtained
online from the UK Data Archive at www.data-archive.ac.uk.
6 For more details on Eurobarometer and the sampling procedure please see
www.gesis.org/en!data~service/eurobarometer/standard_eb/fieldwork.htm
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the two leading surveys of which the data for cross-national European public opinion
will be derived.
The harmonisation of the Eurobarometer survey questions allows for a cross-national
comparison of regional attitudes towards European integration and the large sample size
understandably makes Eurobarometer the most widely used .survey for quantitative
analyses on European public opinion. This makes Eurobarometer the best fit survey for
analysing public opinion towards integration in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This cross-national
harmonisation does have a setback in that it leaves no room for country specific
questions. While Eurobarometer could give interesting insights for Chapter 8 on the
United Kingdom, I felt it sensible to search for a more "British" specific survey to
capture the country's regional uniqueness.
Several British public opinion surveys were considered for the research including the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) and
the British Election Study (BES). The major shortcoming when using any of the above
surveys is that Northern Ireland is either not included or conducted in a separate survey.
This is likely due to the unique situation of Northern Ireland's historical context which
does merit its own analysis. Due to this complication Northern Ireland will not be
included in Chapter 8 but only the regions of Great Britain. After review of the possible
surveys to analyse the British public, I found the best fit survey for the study to be the
BES survey taken after the 2005 election.
Inaugurated in 1963 under the direction of David Butler and Donald Stokes, the BES
survey sought out to record the opinion of the British public at the time of or shortly
after each national election. Since, the study has been under the management of a
number of academics and institutions. The sampling procedure for the BES is a
stratified random cluster sample. 128 constituencies across Britain are selected at
random using stratification based upon election results, geographical location and
population density. To improve the samples, constituencies in Scotland and Wales in
addition to English marginal constituencies were over-sampled. Within each
constituency addresses were selected at random from two wards. For each ward 24
addresses were selected in England and 27 in Scotland and Wales. The survey is then
conducted face-to-face at the interviewee's home -. The BES includes a pre- and post-
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election survey although all the data for this research are from the post-election section
only.i
The BES includes a wide array of regional specific questions that make it valuable for
British regional analyses. Such questions that are unique include
Scottish/Welsh/English vs. British identity questions in addition to questions relating to
devolution and independence in Scotland and Wales. The question on devolution,
which is not included in Eurobarometer, allows for the comparison of EU support levels
between individuals who support devolution, support separatism or support a centralised
UK government. Furthermore the timing of the survey taken after a national election is
beneficial as the respondent is more likely to have reflected on several of the survey
topic issues as opposed to a non-election period.
Measuring Party Positions
The influence of political parties has been noted to make a significant contribution to
influencing public opinion towards European integration (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson
2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Hooghe 2007; Ray 2003a;
Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). New regionalism brings a unique dynamic
to the examination of political parties and their influence on public opinion towards
integration. Chapter 5 discusses regional party positions towards European integration
and determining their influence on regional public attitudes. Reaching conclusions on
regional party/public effects requires the use of datasets on both the party and public.
Measuring party positions however is not as straightforward as observing the public.
Political parties consist of a much smaller population than the general public and
accessibility to party elites can be a daunting task to attempt any party survey. Two
datasets have however been established attempting to properly measure political party
. positions towards Europe: the Chapel Hill expert survey and the Comparative
Manifestos Project (CMP). Both datasets use completely different techniques and there
are advantages and disadvantages depending on the information the researcher is ..
attempting to gain. .In this research I attempt to utilise both datasets when analysing the
regional party/public dynamic.
7 For more details on the 2005 BES and the sampling procedure please see www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005
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The Chapel Hill expert survey is a project carried out at the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill. The survey is distributed to a number of country and party expert
scholars questioning them on particular political parties and their position towards
European integration. The survey asks the experts to evaluate the parties at the given
time of the survey. The original survey was designed and conducted by Leonard Ray
(1999) covering the years 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 and subsequently the survey was
expanded and carried out to include several new variables by Marks, Wilson and Ray
(2002) in 1999 and 2002.
The benefit of the expert survey is that it uses a structure of "reputational measures" in
using a considerable number of experts to draw comparisons of party opinions
identifying any outliers whose estimation lies away from the mean. Furthermore the
consistency of measurements between experts helps validate the reliability of the data
(Ray 2007: 14). A critique of using expert surveys however is the considerations of
what information experts use to evaluate their judgement. This can range from
manifestos, voting behaviour or party ideology all raising issue to the validity of the
measurement (Ray 2007: 15).
The Chapel Hill survey data are subjectively measured in accordance with the opinions
of the party experts. This allows for the possibility of measuring party actions as
opposed to concrete ideological stances. In addition, the survey can account for the
saliency of political issues over time. It would be expected that certain issues, such as
European integration, take precedent over other issues dependent of the year examined.
This can make party positions difficult to compare as they might not be replicable. To
overcome this, objective data on party positions should be examined in addition to the
subjective data of the Chapel Hill Survey. Objective data can be based on written party
documentation on party positions, the best example being found in party manifestos.
They are records of party stances, as opposed to party actions, allowing for the
comparison between competing party positions (Laver and Garry 2000). The objective
data chosen for this research are from the Comparative Manifesto Project.
The Comparative Manifesto Project evaluates party positioning in a much different
approach. Initially started by the Manifesto Research Group, the project entails coding
the text of party manifestos since 1945 into a classification scheme of 54 broad
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categories grouped into 7 policy areas (Vol kens 2001: 98). A percentage score for each
issue is then obtained calculated as the percent of sentences related to the specific issue
within the population of all sentences within the manifesto. A score of 3 for example
would mean that the given policy consists of 3% of the total party manifesto. Originally
not suited for analysing regional parties due to the lack of regional party manifestos a
second dataset measuring manifestos from 1990-2003 including a larger number of
regionalparties has been introduced'
Examining manifestos is useful because they are issued by the actors that are being
analysed and are comparable because the actors that produce them participate in the
political process (Pennings 2002: 63). As Budge (2001: 82) states, measuring the
emphases of issues by party is the only way to determine their policy differences which
can be achieved by evaluating the saliency of these issues within the parties' manifestos.
Furthermore manifestos provide what the party's "best thinking" is as well as their
perception of policy priorities and government strategy (Pennings and Keman 2002:
76).
This is not to say the Comparative Manifestos Project does not come without its
limitations. First, the manifestos are coded according to national election years. This
makes it difficult to capture a party family within one particular year as elections
throughout Europe are not concurrent with each other. Second, a manifesto may be
examined as a form of advertising. They may be subject to unrealistic promises,
commitments and an exaggeration of policy differences thus as a result of advertising,
policy preferences may not necessarily be the same as policy outcome (Ray 2007). This
in tum can make the manifesto data more of a measure of saliency and not necessarily
party position. These issues must be taken into account when attempting to measure
. what the party wants versus what the party does.
Additional Data
In addition to the primary datasets described above other forms of data will be used
within the analyses to strengthen the models. Such data include macro economic data
such as national and regional GOP and unemployment figures. These data were made
8 See Kilngemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald (2006)
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available from Eurostat, the official statistical office of the European Commission." All
economic figures used in the models of research are statistics from the year prior to that
of the survey of analysis. These data present the economic indicators of a full annual
term. As the Eurobarometer survey is conducted in the spring of 2005, the economic
data from 2005 would not represent the state of the economy prior to the time the survey
was conducted. Therefore the last annual data produced before the Eurobarometer
survey was conducted is used.
Variables from previous research will also be used such as a language difference score
developed by James Fearon and Pieter Van Houten (1998; 2000) and a regional
assertiveness score created in additional work by Pieter Van Houten (2003). As these
variables were created by previous researchers and are not derived from the primary
datasets of this research they will be described in further detail in the respective chapters
of use.
Techniques in Statistical Modelling
Selecting the best fit statistical test requires as much consideration as does the right
dataset. Choosing the best technique is dependent upon the structure of the data being
used and the question being asked. In the section above I described a number of
datasets that will be used for the research. Each chapter of this dissertation attempts to
analyse a different segment to understanding regional attitudes towards European
integration thus a mixture of data and statistical methods will be used dependent upon
the question of analysis. I will be utilising an array of statistical tests ranging from
regression analyses, including ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and logistic
regression, as well as more recently employed techniques in multilevel modelling. The
below descriptions will 'summarise these techniques and will be explained in further
. detail within the chapters they are applied.
Applying Reqresslon
In basic model form, this research is observing the relationship between an outcome
variable (also known as a dependent variable) and the effects that several explanatory
variables (also known as independent variables) have on that outcome variable. In the
9 Made available at epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
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behavioural sciences, one of the most common tools of statistical analysis for observing
the effects explanatory variables have on the outcome variable is multiple regression
(Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken 2003). The basic regression formula is as follows:
y = bx+c
Here y is equal to the outcome variable, x represents the value of the explanatory value,
b represents the increase in the outcome variable as the explanatory variable increases
by 1 and c represents the intercept (the predicted value of the outcome variable if the
value of the explanatory is 0).10 For the purposes of this research what we are most
interested in is the value ofb , also known as the regression coefficient. A regression
coefficient is produced for each explanatory variable in the model and tells us much
about the effect the explanatory variable has on the outcome variable. First, the
direction of the coefficient is of importance. If the coefficient is a negative value it tells
us that the explanatory variable has a negative effect while if it is a positive value it is a
positive effect. Second, the size of the coefficient is of importance. Larger values have
stronger effects although this remains dependent on the scale of the explanatory value.
In addition to the regression coefficient it is important to know whether or not we can
draw any firm conclusions from the model results. A significance test for each variable
is conducted producing a p-value. The p-value is a value between 0 and 1 and
significance is accepted if the p-value is equal to or smaller than the significance level.
Social scientists generally prefer to be 95% sure that the results would be the same if the
test were to be carried out again. Thus, the confidence level for significance would be
5% (1-0.95)* 100. Therefore, if the p-value is equal to or below 0.05 the result would
deem significant. In this research, while I maintain that p-values below 0.05 are highly
significant I feel that those between 0.05 and 0.10 (or 90% confidence level) should not
. be overlooked. Therefore those variables within this range will not be ignored but noted
with caution.
Quite often the researcher must decide which type of regression he/she will use
depending upon the structure of the data and questions being examined. In this
dissertation two forms of regression will be used. The first is known as Ordinary Least
10 This notation is taken from Miles and Shelvin's (2001) Applying Regression & Correlation.
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Squares (OLS) regression and the second Ordered Logistic Regression. OLS regression
is simply linear regression as explained above. Its purpose is to identify the linear
relationship between an outcome variable and one or more explanatory variables. The
outcome variable however must be a quantitative continuous measurement of some
condition or behaviour. Furthermore it is assumed that the outcome variable is normally
distributed, that is the values of the variable when plotted on a frequency graph will
producewhat looks like a bell-curve. OLS will work with some of the data that will be
used in this dissertation, such as the Comparative Manifestos Project data where the
outcome variable is the ratio of sentences in a manifesto devoted to EU integration.
Other datasets however such as Eurobarometer use categorical variables to measure
public opinion.
It is often the case the outcome variable is not a measurement in continuous form.
Surveys such as Eurobarometer often ask questions where the response categories are,
for example, strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly
disagree. It is not safe to assume that the distances between the categories are of equal
space although they may be in consecutive order thus analysing this variable with linear
regression can lead to incorrect conclusions (Long and Freese 2006). It is unlikely that
the outcome variable will have a normal distribution thus the variable needs to be
transformed into its logit form to continue the analysis (Miles and Shevlin 2001). The
logit transformation first takes the odds ratios of the probability of each outcome
category then takes the natural logarithm of each odds ratio giving the logit. By
transforming the dependent variable into a logit variable, logistic regression
demonstrates the maximum likelihood, or odds ratio, of a certain event occurring. The
logistic regression coefficient of the explanatory variables can still be explained
similarly. to the OLS regression coefficient; the amount of change in the outcome
. variable given the change in one unit of the explanatory variable. However it may
better be explained as a multiplier of the odds ratio given the increase of one unit in the
explanatory variable (Miles and Shevlin 2001: 161).
The form of logistic regression applied in this dissertation is ordered logistic regression.
Like logistic regression, ordered logistic regression transforms the dependent variable
into a logit variable utilising the maximum likelihood method. Ordered logistic
regression however takes into account that the response categories for the dependent
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variable fall within a hierarchical order. It is based upon the proportional odds
assumption where the coefficients produced to describe the relationship between one
response category of the dependent variable and all higher responses is the same as
those that describe the relationship between the next lowest category and all categories
higher.
OLS ana logistic regression are two of the most frequent form of statistical analyses in
political science. I use both OLS and ordered logistic regression in this research to
analyse smaller populations such as political parties and single regions. However, when
analysing larger populations such as multiple countries the nested structure of the data
should be taken into account which requires a different statistical method.
Multilevel Modelling
In political quantitative research we measure a sample of a population and make
inferences on the relationship of particular variables and attempt to generalise our
results to the wider population. Most often however researchers treat each observation
measured as an independent occurrence when reality in the political and social world
may be more complex than this. Data political researchers frequently use are measured
at multiple levels where individual level surveys and other demographic data can be
seen as containing a multiple level structure. A perfect example of this can be seen in
the Eurobarometer survey. The survey is conducted at the individual level however
these individual respondents are nested within a multileveled structure. The respondent
lives within a city, which is part of a region, which is part of a country, which is then
part of the European Union. In general, multilevel structures exist when a group of
analysis is a subgroup of another .
.. Ignoring multilevel data structures can come at some costs such as incorrect standard
errors or inflated type I errors (accepting the hypothesis of interest when the results can
be attributed to chance) (Snijders and Bosker 1999). This is due to treating all"
observations in the sample as independent observations, which is misleading. If
individuals are influenced by contextual factors (the environment they exist in) then the
individuals within a common context share common influences thus they are not truly
independent. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) wrote an extensive piece on multilevel
modelling applied ..to the research of politics. For them there are three substantial
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reasons for using multilevel analysis. First, it allows researchers to combine multiple
levels of analysis into a single comprehensive model. When the model itself includes
variables on multiple levels, it is less likely to endure from misspecification of single
level models. Second, it allows the researcher to examine what is known as casual
heterogeneity. When specifying the cross-level interactions it is possible to determine if
the casual effect of a lower-level predictor is conditioned by a higher level variable.
Third, it allows a test of the generalisability of the findings due to the ability of
exploring casual heterogeneity. This allows the researcher to decipher if what occurs in
one group also applies to other groups (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219).
There are two multilevel model types that will be used in this research. The first is the
random intercept model and the second is the hierarchical linear model (also known as
the random slopes model). The random intercept model takes into account that different
groups have a different mean for the outcome variable. In the example of this research,
some regions have a high mean of EU support while other regions have a low mean.
The random effects model takes this into account estimating a separate regression
coefficient for each group. From this, one can observe the within-group as well as
between-group effects. In this research it will be possible, for example, to examine if
regional EU opinion varies as much within countries as it does between countries. The
random intercept model however keeps the effects of the explanatory variables uniform
meaning the effect of the explanatory variable will cause the same amount of change on
the outcome variable in all groups. To explore the effects of the explanatory variables
the hierarchical linear model will be applied.
The effects of different explanatory variables may differ by group. For example, the
effect of regional identity on EU opinion may have a positive effect in some regions
.while a negative effect in others. The hierarchical linear model makes it possible to
observe this phenomenon. It takes the random intercept model a step further by
allowing the effect of the explanatory variable to vary by group as well as the outcome ..
variable. By doing so, one can observe the strength and direction of various explanatory
variables. This will make it possible to see if individuals within regions truly act
different from one another within the same country. Both the random intercept and the
hierarchical linear models will be described in greater detail within the context of the
chapter each is applied.
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What is unique about the application of multilevel modelling in this dissertation is that
it is a rather new technique in political science. Traditionally used in areas of other
social sciences such as education, multilevel modelling has only been utilised in the
study of politics for the past two decades and is still sparsely used. Early multilevel
modelling research can be observed in works such as Jones, Johnston and Pattie (1992)
in the early 1990s while Steenbergen and Jones (2002) wrote an article promoting its
uses in political research a decade later. In the realm of public attitudes towards
European integration research Hooghe and Marks (2004; 2005) have made a
considerable contribution to the use of multilevel modelling. Hooghe and Marks
however typically use country and political party as their levels of analytical choice. In
this research I hope to contribute to the use of multilevel modelling by not only
accounting for the regional level into explaining EU support, but by attempting to
explain regional variation of public attitudes as well.
Utilising the Data and Statistical Methods
This research includes an assortment of appropriate data and statistical techniques to
explore public attitudes towards the European Union within the context of the region.
The described data and methods above have each been chosen to examine the questions
of each analytical chapter in the dissertation.
Chapter 5 focuses on the dynamics of regional party politics. It will explore the
question of whether regional parties are just as pro-European as the major party
families. In addition the chapter investigates if regional party supporters are aligned
with their party's position on Europe. This chapter requires a range of data. First to
evaluate party positioning OLS regression will be applied to the Comparative
Manifestos Project data. The analysis should demonstrate that regional parties are
indeed just as pro-European as their larger party counterparts. The Chapel Hill expert
survey will give insight into the change of regional party positioning from 1984 through .'
2002. Furthermore; the positions of the regional party family along with the other party
families will be compared to that of their electorate demonstrating that regional party
voters remain constant with their party as opposed to other smaller 'fringe' party
families of the greens, far left and far right. This will be achieved by comparing mean
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evaluation scores over time from both the Chapel Hill expert survey and the Mannheim
Eurobarometer Trend File.
Chapter 6 investigates the role of economic and political indicators in determining
public support of the EU. The analysis uses the data for the EU15 from the
Eurobarometer 63.4 survey conducted in 2005. This chapter uses the multilevel random
intercept" model to account for the variance between countries as well as between
regions within the same country. The random intercept model will show that while
effects of the political indicators remain within the context of the national level, certain
economic evaluations show their strongest effect at the regional level. The conclusions
drawn from this chapter would only be possible by accounting for the multileveled
structure of the data.
Chapter 7 deepens the analysis of multilevel modelling by investigating the effects of
regional assertiveness. Regional assertiveness exists in only a handful of countries
therefore the analysis is limited to a selection of six member-states. Using the same
dataset in Chapter 6, Eurobarometer 63.4, this chapter applies the hierarchical linear
model (or random slopes model). The hierarchical linear model will allow for the
possibility to allow the effects of regional and national identity to vary by region. This
will show that the role .of identity is much more complex than initially thought. The
way individuals view themselves in terms of regional and national identity can have
varying effects even within the same country. In addition, while the overall trend
demonstrates that regional identity will have a negative effect on EU support, national
identity will have a positive effect overall. Furthermore, the regions which have
differing effects from the overall trends will be noted. The hierarchical linear model
will allow the possibility to find these regions that oppose the trend.
Chapter 8 takes an in-depth look at public attitudes towards integration in the United
Kingdom. The Eurobarometer surveys were designed for a cross-national comparison
and therefore do not ask any questions that are country specific. To capture a better
understanding of the British experience the British Election Study is used to conduct the
investigation. The outcome variable measuring EU support in the BES survey is a 5-
point ordered categorical response question therefore the chosen statistical methodology
is an ordered logistic regression analysis. A regression analysis is carried out for
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England, Scotland and Wales revealing identity again can vary within the same country.
In addition, the Chapel Hill expert survey and the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file
will also be used to compare the major political parties' EU position with that of the
regional public's.
This dissertation is foremost an investigation on public attitudes towards European
integration and the contextual effects of the region. However given the wide array of
methods and data used it also contributes to an exploration of quantitative methodology.
Using this wide variety of statistical methods as well as applying the latest statistical
technique in multilevel modelling this research hopes to offer further insight to the
complex nature of public support for the European Union.
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Chapter 5
Regional Political Parties, the Public and their Support
for European Integration
Introduction
This dissertation explores the dynamic of public opinion towards European integration
within the context of Europe's subnational regions. As explained in Chapter 3
multilevel governance creates channels of access for subnational actors to participate in
the political process at the European level (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks, Haesly and
Mbaye 2002). In turn these political actors become highly important in facilitating the
climate for mobilisation within the region and can be highly influential in providing
information to the regional public. Examining the positions that party elites take on
European integration provides a better comprehension of regional mobilisation and the
role of multilevel governance in each region. This chapter intends to explore regional
political parties and their position on integration in addition to comparing public support
for integration amongst regional party voters with those of other political parties. In
addition, the chapter serves as a starting point into understanding the link between
regional assertiveness and support for the European Union. It will reveal that regional
parties are likely to support European integration, in addition to their supporters, so that
we can compare their positions with those of the entire regional public in the subsequent
chapters. By doing so, conclusions can then be drawn in the final chapter to determine
if regional assertiveness serves as a deterrent or stimulus to public support of European
.. integration.
Investigating political parties is valuable when examining public attitudes towards
European integration, In Chapter 2 it was explained that European integration is rarely
a salient issue thus the public looks for cues, or proxies as Anderson (1998) explains, to
help establish their position towards the European Union. Party labels are one of the
most commonly used predictors for estimating voter positions on nearly all political
Issues. Political party positions vary significantly throughout the European Union. The
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EU presents domestic political parties with a new political structure that can potentially
be seen as threat or opportunity, having to organise themselves to enable participation at
the European level of policy making. Determining how to confront this new political
structure will lead to varying positions towards integration not only between different
political parties but at times within them (Hix and Lord 1997: 5-6). As party supporters
often reflect the positions of their party as a cue for integration support, it would be
expectedto observe variation within the public based upon party support.
Regional parties are very unique when compared to other political parties. Unlike the
mainstream parties, those that fit within the regional party family do not typically find
shared identity within the traditional political ideology spectrum. Instead they find their
common identity in the appeal of restructuring the domestic political system around the
regional territory in which each party operates (Hix and Lord 1997: 44). Additionally
this objective of autonomy can further vary by regional party ranging from substantial
decentralisation of the nation-state to complete independence. At first glance it would
be easy to assume that regional parties would be against the concept of a European level
of governance. The idea of supporting another level of authority that threatens the
autonomous objective of the regional party seems contradictory. Furthermore regional
parties are seen as "single issue" parties, devoting their efforts to the goal of regional
autonomy leaving European integration as only a secondary issue. According to Paul
Taggart (1998) because these fringe or "single issue" parties are less likely to partake in
governmental office, they are unlikely to take a significant position on or influence EU
policy making as it is largely an intergovernmental process.
In this chapter I intend to demonstrate that the European issue is just as important to
regional parties as it is to the other mainstream national parties. The primary hypothesis
.. to be tested in this chapter is that regional parties are as likely to be as "pro-European"
as the main party families, while the other single issue party families of the greens, far
left and far right will be more Euroskeptic. I will build upon the previous literature and
re-establish that first, party family is a strong predictor of a party's position on
integration and second, the regional party family is just as Pro-EU as the larger
mainstream parties. I will go on to correlate other party characteristics with integration
position such as political ideology, cultural variation in language difference and
decentralisation policy. Lastly I will compare party stance and voter preferences by
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party family to demonstrate that regional party voters are just as inline with their party's
European integration position as the other mainstream parties.
Regional Parties and Europe
In historical terms the issue of European integration has been a transforming one from
the earlydays of the ECSC. In the preliminary years the public was detached from the
process thus Europe never gained momentum in becoming a political issue within the
domestic political parties. The direct election of the European Parliament in 1979
however can be seen as forcing the political party structure to take a position on Europe
as the parties' candidates were being directly elected by the public to serve at the
European level. Despite this change however, Peter Mair (2000) finds that Europe is
still a non-election issue in terms of domestic politics, as Europe limits national
government authority consequently reducing policy competition as the number of policy
alternatives would be reduced. This then creates a mainstream consensus amongst
national parties within each political system. Kriesi (2007) argues that it is more likely
for the European issue to be introduced during election terms in states that are more
. Euroskeptic such as the United Kingdom. In addition, within these states, issues of
European integration are more likely to be mobilised by the conservative parties or new
populist right.
European integration can be regarded as a relatively new issue within the political arena.
Although a new issue, this is not to say that parties will calculate their position based
upon electorate and constituency positions. On the contrary Marks and Wilson (2000:
434) argue that parties are instead guided by their long standing historically rooted
orientations that in turn "guide" them to their supposed positions on new issues. In
r •
addition political parties are bounded to predetermined ideologies and party leaders'
opinions which are difficult to alter. Based heavily on the previous works of Lipset and
Rokkan (1967) and Inglehart (1990), Marks and Wilson (2000) believe that this
"cleavage hypothesis" can help distinguish a party and party family's position towards ..
European integration.
As mentioned above it is almost contradictory for a regional party to support European
integration as strengthening the authority of a European level government would in turn
limit the amount of autonomy granted to the regional level. Scheinman (1977) noted
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that the intergovernmental nature and the capitalistic characteristic of the European
Union can be a drawback in protecting regional economic and cultural identity. This
reaction was common with regional party elites in the 1970s, however, by the mid
1980s this position transformed into a positive commitment towards Europe using it to
benefit the region both economically and culturally even if simply acting against the
centralised government of the nation-state (Keating 1998: 163).
There are several ways that regional parties can use integration to their advantage.
Europe can strengthen the functionality of regional party representatives. As the
European Union invests significant amounts of funding into regional policy and
economic support, the European Commission relies on regional actors to be involved in
the process of regional policy making, one of the outcomes of new regionalism (Keating
1998). This interplay of multilevel governance allows regional actors to represent their
interests at the European and regional levels, furthermore allowing regional politicians
to take credit for introducing EU subsidies to the region (De Winter and Cachafeiro
2002). The European Parliament also gives regional parties many advantages, not only
by giving regional parties another level to compete in but by also providing
organisational and financial resources which assist the party in its domestic and regional
capabilities (Lynch 1996). Furthermore, as Hix and Lord (1997: 44) explain, most
regional parties favour the concept of a "Europe of regions" where the nation-state will
be replaced by a European-wide political system in which smaller territories will be the
crux of representation at the European level. From the late 1970s through the 1980s
regional parties can be seen shifting to a more positive integration position. An
excellent example of this is the change in the Scottish National Party (SNP), which was
previously Euroskeptic in the 1970s, altered its outlook on Europe by the mid-1980s,
calling for. "independence within Europe" by 1990s (Lynch 1996; Dardanelli 2005).
Through the use of interviews, De Winter and Cachafeiro (2002) find that ethno-
regional party members of the European Parliament view European elections as a way
to gain political visibility and legitimacy at the European level. They find that political
ideologies are still the most important and distinctive feature of all political parties.
However, while ethno-regionalist parties may ally with their ideological party families
on many issues within the European Parliament, their regionalist presence in the form of
the European Free Alliance (EFA) party group within the European Parliament gives
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visibility to the new issues or 'alternative politics' such as regional mobilisation towards
further autonomy (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002: 496).
Given the above discussion the following hypotheses have been developed to
investigate regional party and electorate positions towards European integration:
Hypothesis 5.1: Regional parties are as likely to be as "pro-European" as
the main party families, while the other single issue party families of the
greens, far left and far right will be more Euroskeptic.
As described, most regional parties have shifted their positions towards European
integration in the past few decades. As the EU provides several benefits to regional
parties, including an additional level to compete in elections as well as taking credit for
EU subsidies, regional parties should view the EU positively and maintain its
importance within the party platform. The greens, far left and far right however gain
less from integration as it does not favour their party goals thus will not favour
integration as positively.
Hypothesis 5.2: Traditional left/right political ideology of the regional
parties will not determine EU support levels.
As regional parties are not formed on the basis of left/right ideology they may include
members from all sides of the political spectrum. Because of this, they are likely to take
a more centrist position on the traditional political spectrum however maintain high
levels of EU support.
Hypothesis 5.3: Regional parties within regions of greater cultural
difference from the. primary culture of the nation-state will be more inclined
to support the European Union.
As described in Chapter 3 cultural identity is a large contributor to new regionalism and
mobilisation for further regional autonomy. The European Union may be seen by some ..
cultures as it means of protecting the regional culture from the dominate culture of the
nation-state. Therefore, regional parties which represent regions with a larger cultural
difference from that of the nation-state will have higher levels of EU support.
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Hypothesis 5.4: Regional parties supporting higher levels of
decentralisation will be more inclined to support the European Union.
As the European Union contributes to the multilevel governance system and pulls
authority from the central-state, those regional parties more in favour of decentralisation
will likely have higher levels of European support.
Hypothesis 5.5: EU support levels between the regional parties and their
electorate will be similar.
The issue of integration is significant for regional parties m progressing towards
regional autonomy. As regional parties have promoted the benefits of European
integration their electorate may be likely to take cue from their party's position. While
regional parties have been characterised as fringe parties, displaying similar party and
electorate levels of EU support may show that regional party supporters do identify with
the positions of their regional party and are not simply protest votes.
Predicting Party Family Positions on Integration
The framework for predicting party position relies heavily on the left/right ideological
structure. Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) find, through the use of the Chapel Hill
expert survey on party positioning towards EU integration, that parties towards the
peripheral of the left and right are more likely to be Euroskeptic than the parties closer
to the centre of the spectrum. Furthermore they find that party support and ideology are
linearly related, however, this linear relationship is strongest on policies that can be
clearly identified between neoliberal and European regulated capitalism. I Other
policies, or new political issues such as environmentalism and cohesion policies,
constrict positions according to party location on the left/right political spectrum. In
..addition they explain that social democratic parties can be seen shifting in favour of
integration from the early 1980s as the EU's focus changes from largely neoliberal
economic goals to including more social policies (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002: .,
975). This creates a new political spectrum examining these new political issues,
environmentalism for example is an issue on the left side of the spectrum and cultural
protection issues such as immigration are on the right, can have a profound effect on
1 Marks, Hooghe and Wilson (2002) use two different ideological scales for this study. Here, the results
are based on the traditional left/right scale resulting in an inverted U-shaped curve, which the peak is the
highest level of support for the EU, from left to right.
- 75 -
integration positions.' Parties that stand on the right of the new political spectrum are
more likely to be Euroskeptic while those on the left are more likely to be pro-
European.
Using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and running a multivariate OLS analysis, Marks,
Wilson and Ray (2002) find that the most influential variable on predicting a party's
support for European integration that they test is classification of party family. National
location, the country in which the party contends, does not seem to have as strong of an
influence in predicting party positioning on EU support. In addition, they found that
there is a relationship between party position and the position of the median party voter
although it is unclear to which direction this effect takes, the voter influencing the party
or the party influencing the voter.
Seth Jolly's (2007) research builds upon the cleavage hypothesis of Marks and Wilson
(2000) within a regional context. According to Marks, Wilson and Ray's (2002: 587)
further research into the cleavage hypothesis, regional parties belong to the centre-
periphery cleavage. Here the regional party should be expected to be moderately to
strongly in favour of European integration. Economic integration is seen positively as
Europe provides the economic framework for regional autonomy while political
integration weakens the. nation-state's authority through the replacement of a plural
European level of governance. Jolly (2007) demonstrates through a multivariate OLS
analysis of the Chapel Hill expert survey that regional parties are as pro-European as
other main stream parties.
I intend to build upon the findings of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002), Marks, Wilson
and Ray (2000) and Jolly (2007). Just as these works have demonstrated high EU
..support within the regional party family through the use of the Chapel Hill expert
survey, I will further demonstrate this relationship with the use of an additional dataset
that gauges party positioning focusing on the policy preferences within party manifestos
as a comparison to_the expert survey. I will then observe within the regional party
family correlations between ideology, cultural differences and decentralisation policy
versus EU policy. Lastly through the use of the Chapel Hill expert survey and the
2 Marks, Hooghe and Wilson (2002) label this second ideological spectrum the GALIT AN scale. GAL
(Green / Alternative / Libertarian) is on the left side of the scale while TAN (Traditional/Authoritarian /
Nationalist) is on the right side of the scale.
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Eurobarometer survey I will compare the EU positions of all party family elites versus
the party family electorate.
The Data
This chapter uses three different datasets to analyse party support for European
integration. The principal datasets are the Chapel Hill expert survey on party
positioning towards EU integration and the Comparative Manifestos Project data. In
addition, the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File will also briefly be used to compare
EU positions of the electorate with party family elites.3 Each dataset has its advantages
and disadvantages when analysing party policy preferences.
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, carried out at the University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill, is based upon a questionnaire distributed to a number of party expert scholars
asking them to evaluate particular political parties on their position towards European
integration at a given time. The original survey was designed and first conducted by
Leonard Ray (1999) in 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996, then later expanded and carried out
to include several new variables by Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) in 1999 and 2002.
The combined dataset from the years survey years between 1984 and 1999 include
observations of 188 European parties. The benefit from using the expert survey is that it
gives a dynamic impression of the change in party positioning over two decades. This
variation over time can then be compared to the variation of public opinion thus helping
determine if regional party supporters are consistent over time with their party's
position towards European integration.
The Comparative Manifesto Project evaluates party positioning in a much different
. "
approach. Initially started by the Manifesto Research Group, the project codes the text
'of party manifestos into a classification scheme of 54 broad categories grouped into 7
policy areas (Volkens 2001: 98). The ratio of each given policy with the overall
manifesto is then calculated into a percentage score. The score equals the total percent ..
that the given policy makes up of the total manifesto. The Comparative Manifestos
Project dataset that will be used in this chapter is from the second series covering
manifestos from elections between 1990 and 2003 including a number of regional
.'
3, The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Comparative Manifestos Project and Eurobarometer surveys are
explained in more explicit detail in Chapter 4.
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political parties." The Comparative Manifestos Project data differ from the Chapel Hill
expert survey in that the data are more objective, records of party stances, as opposed to
party actions, allowing for the comparison between competing party positions (Laver
and Garry 2000). The Chapel Hill expert survey data are subjective where they are
recorded evaluations of party experts measuring each party's position towards Europe.l
As both datasets are used in this dissertation there will be no need to defend either
position of the debate between utilising subjective or objective party data.
I will use the expert survey to gain a dynamic representation of party positioning from
1984-2002. Furthermore I use it to compare party elite positions with the party
electorate data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File using the same
corresponding years." I use the Comparative Manifestos Project to run an OLS
regression analysis in comparison to the works of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002)
Marks, Wilson and Ray (2000) and Jolly (2007) already done with the expert survey. In
addition, the manifestos data will also be used to compare party ED support with
positions of other policies including decentralisation which will not be possible with the
Chapel Hill survey. I believe that the policy preferences within the manifestos should
demonstrate that the parties' "best thinking" is comparable to what was concluded with
previous works on the expert survey. I also use the Comparative Manifestos Project
data to measure ED policy against ideology, cultural differences and decentralisation
policy of regional parties. Lastly I use the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File with
the expert survey to compare ED positions of the electorate with party family elites.
Party Family Preferences towards the European Union
In order to demonstrate the first hypothesis that the regional party family is just as pro-
European as the other mainstream parties I perform a means comparison of both the
-Chapel Hill expert survey and Comparative Manifestos Project. The means comparison
will help determine the validity of using both datasets for the chapter analysis. The
strength of the two datasets is slightly difficult to compare over time due to the time ..
structure of the data: The expert survey will be used first so that a temporal comparison
of party positions can be made. Observations are each conducted at identical time
4 See Kilngemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald (2006) 00
S Please refer to Chapter 4 section Measuring Party Positions for more detail on the debate between
utilising the Chapel Hillexpert survey and the Comparative Manifestos Project data.
6 Please refer to Chapter 4 for an in depth description of the Eurobarometer surveys.
-78 -
intervals for all parties in the years 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2002. The manifestos
however are evaluated during national elections for each country between the years
1990 and 2003. Party observations therefore can be more frequent depending on the
number of times a country has held elections within the given time range. To avoid the
conflict I have averaged each party's position over the thirteen year period, thus the
evaluations using the manifestos will be an analysis of the 1990-2003 time period only.
Nevertheless both datasets provide interesting findings to investigate. Lastly, the parties
that constitute each party family are defined by the party family classifications
according to Hix and Lord (Hix and Lord 1997: 21-53). For Hix and Lord Hix, the
European-wide party families are defined by political parties sharing "ideological
identities and the interests of social groups of which they emerged to represent". The
party families which will be compared in this chapter are the Christian Democrats, the
Conservatives, the Liberals, the Socialists, the Greens, the Radical Left, the Radical
Right and the Regionalists.i
Observing Figure 5.1 we can analyse regional party EU positions compared to the other
party families over time using the expert survey. The scale for EU position, originally
coded from 1 (least favourable) to 7 (most favourable), has been normalised by recoding
to a simple scale of 0 to 1.8 As Figure 5.1 shows, the mean EU position of regional
parties is not only as pro-European as the other mainstream party families, but this
attitude also remains consistent between 1984 and 1996 in which a slight positive slope
can be observed. After 1996 however a decline back to the 1984 level is seen with
attitudes once again climbing from 1999 to 2002. This slight drop in EU support can
perhaps be attributed to the number of Spanish regional parties that exist in the sample.
After the 1996 Spanish election the Partido Popular (PP), Spain's conservative party,
did not haye enough seats to form a government therefore having to find other parties to
_form a coalition. In doing so, the PP courted the regional parties of Catalonia, the
Basque Country and the Canary Islands to form a minority government in exchange for
7 As noted by Hix and Lord (1997: 25), the Agrarian family has not been included as this party family has
almost disappeared as these parties have been absorbed into the other party families. The few parties
originally coded as Agrarian in the data have been recoded accordingly with Hix and Lord (1997: 29-49).
Also not included were the anti-European family as limited data were available.
8 The formula to normalise a variable outcome to a range of 0 to I is as follows:
. Y -lower bound of Yz.= I
I upper bound of Y -lower bound of Y
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Figure 5.1: Party Family EU Positions 1984-2002
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Note: Data is from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1984-2002.
pact agreements including policy issues specified to the autonomous communities
(Heller 2002). Participating in this conservative coalition may have convinced the party
experts of a slight temporary deterioration of the ED agenda for the regional parties at
this time. Although this small decline in ED support exists, the regional party mean
never goes as low as the other fringe parties of the radical left, radical right and greens.
Next, I will determine if this pro-European sentiment within regional parties runs
consistent with the. Comparative Manifestos Project data. ED positions within the
manifesto' data are calculated based upon the difference between two policy score
values. In other terms, the ED position score is the value of the manifesto percentage of
Positive ED coded statements minus the percentage of negative ED statements.
Observing Figure 5.2 we. can gain an overall sense of ED policy preferences within the'
manifestos by party family for the time period of 1990 to 2003. Here we can see that
the regional parties score remains as pro-European as the other four mainstream party
families, while the other fringe parties either show negative European statements, as
seen with the radical right and left, or very few positive statements, as with the greens.
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Figure 5.2 1990-2003 Mean Manifesto EU Positions
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Note: Data is taken from the Comparative Manifestos Project.
By comparing party family means of both datasets, consistency has been demonstrated
that regional parties are as pro-European as the mainstream families and not similar to
the other fringe parties on the European issue thus giving evidence to support
Hypothesis 5.1.
Regression Analysis of the Comparative Manifestos Project
Data
The means comparison only explains either the relationship between EU position and
time as in Figure 5.1 or the overall EU position summarised over a larger time period as
in Figure -5.2. To further my comparison with earlier studies I test an OLS regression
. model accounting for the strength of party family positioning on EU support. As the
dependent variable is continuous, OLS regression will not only demonstrate the effect
of each of the independent variables but will also be useful in obtaining the predicted"
value of the dependent variable given set values of the independent variable.9 However
unlike the mentioned researchers who run their models based on the expert survey data,
I attempt to make a comparable model using the Comparative Manifesto Project data.
9 The dependent variable being EU manifesto score and independent variable being party family. This
will be explained further in the chapter.
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Comparing the results of both datasets will either strengthen or weaken the claims of
predicting EU position based on party family as well as determining if regional parties
are as consistent as mainstream on the European issue. In addition by using the
manifestos data, it will be possible to measure the effects which other policies have on
party EU support. This is not possible with the Chapel Hill survey as European
integration is the sole policy area in which the survey focuses on.
The dependent variable used in the analysis will be the value of the difference between
positive and negative EU statements, as used in the above means comparison. The party
positions within the data set vary greatly from the most pro-European party, the Danish
V Liberals with a score of 25.7, to the most anti-European party, the Danish People's
Party with a score of -13.7. IO
The primary independent variables used in the model are based on each party family.
A dummy variable is assigned to each manifesto observation assigning a value of 1 if it
belongs to the party family and 0 if it does not. The reference category provided for the
party families is the far left family. Choosing a party family likely to be Euroskeptic
will present a series of positive values for comparison, increasing the more positive the
party family evaluates integration when compared to the far left parties. Dummy
variables for member-states are also included to account for national contexts. Here,
Denmark has been used as the reference category. In accordance with of Hooghe,
Marks and Wilson (2002) Marks, Wilson and Ray (2000) and Jolly (2007), I expect
party family to be the strongest predictors in the model. In addition, I estimate that the
party family positions will look similar to those in Figure 5.2. This test will moreover
determine the strength of the regional party family's pro-European position. A
significan! and larger regression coefficient than the other so called "fringe" parties will
_demonstrate that regional parties remain consistent towards their pro-European stance.
A dichotomous variable for election year was also included in the model but not
presented in the below table due to lack of space. The regression coefficients for year
are available in the appendix in Table 5.4.
10 As Denmark contains both the most pro-EU as well as anti-EU parties, it serves as a good candidate to
stand as the reference category for the country dummies which will be included in the model.
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A number of other independent variables have also been included in the model.
Left/right ideology is a variable score coding the difference of the sum of several right
emphasised policies minus left emphasised policies (Budge and Klingemann 2001: 19-
24). As Marks, Hooghe and Wilson (2002) have demonstrated political ideology to
have a positive effect the closer a party is to the centre I would expect this variable to
have a minimal effect. I have also included Free Market Economy evaluating the
number of statements a manifesto has positively mentioned the issues of an open
economy. I I This variable is included to capture the economic aspects of European
integration. The more positive a party is to the free market, the more positive it should
evaluate the EU. In consideration of a party's electorate, I have included demographic
variables. Labour Class +, Farmers + and Middle Class + are all scores based on
positive statements for each of these economic groups. I would expect farmer and
middle class support to be positively correlated with EU support as both groups gain a
number of benefits from EU integration.V I would expect labour groups to be less
favourable towards a free market economy due to national protectionism thus less likely
to support integration. Multiculturalism and National Patriotism have also been
included. Parties positively mentioning non-economic groups and multiculturalism
should have a positive relationship with integration while national patriotism should
have a negative relationship. Decentralisation has also been included in the model as
one of the key variables of interest. I would expect parties supporting higher levels of
decentralisation to more likely favour the multilevel structure of governance of the
European Union thus having a positive relationship with integration support.
Parliamentary Seat Percentage represents the percent of seats a party has in the national
parliament. I would expect for parties that have little or no seats in parliament to be
more favourable to integration as Europe provides another level of participation in
policy m~king. Larger parties that have the possibility of forming the national
_government at some point in time are expected to see Europe as a threat of authority.
Lastly to account for parties that are adapted to the multilevel governance structure I
have included Hooghe and Marks' (2001: 191-206) regional governance variable. The
variable is a combination of various scores relating to constitutional federalism, special
territorial autonomy, the role of regions in central government and regional elections
II A correlation matrix was assessed after the OLS test in order to check multi-coIIinearity between Free
Market Economy and left/right position. The correlation coefficient between the two variables was -0.45,
far enough from -1 not to raise any serious collinearity issues. _-
12 Various benefits for the middle class may include investment opportunities while farmers may receive
subsidies which would encourage a favourable opinion of the EU.
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accumulating to a total score based on 0 to 12 scaleY The Regional Governance
variable will account for parties which compete in countries with higher or lower levels
of multilevel governance. I would expect that parties within a stronger multilevel
governance state will be more inclined to view the European Union positively as these
parties are more accustomed to the multiple tier system of authority.
Table 5.r displays the strengths of the predictor variables from the 0LS regression test.
It can be seen that the party family variables are amongst the strongest predictors of
positive EU evaluations. Each main stream party family displays statistical significance
while the other fringe parties do not. The exception to this however is within the
Regionalists party family which displays statistical significance while maintaining a
higher regression coefficient than the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, giving
further support for Hypothesis 5.1. Amongst the national dummy variables only Austria
displays any statistical significance. Few of the remaining independent variables
displayed significance. While Left/Right Ideology showed no statistical significance
Free Market Economy did so perhaps displaying the strength of economic ideology
when evaluating economic integration as opposed to the other social elements that
contribute to political ideology. This component may contribute to why the
Conservative party family obtained the highest regression coefficient among the party
families. A further investigation of conservative parties within their national locations
may give insight to this phenomenon. Both Labour and Farmers displayed a negative
relationship. This may be attributed to Juan Diez Medrano's (2001: 45) research of
public opinion towards European integration in Spain where he found that within
farming regions, where the EU may provide benefits such as subsidies, quotas presented
a larger cost to the individuals within these regions. Quotas add direct competition with
other fa~ing regions around the EU thus breaking down the local agricultural tradition
_within certain regions. Interestingly Internationalism displays a negative relationship
with EU position. This may be due to parties insisting that foreign affairs should
remain at the state level as opposed to a higher level of governance. Unsurprisingly,
13 Hooghe and Marks (2001: 191-206) attempt to account for changes in subnational governance over
time by observing each state's subnational governance in ten year intervals. For this study I have used the
scores given at 1990 and 2000 only. For any changes in scores between these two years I carefully
evaluated the year any significant change took place and adjusted the score accordingly. Furthermore
Hooghe and Marks have not included Luxembourg in their. evaluation thus it has also been left out of
below model.
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Table 5.1: OLS Regression of Party Manifesto EU Policy
Independent Variable 13 (S.E.)
Party Family
Socialists 2.771 ** (0.704)
Liberals 3.195** (0.811)
Christian Democrats 2.825** (0.784)
Conservatives 3.116** (0.979)
Greens 0.979 (0.732)
Far Right -0.389 (1.051)
Regionalists 2.941** (0.973)
Member State
Sweden -0.913 (1.051)
Finland -0.994 (1.189)
Belgium -5.595 (4.150)
Netherlands -0.897 (1.488)
France 0.003 (2.40 I)
Italy -1.058 (2.092)
Spain -2.835 (4.081 )
Greece -1.654 (1.286)
Portugal -1.146 (1.421)
Germany -3.337 (4.962)
Austria -7.329+ (3.922)
Great Britain 0.424 (1.256)
Ireland -0.159 (1.253)
Parliamentary Seat % 1.422 (1.535)
Left/Right Ideology -0.026 (0.017)
Free Market Economy 0.165** (0.051)
Labour Class + -0.200* (0.085)
Farmers + -0.207** (0.075)
Middle Class + -0.287 (0.219)
Internationalism -0.20 I+ (0.144)
Multiculturalism 0.143+ (0.074)
National Patriotism -0.077+ (0.092)
Decentralisation -0.014 (0.059)
Regional Governance 0.866+ (0.522)
R2 0.374
Adj R2 0.291
N 375
+P < .10, * P < .05, ** P < .01
Note: Far Left and Denmark used as reference categories. Dummies provided for manifesto year not
included in table are available in Appendix Table 5.3.
National Patriotism displayed a negative relationship while Multiculturalism showed a
statistically significant positive relationship.
The Hooghe and Marks Regional Governance variable also displayed a statistically
significant positive relationship strengthening the argument that regionalism within
states may contribute to a more favourable opinion of the European level of governance
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Figure 5.3: Multilevel Governance Predicted Manifesto EU Support Score
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Note: Predicted Values obtained from OLS model presented in Table 5.1.
amongst parties. Although the Multilevel governance variable is not specific to regional
parties alone, it does emphasise the strength regional level politics may play in relation
to supporting a further European level of governance. The relationship between levels
of governance in a state and party support of the European Union can be further
emphasised when observing the high angle of the slope in Figure 5.3.
As levels of multilevel governance increase in a state, so does a party's likelihood of
supporting the EU. While Multilevel Governance displayed significance
Decentralisation showed no significance. The high number of insignificant variables
may be responsible for the lack of explanatory power of the full model as displayed in
the adjusted R2 value. Nevertheless the strengths of the party family variables should
not be overlooked and remain comparable to the previous models using the expert
survey.
To further investigate the strength of party family as a predictor of party integration ..
support, Table 5.2 includes the party family predicted value of the dependent variable
based on the regression model. The predicted value is calculated based on the results of
the OLS model for each party family while the rest of the independent variables are kept
at their mean value. The results show that while the Liberals now have the highest
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Table 5.2: Predicted Values of EU Position by Party Family
Party Family Predicted Value of EU Position
Liberals 3.02
Conservatives 2.94
Regionalists 2. 77
Christian Democrats 2.65
Socialist 2.60
Greens 0.81
Far Left -0.17
Far Right -0.56
value, the Regionalists remain the third highest family thus further demonstrating that
Regional parties are likely to be pro-European.
Explaining Regional Party Support for Integration
For a more in depth examination of regional parties I have included a bivariate analysis
of EU support versus left/right ideology, cultural differences and decentralisation
policy. The analysis will be made using the means of the policy preferences for each
party within the 1990-2003 time period from the Comparative Manifestos Project data.
Again the manifestos data is used as it provides the ability to observe other party policy
positions. By analysing these relationships we can see where each regional party within
the dataset stands on particular issues. This analysis will not necessarily give us the
strengths of the variables but instead help us map policy preferences by party basis.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter the regional party family is unlike any other as the
parties that constitute the regional family are not bound by traditional left/right
ideologies but rather by the goal of reforming their domestic political structure around
the region of which they function (Hix and Lord 1997: 44). As neither decentralisation
nor independence is conventionally placed on the left/right scale, the parties within the
regional family are ideologically divided. Therefore it would be of interest to determine
if left/right ideology has any linear relationship with EU support. In support of
Hypothesis 5.2, I would expect to see a minimal relationship amongst the parties.
Figure 5.4 displays the left/right positioning of the regional parties for the Comparative
Manifesto Project data. When observing the mean line, it has a slight positive slope as
the left/right score becomes more conservative. This effect is similar in comparing with
the conservative parties which were the most pro-European family in both the means
comparison and regression model. As we can see however, most regional parties are
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Figure 5.4: Regional Party EU Policy vs. Political Ideology 14
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Figure 5.5: Regional Party EU Policy vs. Language Difference Score
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Note: EU policy score is taken from the Comparative Manifestos Project.
Language difference score is based on index developed by Fearon and Van
Houten (1998) and examined further by Van Houten (2000) .
.14 Please refer to Table 5.3 in the appendix or the acronyms list in the beginning ofth~ dissertation for full
party names for Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 in the appendix.
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Figure 5.6: Regional Party EU Policy vs. Decentralisation Policy
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gathered around the centre/left of the ideological spectrum. This supports Hypothesis
5.2 showing the centrism of the party family of which Hix and Lord (Hix and Lord
1997: 44) suggest is formed as many regional parties consist of members from the left
and right thus forming a centrist position. The most noticeable outliers are that of the
Galician National Bloc (BNG) and the Basque National Party (PNV-EAJ). While
centre-left, the BNG does contain many Marxist/leftist members causing the party to be
highly suspicious of integration claiming the adverse effects Europe has had on Galician
agriculture and ship-building. The PNV on the other hand favours all aspects of
integration and has used Europe to its benefit decreasing their claims for full
independence in exchange for Basque independence within a federal Europe (Keating
2000).
While ideology may be a weaker explanation, cultural differences may contribute to
understating regional party support for European integration. As noted in Chapter 3
many regionalists movements have been based upon cultural identity and the region's
historic cultural differences from the nation-state which contribute to regional
mobilisation for autonomy. For a cultural difference comparison I measured EU
support against the language difference score developed by Fearon and Van Houten
(1998) and examined further by Van Houten (2000). It is based on comparing regional
language families to the language family spoken in the nation-state's capital. While the
regional language does not necessarily have to be spoken throughout the region, the
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variable is designed to capture a sense of historic cultural differences of which regions
within a given member-state may possess. Based on a 0 to 1 scale, those languages
closer to 1 will be more distinct to the primary language of the region's member-state.U
By observing the mean line in Figure 5.5 we can see a positive slope between language
difference and EU support giving evidence of Hypothesis 5.3, that regional parties in
culturally different regions will be more inclined to support integration. The parties
with the languages most different from their member-state are within the Basque
Country of Spain and the Swedish speaking regions of Finland. Towards the centre lie
the parties of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Flanders while the parties within regions
that speak languages closer to their member-state are from Catalonia, The Canary
Islands, Andalusia, Aragon and the regions of Northern Italy represented by the
Northern League. This figure gives some support to the notion that regions can find
solace in the idea of a Europe of the cultures, where Europe can help protect the
minority cultures and languages oflarger nation-states (Keating 1998: 163-164). This is
strongly demonstrated with both Basque parties of the Basque National Party (PNV-
EAJ) and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). Referring back to Figure 5.4 both these parties
differ vastly on the ideology scale with the PNV -EAJ being centrist and the EA on the
far left. Both however display high levels of EU policy preference albeit the PNV -EAJ
is much higher.
Lastly, EU policy preferences will be compared to decentralisation preferences. As
noted earlier, several parties have used EU integration as a means to promote
decentralisation within their nation-states; the Scottish National Party and the Basque
National Party are key examples (Keating 2000; Dardanelli 2005). As Keating notes,
there have been two types of reactions towards Europe by the regional parties, the first
- 15 The values for each language are based on language families as defined by Grimes (1996) in Fearon
and Van Houten (Fearon and Van Houten 1998) and Van Houten (2000). Each language is classified by
sub-groups, for example Castilian Spanish is categorised as "Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-
Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian" and Catalan is categorised as
"Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, East Iberian" .. ,
A value is assigned at the level the regional language splits from the language spoken in the capital. In
this example Catalan splits from Castilian (as Castilian is the language spoken in Madrid) after "Ibero-
Romance" or the 8th level, thus Catalan receives a language family score of 8. Those regions that speak
the same language as that in the capital receive a value of I0, the highest level of sub categories. The
language family score is then inversed to create a score between 0.1 and 1 measuring language difference.
In the above example Catalonia would receive a Language Difference score of 0.125 (I divided by 8) and
Madrid a score of 0.1 (1 divided by 10). Another example would be Basque, a language so unique that it
splits at the first level. The language family score for Basque would then be 1 and its Language
Difference score wouldalso be 1 (1 divided by 1).
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is opposition to integration as a European level of governance may hinder democratic
control of the region, and the second a more pro-European stance as Europe can be seen
as a mechanism to gain autonomy from the nation-state (Keating 1998: 163). While the
prior of the two positions decreased by the end of the 1970s skepticism still remains
within a few regional parties. I would expect, as stated in Hypothesis 5.4, to see higher
aspirations of decentralisation to increase support for integration as regional parties
have demonstrated their strength as a pro-European family.
The mean line of Figure 5.6 shows a slightly positive slope demonstrating a small
positive relationship between higher levels of decentralisation policy leading to higher
levels of EU support, giving some evidence to support Hypothesis 5.4. It is of no
surprise that the values for decentralisation policies are much higher than those of EU
policy as this is the primary issue for regionalist parties. The parties that have the
highest levels of decentralisation are all from Spanish regions. Again the two largest
outliers are the BNG, as mentioned above include a high level of Euroskeptics within
the party, and the PNV-EAJ, which has been fruitful in using the EU to its advantage.
The Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) posses the highest decentralisation policy level
however remains below the mean line. This may be attributed to the ERC primarily
being founded as a leftist party. As the ERC may be closer to the far left peripheral of
the cleavage hypothesis, it may be less supportive of EU integration (Marks, Wilson and
Ray 2002).
Party Positions and Public Opinion towards EU Support
Lastly Iwill make a comparison of party positions with those of the party electorate in
order to test the Hypothesis 5.5 that regional party voters are as inline with their party's
position on integration as are the mainstream parties. Here, I simply define the party
- electorate as those individuals that would vote for any given party if there were to be an
upcoming election, as stated within the Eurobarometer surveys. Leonard Ray (2003a)
found that party positions influence voter opinions on European integration through a 2-"
stage least squares model. Ray found several key factors on party influence; first,
parties are more persuasive when the given issue is of higher importance. Second,
parties are more persuasive when the party demonstrates unity on the issue, and third
the closer an individual feels to the party the more likely the party will affect hislher
opinion (Ray 2003a: 988). While this may help explain party and electorate positions
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for mainstream parties this may not however help explain positions within regional
parties. The regional party electorate may not be seen as pro-EU as the regional party
they vote for. This might be due to the European issue not being of critical importance
to the voters or the regional party elites are not able to define European positions of the
party clearly (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002: 492). I predict however that as the
regional party positions remained consistent with the mainstream parties on EU position
in the prior analyses, the regional party electorate will demonstrate similar positions as
well. In examining this I use the expert survey on party positions along with the
Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File from the corresponding years of the expert
survey. As this analysis is attempting to capture a trend over time, it is necessary to
revert back to the Chapel Hill survey as the manifesto data is collected at various
intervals depending upon the timing of a member state's election. Furthermore, the
Eurobarometer score for EU evaluation is based on a limited scale while the manifesto
score has no upper or lower bound limit making it problematic to achieve an accurate
comparison. I then take the responses from each data set observing EU position and
normalise them on a 0 to 1 scale for comparison. I then compare the means between
party and voter for each party family over time."
Figure 5.7 displays each party family'S party and electorate position. Comparable to
positions of the mainstream party families, regional parties and their electorate appear to
be closely aligned with one another giving support to Hypothesis 5.5. When observing
the other minor parties of the far left, far right and greens, their electorate does not
appear to be as inline with the party position. Furthermore, the party elites of the
regional parties seem to run slightly higher than that of the electorate up until 1999.
This perhaps demonstrates the enthusiasm of regional party leaders using Europe as a
mechanism in obtaining their regional policy goals. While this simple graph cannot
. account for issues such as protest voting it does demonstrate that regional voters are
likely to share similar positions as their party on European integration.
16 Although the Chapel Hill expert survey includes data for 2002, Eurobarometer unfortunately does not
ask for vote preference. I have attempted to examine other datasets including the European Values Study
. and the European Social Survey to include 2002, however none provide adequate responses to continue
the analysis past 1999,
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Figure 5.7: Party Position vs. Voter Preference
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Conclusions
The dynamics of regional parties are very complex when compared to that of
mainstream and other minor parties. Unlike other party families which largely base
their commonalities on political ideologies, regional parties find their common identity
on the aspiration to change the domestic political structure in favour of a more
autonomous regional level. Therefore this allows the regional family to contain parties,
and members, on both ends of the left/right political spectrum. Despite these strong
ideological differences however, this seems to have little effect on regional party
support towards European integration.
This chapter sought to demonstrate that regional parties are just as pro-European ..as
other mainstream parties. The OLS analysis reiterated the findings of Hooghe, Marks
and Wilson (2002), Marks, Wilson and Ray (2000) and Jolly (2007) with the use of the
Comparative Manifestos Project data. Here we found party family to be the convincing
predictor towards EU integration support. Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 5.1,
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the regional party family had a strong and statistically significant effect comparable to
most mainstream parties. The issue of integration remains salient for most regional
parties as they gain advantages from the multilevel governance system which Europe
provides. When exploring reasons for regional party integration, traditional political
ideology as expected showed little correlation with EU support levels supporting
Hypothesis 5.2. As regional parties may consist of members from all political
ideologies they must formulate their support of integration through other motives. One
such ·motive may be cultural which showed a positive relationship supporting
Hypothesis 5.3. This gives some evidence that regional parties may see Europe as a
means of protecting regional culture. Decentralisation policy also showed a minimal
positive relationship indicating that regional parties view Europe as a means to
achieving autonomy within their nation-state. However, when observing the manifesto
ratios between European and decentralisation policies it is noticed that European
integration still remains a comparatively minor issue for regional parties. Nevertheless
there is evidence that European integration may be seen by regional parties as an
instrument in achieving regional autonomy. Lastly, through a comparison of party elite
and electorate EU positions, it was demonstrated that the regional party electorate is not
far adrift from their regional party's position on European integration, supporting
Hypothesis 5.5. This can have greater implications on replacing the notion of the
regional party as a fringe or protest vote party. The issue of integration is as important
to the regional party voter as it is to the party itself.
Understanding regional political parties and their positions towards integration serves as
an excellent starting point for understanding regional variations of public opinion
towards integration. Regional parties are at the forefront of mobilisation for autonomy
as well as representing the needs of the region at both the national and European levels
of go,;:"ernment. Regional parties encapsulate the characteristics of the region from
economy to culture. They help provide an identity which the public can recognise at the
regional territorial level. The final analysis within this chapter demonstrated that for
regional party supporters European integration can be seen as favourable, benefiting
..
both party and region. But does this sentiment hold up against the wider public and not
just regional party supporters? Do Europeans evaluate integration within the regional
context in which some of these parties help construct? The following chapters will
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attempt to provide explanations of regional variations in integration support amongst the
wider European public.
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Chapter 6
Regional Economic and Political Indicators of Public
Opinion: The Random Intercept Model Approach
Introduction
The previous chapter examined regional party attitudes towards integration and
correlated them with the opinion of the regional party supporters. It was demonstrated
that regional party supporters share similar opinions on European integration to their
party. Chapters 6 and 7 will expand the investigation from regional parties and
supporters to an examination of the entire regional public to bring further conclusions as
to whether the public and elites look upon Europe similarly. As noted in previous
chapters, the vast majority of the literature on public attitudes towards integration
overlooks several contexts by which individuals may base their evaluation for
integration. In addition, most research focuses on individual and national level
indicators to explain support for European integration using OLS and logistic regression
as the preferred statistical methods of choice. Described in Chapter 4, multilevel
modelling allows the possibility to account for the nested contextual structure in which
most survey data lies, however, has been infrequently applied to public opinion
research. Chapters 6 and 7 will apply multilevel modelling analysis to account for
regional variation within European public opinion.
The purpose of the research in Chapters 6 and 7 is to capture variance among regional
level variables in terms of regional economic, political and cultural identity indicators. I
predict individuals of regions that are economically, politically and culturally distinct
will be more inclined to evaluate the EU positively as it advances autonomy away from
the nation-state. The basis of this argument relies on the concept of 'new regionalism'
as regions are splintering away from the nation-state in terms of autonomy. The process
of decentralisation allows regions to take a more self-determined role confronting
globalisation thus fostering regional economic, political and, in some instances, cultural
identity.
- 96-
The following two chapters utilise multilevel modelling techniques to explain regional
European integration support. This chapter focuses on a sample from the EU15 and
explores the role of individual, regional and country level indicators and variations as
well as a further analysis of democratic satisfaction, economic expectations and
employment expectations within group level contexts. Chapter 7 will explore
subnational assertiveness as well as regional level variations on territorial attachments
within a sample of six member-states.
This chapter will focus on economic and political indicators at the national, regional and
individual levels. I will examine the strength of regional and national level economic
and political indicators in a multilevel analysis and demonstrate that the regional level
does contribute to group level variation and helps strengthen the explanatory power of
the model. I will also focus on three individual level variables, democratic satisfaction,
economic expectations and employment expectations, and show that each influences EU
opinion differently when examined in the contextual levels. The chapter will begin with
a brief description of previous research using similar variables to those chosen for the
statistical models in this chapter. It will follow with an explanation of the methodology
including a description of the random intercept model as well as an overview of the
datasets. Lastly the results of the models will be presented followed by the chapter
conclusions.
Economic Indicators and Public Support for European
Integration
Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the literature on public attitudes towards
European integration. The following two sections recount some of the previous works
utilising economic and political indicators which will be applied within the models of
this chapter. Many scholars have attempted to analyse the link between public
economic outlook and its influence on EU support. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993)
shaped their theoretical framework from theories of economic voting. Their theory
stated that current economic conditions in the nation-state would in tum influence one's
view of governing institutions at both the national and supranational level. They
conceptualised that European integration remains part of the domestic political debate
thus any benefits that would arise from integration are promoted as advantages it would
- 97-
provide the nation. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993: 512) focus on gross domestic product
(GDP), unemployment rates and inflation. GDP measures the overall wealth of a
country and should positively affect support for integration the larger a state's GDP.
Unemployment and inflation measure economic hardship of a country and should
therefore reflect a negative relation on support as these figures increase. As a result of
their study, they found limited evidence that economic conditions actually influence EU
support. Only inflation displayed any level of statistical significance in their outcome.
In contrast Gabel and Whitten (1997) demonstrated that it is the 'subjective' economy,
as perceived by the EU citizens, and not the 'objective' economy as measured by
economic indicators that influences support for integration. Consequently, EU support
draws on the public's perception of their personal and national economic welfare.
Gabel and Whitten (1997) differ from Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) in the hypotheses
of micro and macro-economics but also in modifying the economic voting model to
include regional and sub-national economic conditions. Economic conditions are never
clearly constant throughout a state. Regions need to be measured separately to show
discrepancies of national EU support within economic perceptions. Much of this
argument is based on Weatherford's (1983) finding that local unemployment conditions
in the United States influenced individual support of the President's economic policies.
In tum, when Gabel and Whitten (1997) applied this voting model to their study they
were able to achieve a clearer picture of individual perceptions on their personal
economic welfare.
Based on the above discussion the following hypotheses have been derived to
investigate both objective and subjective economic explanations of regional variation in
public attitudes of integration:
Hypothesis 6.1: Individuals within economically stronger regions are more
likely to support European integration than individuals within economically
weaker regions.
As Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) stated it would be expected that individuals within
wealthier countries would be more inclined to support the EU as they may potentially
benefit from the free market. This concept may also be applied to wealthier regions.
Those within wealthier regions may find the European free market beneficial in
- 98-
attracting European industry to invest within the region. Higher levels of regional
wealth would enable the region to be better suited to compete in the free market while
poorer regions may find economic competition unmanageable thus more likely to rely
on the nation-state. Economic well-being of a region will be measured by GDP and
unemployment rates explained further in the chapter.
Hypothesis 6.2: Individuals will more likely base their overall economic
.perceptions at the regional level rather than the national level when
assessing EU support.
This hypothesis will revaluate Gabel and Whitten's (1997) investigation of subjective
economic evaluations. The effect is expected to be a positive relationship, as positive
expectations of the economy and employment levels increase support levels of
integration will also increase. The hypothesis however estimates at which level
individuals will base their economic evaluations. I predict, as regional economies
. within a country differ, the public may be more aware of the economic conditions in
which they experience in their daily lives. Thus, individuals may be more likely to
evaluate economic conditions within a regional context, the closest contextual level in
which they are nested, to determine if European integration would be beneficial.
National Political Indicators and Public Support for European
Integration
National politics serves as an additional indicator for public evaluations of European
integration. Several argue that citizens do not have enough information to make
independent evaluations of the EU (Janssen 1991; Anderson 1998). Therefore the
public uses what is familiar and evaluates the EU in terms of domestic politics.
Anderson (1998) argues that individuals with positive evaluations of the national
government and institutions will most likely lead to positive evaluations of European
integration. In contradiction, by examining public support towards EU institutions,
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) found that EU support is highest when citizens view EU
institutions positively and their national institutions negatively. If a national
governinent seems to perform negatively while the EU institutions meet a citizen's
satisfaction, the cost of shifting authority to the EU will not exceed the benefits.
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Political judgment of the nation-state can lead to diverse evaluations of the EU.
Kritzinger (2003) demonstrated that support for the EU can be a symbolic protest
against "the dominant values of the nation-state" (Kritzinger 2003: 226). For
Kritzinger, the concept of individual support is based upon two approaches. The first is
that individuals who have fewer ties to the national political order have less
commitment to the politics of the nation-state and are more likely to take chances with
political institutions at different levels (Kronhauser 1959). The second is that those with
stronger ties to the national political system have a greater psychological limit that must
be overcome before protesting against the national political institutions (Rohrschneider
1990). Therefore a positive evaluation of the EU and a negative evaluation of the
political nation-state can occur simultaneously. In Kritzinger's (2003) research, she
statistically compared four EU member-states (France, Germany, Italy and the United
Kingdom) to demonstrate that EU evaluation and support strongly relies on the
performance of the nation-state. All four member-states demonstrate that negative
perceptions of the national government result in positive attitudes towards EU
integration. When evaluating the national government's economic management, France
and the United Kingdom showed higher support for EU integration in stronger
economic conditions whereas Germany and Italy showed negative support for EU
integration (Kritzinger 2003). The French and British are more likely to trust their
respective national governments to manage the economy during lower economic
performance whereas Germany and Italy are more likely to trust the EU.
Based upon the above discussion of political evaluations, in addition to the conceptions
of multilevel governance described in the previous chapters, the following hypotheses
have been developed to examine domestic political indicators and their influence on
regional variations of European support:
Hypothesis 6.3: Individuals within countries with stronger levels of
regional governance will more likely support European integration than
individuals in countries with weaker levels of regional governance.
As described in Chapter 3, the European Union is establishing a multi leveled system of
governance. As the EU pulls authority from the nation-state from above, regional
mobilisation based within the concept of new regionalism is demanding to pull
authority from the nation-state from below. In Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that
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political parties are more likely to favour integration if they already participate within a
domestic multilevel system of governance. Does this sentiment hold true for the wider
European public? I would predict that individuals residing within countries with higher
levels of regional governance will more likely be adapted to a multilevel governance
system. Therefore, these individuals will be less hesitant in accepting the transfer of
authority to the additional level of the European Union.
·Hypothesis 6.4: Individuals will equally base their overall democratic
perceptions at the regional and national levels when assessing EU support.
Multilevel governance and decentralisation may have potential impact on the public's
evaluation of national democracy. New regionalism and the process of decentralisation
differ not only between countries but at times between regions within the same country.
The United Kingdom and Spain are both prime examples of where regional mobilisation
exists only in certain regions in addition to an imbalance of powers between the
different regions. Even in federal countries like Germany higher levels of regional
mobilisation still exist in some regions such as Bavaria. Because of this imbalance of
either regional mobilisation and/or decentralisation I would expect individuals to
evaluate national democracy dependent upon the region in which they live. Those
within regions of higher mobilisation levels and/or higher levels of political autonomy
may be more inclined to support the multilevel governance nature of the European
Union.
The Random Intercept Model
One of the major contributions made in this, and the following chapter, is the use of the
multilevel statistical model. Individuals are typically members of nested communities
and can be influenced by the contextual settings that surround them. For example, a. '
person may be within a family, within a neighbourhood, within a city, within a country
and so on. Each of these clusters has the potentiality of affecting one's outlook on any
given subject. The multilevel model takes a given variable and accounts for the group
aspect. which may contribute to its explanatory power on the dependent variable
-
(Snijders and Bosker 1999).
As noted in Chapter 4 on the methodology of this dissertation, the use of multilevel
modelling in the realms of political science has been rather limited. Though used
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infrequently in earlier political research, Steenbergen and Jones' (2002) made a strong
argument for using multilevel modelling by comparing it with OLS regression in an
analysis of public EU support using country, political party and individuals as the
nested structure of the data. When compared to the OLS model, they demonstrate that
the multilevel model can help avoid inaccurate parameters in the estimation. Other
notable research using multilevel modelling includes Rohrschneider's (2002) analysis of
EU support and the democratic deficit, Peffley and Rohrschneider's (2003) work on
political tolerance, Hooghe and Marks' (2004; 2005) work on explaining EU support
through identity and economic calculations, and Duch and Stevenson's (2005)
examination of economic voting in elections. In most of the above mentioned research
country, and some instances political party, were the chosen clustered groups.
The multilevel model takes these nested structures into account by adding additional
error terms (one more per level) into the regression equation (Snijders and Bosker 1999:
38). This chapter deals with the simpler type of multilevel model, the random intercept
model, while the following chapter will explore integration support through the
hierarchical linear model which includes random slopes. For the purposes of this
research, the individual level is level-I, while the region and country levels are level-2
and level-3 respectively. More detail of the nested structure pertaining to this chapter
will be explained below.
The random intercept model takes into account that the mean of the dependent variable
is different for each group. The following equation for a two-level model reflects that
the intercept ({30j) is dependent on the group while the regression coefficient ({3IXij)
for the explanatory variable remains constant: I
(6.1) •
Here, .Yij is the dependent variable for individual i in group j while Xij is ..the
explanatory variable at the individual level. In addition is Rij , the error at the individual
IThe following equations and notation that will be used in this and the following chapter are taken from
Snijders and Bosker (1999: 38-66)
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level (level-l ), The intercept (PO) ) can then be broken down into the average intercept
and group (level-2) deviation shown in equation 6.2
(6.2)
By placing Equation 6.2 in place of the intercept in equation 6.1, equation 6.3 is created
stating that the "values VO} are the main effects of the groups: conditional on an
individual having a given X-value and being in group j, the Y-value is expected to be
VO} higher than in the average group" (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 42):
(6.3)
While the above two-level equation is a basic notation for the simplest random intercept
model, this research involves three levels when explaining European integration
support, the individual (level-l ), the region (level-2) and country (level-3). Equation
6.4 adds the level-3 (k) terms and deviation to equation 6.3, where VOOk represents the
main effects of the 'groups conditional on an individual having a given X-value and
being within level-2 group j within the level-3 group k:
(6.4)
This equation will be used in more detail below following the discussion of the selected
variables.
The Data -
The dataset used for the models in this chapter is the Eurobarometer 63.4 Survey,
conducted in 2005 and contains the then 25 total member-states of the European Union,
although the additional Central and Eastern European member-states were included in
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the dataset I have chosen to analyse only the original first 15 member states? The basis
of this sample was chosen to limit the analysis to member-states with similar historical
economic and political experience upon entry into the European Union as well as
methodological restraints including properly coding each country's region and gathering
regional GDP and unemployment data. The total sample size after removing
observations with any missing values is 14,978. The economic indicators for
regional/national GDP and unemployment were taken from the European Union's
official statistics administration Eurostat. 3 The economic figures are for the year 2004
which at the time of this research were the most up to date statistics available (further
discussion below).
As explained in Chapter 1, the meaning of region can be quite ambiguous. It can refer
to simple geographical boundaries outlined by natural borders or territory defined by the
peoples that inhabit it. For the purposes of this dissertation I begin the basis of my
definition of region with the work of Pieter Van Houten (2003). Where Van Houten
(2003: 124) defines the region simply as "the administrative level immediately below
the national state", I go further in allocating these administrative levels regional status
through the definition outlined in Chapter i.' The total number of regions for the
analysis in this chapter is 148.
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is an index scale combining the following three questions from
the Eurobarometer survey:
Generally speaking, do you think that [our country's] membership of the
European Union is a bad thing, neither good nor bad thing, or a good thing?
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
3 Data available at epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
4 The subnational administrative regions of England are a bit ambiguous as it is divided purely for
administrative purposes although several attempts have occurred at creating stronger regional authority,
particularly in the Northeast. As the European Commission recognises each English region each will be
used in this research. Furthermore, due to the constraints of Eurobarometer's sample coding, some
member states' regions are slightly unclear as Eurobarometer does not include coding for all
administrative regions. This is the case for Sweden and Denmark in which the historical regions are
included in this analysis. Furthermore Eurobarometer combines the Italian regions of the Aosta Valley
and Piedmont as well as Molise and Abruzzo. Due to this circumstance these four regions will have to be
treated as two combined regions that] identity as "Piedmont and the Aosta Valley" and "Molise and
Abruzzo". ..
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In five years time would you like the European Union to play a less
important role, the same role, or a more important role in your daily life?
In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very negative,
fairly negative, neutral, fairly positive or very positive image?
The above questions were selected as each measures a different aspect of attitudes
towards EU integration. The first asks the respondent to evaluate the EU relating to the
bene~ts his or her country has received from membership, a more overall objective
evaluation. The second question is more subjective asking the role the EU should play
in hislher life. Lastly the third measures the respondent's overall image of the EU. The
basis of this index is similar to that of Hooghe and Marks' (2004) and Steenbergen and
Jones' (2002) dependent variable scaled index. The variable is effective because it
measures several aspects of what integration support may represent to an individual.
The first question relates the EU to one's country, the second relates the EU to the
individual on a more personal level and the third question asks an overall perception of
the EU. Other researchers such as Gabel and Whitten (1997) have used two questions
relating to membership and unification to create an index variable, however, with the
addition of a third question the index should gain reliability. The responses for each of
the questions were first coded for 1 to equal the most negative response, while adding a
value of 1 for each response thereafter in positive categorical order, thus higher values
are stronger pro-European responses. As the scales for each variable differ, all three
variables were standardised so each has equal weight to a shared scale of 0 to I using
the following formular'
Z, = r: -lower bound of Y
I upper bound of Y - lower bound of Y
The scores for each respondent were then summed, divided by 3 and multiplied by 10 to
create an index scale of 0 to 10. Those with a higher index score are more pro-
European while smaller index values are more adverse to integration.
There has been much contention in all realms of statistical survey research on how to
treat the 'don't know' responses in the dependent variable. One common practice has
S i = individual respondent, Z = Rescaled variable, Y = original variable
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been to remove the 'don't know' responses from the analysis using listwise deletion.
When using large data sets such as Eurobarometer listwise deletion can seem to be an
understandable approach. However, it is possible that some information will be lost if
these observations are removed. In Gabel's (1998c) test he runs his models both
including the 'don't knows', coding with the median value as ambivalent, and excluding
them using listwise deletion finding little difference in his results. Carey (2002) ran his
models using listwise deletion, imputed data, as well as coding the 'don't knows' in the
'neither good nor bad' ambivalent category, finding little variation. Both these studies
can be seen as demonstrating that 'don't know' can be seen as an ambivalent response.
I tested each of my models using both listwise deletion and recoding the 'don't knows'
as the neutral response for each of the above questions and have found the results for
both methods to be similar. As a result, I have included the 'don't knows' in the
analysis. All respondents with missing values, however, for any used variable, have
been left out.
The Explanatory Variables
As noted earlier, the multilevel analysis is divided into two chapters. This chapter
evaluates democracy and economic effects on support for European integration while
the following chapter examines territorial attachments and regional mobilisation. In
order to remain consistent, both chapters use the same variables for the models with the
exception of an additional variable on regional assertiveness which will be introduced in
the next chapter. The below descriptions will detail the main variables of interest for
this chapter only while including a brief description of the control variables. The
remaining variables will be described in more depth in the next chapter.
As I have discussed in the above review of the previous literature, a large amount of. .
public opinion research on European integration focuses on economic indicators. As I
am attempting to determine the strengths of regional variance, my regional economy
model includes macro-economic variables to capture the regional economic situation's
influence on integration support. As mentioned throughout the dissertation, much of the
previous literature concentrates on macro-economic indicators at the national level
(Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Duch and Taylor 1997; Gabel and Whitten 1997;
Kritzinger 2003). Ihave included several of the same national level indicators used in
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previous research as well as additionally including the regional indicator to compare the
levelled strengths of the effect.
The first economic variable in the model is GDP.6 In previous literature measuring
public attitudes towards European integration at the aggregated national level, GDP was
used as an indicator of economic well-being and an overall global measure of the
national living standard (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 513). GDP however may take an
additional form when investigating new regionalism. As has been stated previously
within new regionalism's definition, it is the regional reaction towards globalisation and
confronting the global market (Keating 1997; 1998). It has been hypothesised that
regions which are better equipped for the competitiveness of the global market, that
being economically stronger regions, are more likely to have higher levels of regional
assertiveness (Gourevitch 1979: 319). In addition Van Houten (2003) provided
evidence within his model that higher levels of regional GDP provide more favourable
conditions for higher levels of regional assertiveness. As Chapter 5 established that
regional party elites are likely to favour European integration, individuals within
economically stronger regions may likely reflect this sentiment as well recognising the
region's ability to compete and benefit from the European market. Therefore it is
predicted that higher levels of Regional GDP will lead to higher levels of EU support.
At the national level, in consistency with Eichenberg and Dalton's (1993: 513)
hypothesis, countries with a higher standard of living and a stronger economic well-
being are more likely to benefit from the European market thus higher levels of
National GDP are also likely to lead to higher levels ofEU support.
In addition to GDP as an indicator of economic well-being, I have also included
Unemployment for both the regional and national levels," Although in previous studies
national unemployment has been found to be insignificant (Eichenberg and Dalton
1993; Duch and Taylor 1997; Gabel and Whitten 1997), I believe that regional
unemployment levels may display stronger significance as unemployment levels vary
throughout each member state and individuals may be more likely to evaluate
.'
unemployment within the community level closest to them. As the Eurobarometer
survey was conducted in 2005, all economic figures are from the year 2004 and were
taken from the Eurostat online database. The 2004 data is used as the figures represent
6 GDP is measured in 'millions of€uros' by Eurostat and then is transformed tonaturallog.
7 Unemployment is measured by percent of unemployed persons as a share of the active population.
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a full year thus the 2005 data would not represent the point in time in which the survey
was conducted. In addition this is also to account for the potential time-lag in which the
public use economic stimuli to influence their attitudes.
As displayed by Gabel and Palmer (1995) individuals may evaluate integration in terms
of a costs and benefits analysis. Therefore, I would expect those that are able to observe
the direct benefits of the EU are more likely to support integration. Many economic
benefits of the EU are highlighted at the regional level. For example, I have included a
dichotomous variable for Objective J Region assigning the value of 1 to individuals
residing in an Objective 1 region and a value of 0 if they are not.8 Regions that are
designated Objective 1 are those in most need of the European Union's Regional Policy,
which transfers resources from wealthier to poorer regions. Objective 1 qualify as
poorer economic status and receive financial benefits from the EU in order to reduce
regional economic disparities. I expect individuals residing in an Objective 1 region
will more likely see the regional benefits from EU policy. Therefore I expect the
variable to have a positive relationship with support of integration.
In addition to objective economic variables I have also included objective political
variables in an attempt to measure the political characteristics of the regions and the
countries they exist in. The first of which is a national level variable measuring the
overall strength of regional governance within the country. The Regional Governance
variable is taken from Hooghe and Marks' (2001: 191-212) attempt to quantify the level
of regional democracy within the EU member-states. They base their overall value for
each country on the summed scores of four criteria: Constitutional federalism, special
territorial autonomy, role of regions in central government and regional elections. The
overall scale is between 0 and 12 where higher scores equal countries with higher levels
of regional governance. I would predict that countries with higher levels of regional
governance are more likely to be accustomed to a multilevel system of governance.
Therefore, individuals within countries with a higher Regional Governance score will
be more likely to accept transferring authority to a higher level of governance, thus will
be more likely to support European integration.
8 The Objective 1 regions are referenced according to the European Commission covered for the years
2000-2006. Full list available from the European Commission website:
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/objective 1/index_ en.htm
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The last objective political variable relevant to this chapter is Regional Party. Pieter
Van Houten (2003) included a similar variable measuring the electoral performance of
regional parties within regionally assertive regions. While Van Houten attempted to
capture the strength of electoral performance, I simplify the variable to summarise the
highest level of governance a regional party has been elected. The three possible
outcomes are the regional assembly/parliament, the national parliament or no elected
regional party. I have defined regional party according to Hix and Lord (1997: 44) as
parties within a subnational territory attempting the goal of reforming their domestic
political structure around the region of which they function.9 To code the variable, I
referred to the previous national and regional (if a regional assembly exists) election
results to the time of the Eurobarometer survey.l'' A region where the highest level of
governance that a regional party obtained a seat is the regional assembly a value of 1
was designated. A region where the highest level the regional party sits is the national
parliament a value of 2 was designated. All other regions where regional parties either
do not exist or are not elected to the national or subnational governments are designated
O. In order to obtain a comparable effect of the different regional party governance
levels I then transformed the Regional Party variable into a dummy variable for each
category. In the analysis regions without regional parties elected to any level of
governance are the reference category. I would expect to see elected regional parties to
both regional and national parliaments to have a positive effect on integration support,
as regional elites benefit from the participation in governance and are better able to
promote their position towards European integration.
Additionally I will be examming three subjective indicators used to measure an
individual's perception of domestic economy and democracy. In order to compare
concrete economic figures with the perception of the state of the national economy I
have included two variables referring to the overall national economy and employment
perception similar to those used by Gabel and Whiten (1997). The two questions are as
follows:
What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve
months be better, worse or the same when it comes to ... ?
9 Refer to Hix and Lord (1997: 46-47) for a complete list of regional parties within the European Union.
10 The Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique at the Universite Libre de Bruxelles conveniently created a
database of regional and national election results from each European state available at
dev.ulb.ac.be/cevipol/en/elections.html
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1. The economic situation in (our country)
2. The employment situation in (our country)
The responses are coded 1 for "worse", 2 for "same" and 3 for "better". Eurobarometer
does not include any questions asking the respondent to make any evaluations at the
regional level. Although the above questions refer to the national level, additional
models will be conducted exploring the multilevel context of these evaluations. These
models will include the national and regional means as well as the between country and
between regions of the same country variation of the means. The strengths of these
coefficients can explain at which of these levels the effect of the variable is strongest
giving insight to the context of which individuals generate their evaluations. The state
of the economy can vary by region, for example the unemployment rate in Spain in the
region of Extremadura is 17.5% while Navarre enjoys a relatively low rate of 5.5%. I
would expect the economic perceptions of both these regions to vary significantly. I
predict both variables to have a positive significant effect. Furthermore, in the second
half of the analysis of this chapter, I expect to view a higher level of significance for
both at the regional levels than at the country levels.
In addition to the subjective economy variables I have included one variable measuring
Democratic Satisfaction using the below question:
On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or
not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (our country)?
While Kritzinger's (2003) analysis attempted to evaluate the perceptions of the current
government I attempt to capture the perception of the way democracy works within a
country; It is possible this variable goes further than evaluating the present government
but rather it is an approval of the democratic norms of the state. As the role of
multilevel governance increases in Europe the democratic satisfaction variable should
be expected to be significant at both the national and regional levels. Furthermore,
..
where evaluations are made at the national level it is expected those with higher levels
of democratic satisfaction will be less likely to transfer authority to a higher level, thus
having a negative effect. Conversely, positive evaluations from the regional level will
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be made by those conditioned to multilevel governance and more likely to support the
European level.
Also included in the model are three variables that will be explored more deeply in the
next chapter. The first variable of opinion leadership relates to Inglehart's (1970b;
1970a) cognitive mobilisation theory measuring one's interaction in the discussion of
politics. It is hypothesised that those with higher levels of opinion leadership will view
the ED favourably. The second and third variables evaluate territorial attachment at the
national and regional level. Country Attachment and Regional Attachment both are a 4-
point scale measuring one's attachment to either territory where higher scores equate to
stronger levels of attachment. The predictions and results of these variables are
examined in Chapter 7.
Lastly Age and Gender act as control variables to optimise the effects of the models.
According to Deflem and Pampel (1996) age has a significant effect on EU integration.
It was hypothesised that older generations' sense of responsibility for the wider
community prevail over the younger generations' cosmopolitan ideals. However due to
the democratisation of schooling in recent decades, those of a younger generation, who
are more likely to have received further education than previous generations, are more
likely to support the unification of Europe (Deflem and Pampel 1996). Modem
European youth may consider there to be more opportunities with a further integrated
Europe thus it is expected that the older one is the less likely he/she is to favour
integration. It has been argued that women are more likely to be employed in lower-
paid, public sector, part-time or temporary jobs than men. Therefore a downturn in the
economy will have a disproportionate affect on men than women, making men more
likely to support the EU (Liebert 1999; Nelsen and Guth 2000).
For ease of interpretation it is recommended in multilevel modelling to centre all
individual level variables at their group mean, in this case region mean (Snijders and
Bosker 1999; Rasbash, Steele, Browne and Prosser 2005). II This is primarily done for
..
ease of interpretation as the intercept represents the mean value of the explanatory
variable.12 The dependent variable however remains at its 0-10 score.
II The centred variable is created by subtracting the region mean from the raw score of the respondent.
12 This is also logistically done to reduce the number of numerical errors that may occur in the MLwiN
multilevel modelling software (Rasbash, Steele, Browne and Prosser 2005: 100-101).
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The Results
The nested multilevel structure being tested consists of individuals nested within
regions, which are nested within countries. In order to test the strength of these levels
and validity of the nested structure I have first ran an ANOV A model, also know as an
empty model. The ANOVA model is simply a test of the dependent variable ran with
only the constant and no explanatory variables, using equation 6.5 below: 13
(6.5) .
EU SUPPORTijk = rooo + VOOk+ UOjk + Rijk
Table 6.1 displays the value of the constant as well as the variance for all three tested
levels.l" Observing the standard errors suggests that all three levels are significant
giving evidence that the multilevel structure of the data should be considered.
Analysing the ratios of the three level variances will give a better understanding each
level plays when observing EU support (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Unsurprisingly the
vast majority of variance comes from the individual level where the variance statistic
6.14 makes up nearly 90% of the total variance. The remaining 10% however comes
from higher levels that should not be ignored when making conclusions about EU
support. The regional level makes up 3% while the remaining 7% is accounted for at
the national level. Regional variance accounts for roughly 30% of the group levelled
Table 6.1: EU15 ANOVA
Modell
Parameter ~ (S.E.)
Fixed Effects
Constant 6.264 (0.192)
Variance Components
Country-Level var( VOOk) 0.513 (0.202)
Region-Level var( UOjk) 0.173 (0.033)
Individual-Level var( Rijk) 6.144 (0.071)
-2 Log Likelihood 69910.610
J3 i = individual,) = region and k = country; rooo = constant
14 All estimates in this chapter were generated from MLwiN 2.02 software.
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variance. The low variance of the regional level may be due to those states that are
highly centralised such as Denmark and Ireland. The lack of the regional level
interaction in these states perhaps creates a more fluid opinion towards integration. This
hypothesis will be explored further in the following chapter examining only devolved
EU states. Although these levels are small it would be invalid to ignore them.
Furthermore, this analysis does go into further depth by exploring the effect different
variables play within the multilevel context.
The second section of this analysis is the inclusion of the chosen explanatory variables
into the model. Again, using the random intercept model the equation with the selected
variables is as follows:
(6.6)
EU SUPPORT;,k :::rOOO+ rOOIGDPk+ r002UNEMPLOYMENTk + roo3REGIONAL GOVk +
rOIOGDPjk + r02oUNEMPLOYMENTjk + r0300BJECTIVE 1jk +
r04oREGIONAL PARTY(REG) jk + r050REGIONAL PARTY(NAT) jk +
r060LANGUAGE DIFjk + rlOO DEMOCRA TIC SATyk + r2ooECON EXPijk +
r30oEMPLOYMENT EXPijk + r4ooCOUNTRY ATT;jk + r50oREGION ATTijk +
r6oo0PINIONLEADERSHIPijk + r700GENDERijk + rSOOA GEijk + VOOk+
'-!Ojk+Ruk
The results are presented in Table 6.2, Model 2.
Observing Model 2 we can see that each of the individual level variables is statistically
significant. Clearly age and gender came out as predicted with older individuals less
likely to. support integration in addition to males more likely to support the EU.
Opinion leadership also contains a positive effect while country attachment includes a
positive effect and regional attachment is negative. The effects of these variables will
be explored in the next chapter. The subjective variables, democratic satisfaction,
econom.ic expectations and employment expectations each are significant and positive as
expected. This indicates that positive evaluations of the national political and economic
status equate to positive evaluations of EU integration. Do the objective variables hold
as strong?
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Table 6.2: EU15 Random Intercept Models
Model2 Model3
Parameter p (S.E.) P (S.E.)
Fixed Effects
Country Level
LogGDP -0.353+ (0.186) -0.341 + (0.184)
Unemployment 0.128 (0.083) 0.129 (0.082)
Regional Governance 0.040 (0.066) 0.035 (0.065)
Region Level
LogGDP 0.139* (0.056) 0.131 * (0.053)
Unemployment 0.002 (0.017) 0.001 (0.016)
Objective 1 -0.260+ (0.138) -0.282* (0.130)
Regional Party (R.A.) 0.020 (0.176) 0.092 (0.176)
Regional Party (N.P.) 0.304 (0.193) 0.187 (0.184)
Language Difference -0.378 (00400) -0.206 (0.382)
Individual Level
Democratic Satisfaction 0.801 ** (0.027) 0.801 ** (0.027)
Economic Expectations 0.288** (0.034) 0.288** (0.034)
Employment Expectations 0.247** (0.033) 0.247** (0.033)
Country Attachment 0.112** (0.035) 0.112** (0.035)
Region Attachment -0.072* (0.030) -0.072* (0.030)
Opinion Leadership 0.278** (0.022) 0.278** (0.022)
Gender 0.227** (0.039) 0.227** (0.039)
Age -0.008** (0.001) -0.008** (0.001)
Regional GDP • Economic 0.120** (0.029)
Expectations
Constant 8.302** (2.10) 8.227** (2.176)
Variance Components
Country-Level var( VOOk) 00403 (0.160) 0.398 (0.157)
Region-Level var( UOJk ) 0.156 (0.032) 0.128 (0.028)
Individual-Level var( Rljk ) 50448 (0.063) 50448 (0.063)
-2 Log Likelihood .. 68108.168 68092.196
N 14978 14978
+p < .10, * P < .05, ** P < .01
- 114 -
We can see that amongst the group level variables GDP is the only economic indicator
at both levels to demonstrate significance. Furthermore, it is only strongly significant
with a p-value below 0.05 at the regional level while at the national level it only
maintains a p-value below 0.10.15 Most interestingly, the effect of GDP is differing
with a negative relationship at the national level and a positive relationship at the
regional level. Individuals in wealthier countries are more likely to distrust the EU
while those in wealthier regions are more likely to be favourable to integration,
supporting Hypothesis 6.1. As demonstrated above, the subjective economic perception
variables run positive similar to the regional GDP indicator. Perhaps economic
evaluations interact with regional GDP levels. It would be expected that individuals
within wealthier regions are more likely to have positive economic evaluations than
those in poorer regions. Model 3 includes an interaction term for regional GDP and
economic expectations.l'' The coefficient effect is positive and strongly significant
demonstrating a likelihood that individuals may in fact base their economic perceptions
from the regional level. Here, individuals within high GDP regions who also have high
economic expectations are the most likely to support the EU. The statistical
significance of the interaction term contributes to both Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2.
Regional GDP, a regional level variable, is having a direct interaction with economic
evaluation, an individual level variable, thus reinforcing the importance of the nested
structure of the model.
A second interesting factor which relates to this hypothesis lies within the Objective 1
variable which has a negative effect. This goes against Gabel and Palmer's (1995)
suggestion that those who are more likely to observe the benefits of the EU will more
likely support it. A possible theory as to why the Objective 1 variable is negative may
simply be again related to the regional GDP indicator and Hypothesis 6.1; wealthier
regions ate more likely to support integration. Regions that receive objective 1 funding
are those that are economically deprived most likely being regions with a low GDP. If
the interaction variable explained above is correct, regional wealth conditions one's
evaluation of the economy where lower levels of economic satisfaction lead to lower
15 Traditionally in social sciences, variables are considered significant when the p-value is below 0.05.
Values that come close to this value however should still not be overlooked as they still may contribute to
the understanding of the model. Therefore, variables with a level of significance between 0.05 and 0.10
will also be considered although with caution. These variables will be denoted with a special cross rather
than star on the tables.
16 An interaction term is created by simply multiplying the two variables.
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levels of EU support. Surprisingly, regional wealth has a stronger effect even when
those in poorer regions may benefit directly from the European Union's regional policy.
Regarding the political objective indicators, Regional Governance displayed a positive
effect indicating individuals in a more multilevel governance country are more likely to
support the EU, as predicted in Hypothesis 6.3. The result however is not statistically
significant thus a firm conclusion cannot be drawn. In addition the role of regional
parties in government is also positive however neither of the above two variables
displayed any statistical significance thus these conclusions can only be considered with
caution. The subjective variable Democratic Satisfaction was the only political
indicator that demonstrated significance. This may support Anderson's (1998)
argument that individuals are using familiarity based upon their national government to
transfer support onto the European level. Here the evaluations of the functions of
democracy within the individual's member state appear to positively affect support
towards EU integration.
Given the above results we can see the strong effects of the three chosen subjective
indicators. Are these opinions formed in a contextual circumstance? In other words it
may not be enough to evaluate these effects at the individual level. Anderson (1996)
demonstrated the public reflect on domestic political contexts when evaluating Europe.
An individual's perception of the state of the economy or democracy may be dependent
on the perceptions of those around himlher. Democratic Satisfaction, Economic
Expectations and Employment Expectations will all be analysed at the aggregate levels
of region and country to account for the contextual nature these variables may hold.
Model 4 in Table 6.3 contains the region and country level means for Democratic
Satisfaction, Economic Expectations and Employment Expectationsr' In addition, the
individual level variables are not region centred but left as raw scores so they can be
comparable across each level rather than just the regional level. We can see that the
individual level coefficients are the same as those in Model 2 on Table 6.2. Democratic
Satisfaction is significant at the individual level and country level mean however not
significant at the region level. We can conclude that democratic satisfaction plays a role
17 The test was also completed with each of the variables from model 2. While there were no significant
changes to the coefficients, they are not shown for ease of reading the table.
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Table 6.3: Grouped Effects of Democratic Satisfaction, Economic Expectations and
Employment Expectations
Model4 ModelS
Parameter p (S.E.) P (S.E.)
Democratic Satisfaction (dem)
Individual level (demuk ) 0.801** (0.027)
Within Region (demUk - dem .jk )
0.801** (0.027)
Reg!on Mean ( dem .jk )
-0.153 (0.238)
Between Region/Within Country (dem .jk - dem ..k) 0.648** (0.236)
Country Mean ( dem ..k ) -3043* (1.346) -2.785* (1.325)
Economic Expectations (econ)
Individual level ( econuk ) 0.288** (0.034)
Within Region (econUk - econ.jk )
0.288** (0.034)
Region Mean ( econs ) 0.830* (00411)
l.l17** (00410)
Between Region/Within Country (econ.jk - econ ..k)
Country Mean ( econ ..k ) 10410 (3.583) 2.528 (3.556)
Employment Expectations (emp)
Individual level ( emp ) 0.247** (0.033)
Within Region (emPuk - emP.jk) 0.247** (0.033)
Region Mean (emP.jk) -00440 (0.355)
Between Region/Within Country (emP.jk - emP ..k )
-0.193 (0.353)
Country Mean (emp ..~)
0.351 (2.972) 0.158 (2.948)
Constant 14.365** (3.967) 14.365** (3.967)
Variance Components
Country-Level var( VoOk) 0.294 (0.119) 0.294 (0.119)
Region-Level var( UOjk) 0.117 (0.027) 0.117 (0.027)
Individual-Level var( ~Uk) 50447 (0.063) 50447 (0.063)
N 14978 14978
-2 Log Likelihood 68080.846 68080.846
+ P < .10, * P < .05, ** P < .01
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in influencing EU support at the country level but not at the regional level. Furthermore
the country level coefficient is negative. This can be interpreted that individuals who
overall have a higher satisfaction with democracy are more likely to support the EU
however, individuals in the most overall satisfied countries are less likely to support the
EU. Those in highly democratically satisfied countries seem to be unwilling to
transcend political authority to a supranational level.
When· observing the economic subjective variables, Economic Expectations and
Employment Expectations, we can detect a difference with Democratic Satisfaction.
Economic Expectations demonstrate significance at the regional level and not the
country level while Employment Expectations demonstrates significance in neither
group level. We can conclude that economic expectations playa role in influencing EU
support at the regional level but not at the national level, supporting Hypothesis 6.2.
Although employment evaluations do not seem to consider national or regional contexts
the public does appear to be basing their evaluations of the overall economy situation at
the regional level.
To investigate the group aggregates further, Model 5 offers the within-region, between-
region/within country and between country coefficients. Here, the group means are
replaced with the deviation scores from the mean of each level. Comparably, the
within-region coefficients for each variable are equal to the individual raw score
coefficients in Model 4. Observing Democratic Satisfaction, we see that the within-
country and individual level are both equal to 0.801. The between-region/within-
country score is 0.648 equal to sum of the individual score (0.801) and region mean (-
0.153) in Model 4. We know this difference is not significant however as the region
mean was not statistically significant in Model 4 even though the between-
region/within-country coefficient is significant. Lastly the country mean (-2.785) in
Model 5 is the sum of the individual level (0.801), the region mean (-0.153) and the
country mean (-3.43) from Model 4. The results signify that democratic evaluations
remain stronger at the national level than at the regional level, contradicting Hypothesis
6.4. The public is yet to evaluate democracy from the regional context.
Economic Expectations presents a different depiction. The between-region/within-
country coefficient (1.117) is statistically significant and can be interpreted properly as
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the region mean in Model 4 which was also significant. From this we can conclude that
regions with higher expectations of the economy are more likely to have higher levels of
EU support than those regions with lower expectations within the same country. We
cannot make the same conclusion at the country level as the between country mean is
statistically insignificant in both Models 4 and 5. This emphasises that individuals'
expectations of the economy are affected by the overall perceptions of the economy in
the region they live. Furthermore this transcends into a positive evaluation of the EU if
their region has higher levels of positive economic expectations. Finally Employment
Expectations demonstrate a positive within-region effect but conclusions cannot be
made at any higher level.
Conclusions
This chapter attempted to examine the role the regional level plays when considering
both objective and subjective economic and political indicators. Through the use of the
random intercept model, it found the amount of variance at the regional level to account
for roughly 30% of the total group level variance verifying the significance of the
multilevel structure in the survey data. Upon further investigation of the explanatory
variables, GDP was found influential at both the regional and country level. It was
demonstrated that those in wealthier countries appeared to be less likely to support the
EU while those in wealthier regions were more likely. This result seems to add
evidence in support of Hypothesis 6.1, however, the national level GDP effect appears
to go against the initial concept of the hypothesis. As a whole, those in wealthier
member-states may feel that the country receives less from the European Union as to
what they contribute. As it is countries, and not regions, that formally contribute to EU
funding, wealth at the regional level produces a different effect. The public within
wealthier regions seem to focus more on what there is to gain from integration as
opposed to a financial burden, thus the positive effect. This dynamic continues when
analysing the interaction between regional wealth and economic perceptions where
region GDP seems to condition one's economic perception. In addition, those within
Objective 1 funded regions appeared to have less favourable attitudes towards
integration. This again may demonstrate that at the regional level those within poorer
regions still find the competitive nature of the European free market to be threatening to
the economic stability of the region despite receiving subsidies from the European
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Union. At the regional level, higher levels of regional wealth appear to have a strong
influence on public integration attitudes.
Levels of multilevel governance within a country appeared to have a positive effect,
where those within countries with higher levels of regional governance were more likely
to favour integration perhaps indicating that multilevel governance within a country
helps condition individuals to accept an additional level of authority within the EU.
While· this appears to support Hypothesis 6.3, the results were not statistically
significant thus cannot be concluded. Furthermore, the election of a regional party into
the national parliament had a positive effect on support of integration though not
statistically significant. While these objective political indicators both follow the
predicted direction of support influence, the lack of statistical evidence still
demonstrates that the regional public is not yet ready to base political evaluations at the
regional level. The investigation into the subjective indicators presented a more in-
depth analysis of this possibility.
While none of the objective political indicators showed significance, the subjective
variable evaluating national democracy displayed a strong positive effect on integration
support in addition to both the subjective economic indicators of economic and
employment expectations. When analysing the economic and political perceptions at
the aggregate levels, economic perceptions displayed an effect at the regional level
rather than the national level supporting Hypothesis 6.2. Employment perceptions
however remained statistically significant at only the individual level indicating the
personal perception that the variable may hold. Evaluations of national democracy
however showed statistical significance at the national level only, contradicting
Hypothesis 6.4, indicating that political proxies for integration evaluation remain at the
national level.
The central conclusion of this chapter is that regional econormcs are important in
formulating EU support while the political context appears to remain at the national
level. This displays that regional political considerations still have ground to gain with
the general public as democracy is still evaluated as a national perspective. Individuals
however are showing signs that they can construct evaluations on a regional level, at
least in terms of economic distinction. Culture and identity may give more insight to
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this as they can both be unique on a regional basis. The following chapter will continue
this investigation by evaluating identity in addition to the affect of regional mobilisation
for further autonomy.
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Chapter 7
Identity and Regional Assertiveness: The Hierarchical
Linear Model Approach
Introduction
The previous chapter drew a comparison of variation at the individual, regional and
national levels of public support for European integration through a multi leveled
examination of political and economic indicators of the EUI5. A comparison of three
subjective indicators, democratic satisfaction, expectations of unemployment and
economic well-being, found that democratic satisfaction showed most explanation at the
national level while economic expectations displayed its strength at the regional level.
This indicates that individuals reflect on economic expectations within the regional
context while reflections of democracy still remain at the national level. Employment
expectations only remain strong within the individual context demonstrating that
perhaps individuals reflect on the question from a personal perception. In addition,
GDP only displayed any statistical significance at the regional level. The chapter's
primary contribution concluded that economic indictors were strongest at the regional
level while political indicators still remain a national level trend, indicating that at least
in terms of economy individuals are likely to generate their evaluations from a regional
context and use this assessment to evaluate European integration.
As noted throughout this dissertation, levels of new regionalism and regional
mobilisation vary across the European Union. While the previous chapter contributed
to explaining the multileveled effects of economic and political indicators within a
sample of all EU15 contributing to a better sense of an EU-wide representation, it stops
short in explaining the role regional mobilisation plays in member-states in whi~h
regionalcomponents have a stronger existence. This difference should be taken into
account thus meriting an analysis of member-states in which regional mobilisation is
present. This chapter will further analyse factors of new regionalism within movements
of regional assertiveness and multileveled identities. The models used in this chapter
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will differ from those in Chapter 6, adding a new variable attempting to capture levels
of regional mobilisation towards further autonomy. In addition, this chapter will focus
on devolved member-states where stronger regional variations exist in an attempt to
prevent diluting the effects of regional assertiveness.
I will first present a brief background of the previous literature that helped contribute to
the selection of variables used in the chapter. Next, I will give an overview of the
hierarchical linear model technique and description of the data and variables. I will then
present the findings of the models and their explanation of the effects that both identity
and regional assertiveness have on public support of the European Union. To further
investigate the effect of regional assertiveness I will test a cross-level interaction of
regional assertiveness with Ronald Inglehart's (1970a; 1970b) concept of 'cognitive
mobilisation' using the opinion leadership variable. This will attempt to capture a
relationship between regional level elites and the more politically aware members of the
public. Lastly, I will explore the effects of regional and national identity on a region by
region basis utilising the functionality of the hierarchical linear model.
The Effects of Regional Assertiveness
As autonomy continued to be transferred from the nation-state to the evolving first-level
of EU governance, regional autonomy movements were growing in significance in
several member-states by the mid-90s. Michael Keating (1998) labels this movement as
new regionalism, where mobilisation began in the late 1960s and 1970s peaking in the
1990s with the escalating amount of decentralisation taking place in many EU member-
states. It is the regional reaction to modernity and globalisation, where regions are
confronting the international market as the role of the state is alleviated by the first level
(Keating 1998). While regional movements previously demanded full independence
.,
from the state, modern regional mobilisation aims for greater autonomy without
separation, acknowledging that the nation-state is still important in performing certain
economic and political functions that protect and foster regional societies (Tierney
2005: 171). Moreover regionalism throughout the EU member-states has been 'an
asymmetrical process where there is no systematic procedure of decentralisation within
Europe, thus creating uneven powers of autonomy from region to region.
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The policy making structure of the European Union can be favourable to regional
politicians and elites. The multilevel system of governance that Europe offers allows
the chance for regional participation within European-wide legislation (Marks, Nielsen,
Ray and Salk 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Keating 2004). Where the region is
subjected as a minority interest against the majority of the nation-state, within the
European Union the region can be seen as a small group set against many groups where
none have the ability to maintain any real dominance (Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk
1996). These reasons contribute to overall support of regional parties in favour of
European integration highlighted in Chapter 3. Keating (1998: 163) explains that
although regional rejectionists to integration existed through the 1970s, by the mid-
1980s this sentiment began to turn in favour of integration as regional elites used the
concept of Europe to achieve their autonomous goals. This chapter will attempt to
investigate the effects regional assertiveness has on public attitudes towards integration.
The following hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis 7.1: The public within regions of higher levels of regional
assertiveness will be more likely to support European integration.
I would expect public support to be higher in regions with higher levels of regional
mobilisation. As has been demonstrated in the previous literature and Chapter 5,
regional elites and political parties tend to observe the European Union as a means to
achieving greater autonomy. Therefore, where debates for greater autonomy exist,
arguments in favour of European integration are likely to coexist. As the public within
these regions will likely be subjected to more pro-European positions than regions
without mobilisation, this sentiment may have an overall influence towards public
attitudes on integration. This concept derives heavily from the interaction between both
regional elites and the public. To explore this interaction the second hypothesis will be
examined:
Hypothesis 7.2: Those with higher levels of cognitive mobilisation within
highly assertive regions will be more likely to support European
integration.
Ronald Inglehart (1970a; 1970b) theorised that those who pay attention to different
forms of political communication and frequently partake in political discussion will be
more likely to support the EU as they may be more familiarised. with the concept of
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integration. In addition, I would expect these individuals to be more familiar with the
concept of regional autonomy and the benefits the European Union may provide.
Identity and Public Support for European Integration
Outlined in the literature review of the second chapter, identity is another considerable
attribute that has been used to explain public opinion towards integration. In addition,
identity is a prime component of the construction of regions in the new regionalism.
Carey (2002) demonstrated a negative link using Eurobarometer survey data and testing
a three-level hypothesis model of national identity. The first hypothesis is the
measurement of intensity that one has to his/her nation. Here, the "stronger the bond
that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of
measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics" (Carey 2002:
391). The second concept is the 'terminal community' hypothesis (Peters 1991). The
'terminal community' is the highest level of governance that one will form allegiance
to. In the example of a Catalonian, he/she may find Catalonia, Spain or the European
Union as the 'terminal community'. The individual will therefore consider a balance of
government authority depending on his/her notion of 'terminal community'. As Carey
(2002) states "people who believe in a shared European identity see the EU as the
terminal community and are more likely to recognise the authority of the EU to make
public policy" (2002: 392). In contrast those that feel no European identity will regard
either the nation-state or the region as their 'terminal community', therefore more likely
not supporting European integration.
The third concept is the 'cultural threat' hypothesis. Much of this concept can be
attributed to McLaren's (2002) argument that EU opposition may also be related to the
fear and hostility of a perceived threat from other cultures. This can be demonstrated in
','
the rise of ultra right-wing political parties. While these parties focus on a fascist-like
ideology, other political parties within subnational regions have been created to preserve
national identity from within the nation-state. While most are not fundamentally similar
to the ultra right-wing parties, these parties attempt to either accomplish more self
autonomy or preserve their identity, such an example would be Plaid Cymru (The Party
of Wales). As Carey (2002) explains, those who fear "their language being used less, or
their national identity and culture becoming less distinct, are expected to hold a more
negative view of the European Union" (2002: 392). Juan Diez-Medrano (2003: 67)
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demonstrated through a series of interviews in Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom
that non-supporters of European integration would tend to link the European Union to a
threat of national identity.
Cultural and identity explanations of public attitudes towards European support have
tended to hold a nation-state bias in terms of level of analysis. Carey (2002), however,
included in his study an examination of regional identities within the United Kingdom.
He found that as English identity increases, support for integration decreases.
Conversely, as Scottish, Welsh and Irish identities increase, support for integration
increases as well. This demonstrates the complex nature of cultural explanations and
suggests that identity influence on public attitudes towards integration is not
homogeneous within nation-states.
In addition Hooghe and Marks (2004; 2005) demonstrate through the use of a multilevel
model that exclusive national identity decreases one's support for European integration.
They carried their investigation further by examining the role national elites play within
the relationship of national identity and integration support. In their multilevel models
they nested the individual within political parties which are in tum within the state.
They found that where national elites were polarised on the European question, the
effect of exclusive national identity was stronger and more likely to decrease EU
support. In this chapter both national and regional identity will be explored using the
hierarchical linear model. The model will allow for the possibility to "randomise" the
effects of identity by regions giving way for the opportunity to view the identity effect
for each of the given regions independently. The following hypotheses will be used to
examine the effects of identity:
Hypothesis 7.3: Overall, stronger levels of regional identity will have a
positive effect on EU support.
As Carey (2002), demonstrated with the Scottish, Welsh and Irish it would be expected
that regional identity will increase support. This effect can be attributed to the prospect
that minority regions may view the EU as a means of protecting regional identity from
the dominant identity of the nation-state. While the influence of regional identity
remains positive overall, I would also expect the effect to vary between regions of the
same country.
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Hypothesis 7.4: Overall, stronger levels of national identity will have a
negative effect on EU support.
Where the European Union may be seen as protecting regional identity thus having a
positive effect, I would expect national identity to have the inverse effect on EU support
levels. As the national identity will become a minority in the European Union,
individuals with higher levels of national identity will more likely view the EU as a
threat. Furthermore as the concept of national identity may vary by region, the effect
should demonstrate regional variation within the hierarchical linear model.
The Hierarchical Linear Model
The previous chapter explored economic and political indicators through the use of the
random intercept model. Recognising the nested structure in which individuals exist
gave insight into the amount of variation at the individual, regional and national levels
by allowing the intercepts of each group to vary. This chapter will again use the
random intercept model as well as going one step further in the multilevel technique
through the use of the hierarchical linear model allowing for group slopes to vary
randomly as well as intercepts. The fixed effect of a variable can explain the overall
group level effect but does not consider that the effect of a variable may vary between
groups. Randomising the slopes of the variable by group will allow for a better
understanding of the effect on a group by group basis. In this chapter national and
regional identities will be randomised at the regional level. Randomising these
variables will provide an understanding into which regions' identity has both a stronger
influence as well as the possibility of a contrary effect to other regions within the same
country.
The random intercepts model has thus far been the most used multilevel model III
European public opinion research. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) however conducted a
hierarchical linear model in addition to a random intercept model. Their research
involved the examination of a cross-level interaction between party cues and Inglehart's
(1970a) opinion leadership variable. Traditional opinion leadership demonstrated a
positive effect on EU support. Steenbergen and Jones however randomised opinion
leadership at the party level and demonstrated this is not the case for all parties. A
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simple example would be a negative effect for opinion leadership for those that support
anti-EU or far-right parties.
Both the random intercept model as well as the hierarchical linear model will be used in
this chapter to investigate regional assertiveness and identity. The previous chapter
gave a brief explanation of the random intercepts model. While this chapter uses the
random intercepts model in addition to the hierarchical linear model, only the
hierar~hical model will be explained in this section. I
As with the random intercept model the hierarchical linear model takes into
consideration that the mean for the dependent variable is different for each group. In
addition to the intercepts being group dependent the regression coefficients are also
group dependent. This occurrence, known as random slopes, allows the researcher to
consider that particular variables can have different effects for individuals within
different groups. For better explanation of the functioning of the hierarchical linear
model first consider the group specific regression equation for a two-level model with a
single level-I variable.'
(7.1)
In equation 7.1, Yi} is the dependent variable for individual i in group j while Xij is the
explanatory variable at the individual level. In addition RiJ is the deviation at the
individual level (level-I). Both the intercepts (/3oi) and the regression coefficients
(/3li) for the variable Xi} are dependent upon the group. Together these can be split into
the mean coefficient and the group dependent deviation as follows:
(7.2)
I For a more general overview of multilevel modelling and its uses please refer to Chapter 4 on the
methodology of the dissertation.
2 All formulas, explanation and notations for the hierarchical linear model are adapted from Snijders and
Bosker (1999: 67-73)
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The above can now be placed into equation 7.1 creating equation 7.3
(7.3)
The above hierarchical linear model equation can be seen as two parts. The first part,
represented by roo + rlOXij' is the fixed-part of the formula while UOj + U1jXij + Rij
represents the random-part of the formula. The fixed effect of variable X can be seen
by rlOXij. Here the slope of variable X will have group dependent intercepts, however,
the slope will remain the same for all groups resulting in parallel regression lines when
plotted on a graph. UljXij is known as the random interaction between the group and
the variable X ,meaning that the variable is established on the random effect of both the
intercept and the slope. Allowing the intercept as well as the slope to vary allows for
the researcher to examine the effect of a particular variable by individual groups.
The Data
The dataset used for this chapter will be the Eurobarometer 63.4 Survey taken in 2005.
The variables will be the same as the previous chapter, with the addition of one new
variable measuring regional assertiveness. The economic data is taken from Eurostat
based on figures from 2004.3 The additional new variable added for regional
assertiveness is based on Van Houten's (2003) work and will be discussed further in the
chapter.
This chapter is designed to explore the effects of regional mobilisation and identity on
public opinion towards European integration within member-states in which elements of
regional mobilisation clearly exist. As new regionalism and mobilisation are
asymmetrical, as well as specific only to a handful of states within the European Union,
not all member-states will be analysed. States that are highly centralised and likely lack
any regional dynamic from within will not be included in order to prevent diluting the
effects of regional assertion. The focus of study in this chapter reflects more heavily on
3 Data available at epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
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cross-regional variation as opposed to cross-national. Therefore the member-states
included in this analysis will be Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United
Kingdom. While each state does include regions with a degree of assertiveness each is
unique in its approach towards both devolution and European integration. The selection
of these states corresponds with the research of Van Houten (2003). Each state was
selected as the regions within have democratically elected legislatures (with the
exception of the English regions in the United Kingdom) and all have experienced
regionalist activity in the post-war period, demonstrating that "the territorial structure of
the state has more than just administrative significance" (Van Houten 2003: 124). The
region is again defined as the administrative region directly below the nation-state either
consisting of a directly elected regional assembly or constructed primarily for
administrative and planning purposes." Altogether, 86 total regions from 6 countries
will be analysed within the models of this chapter.
Each country in the sample was chosen for both the inclusion of mobilised regions and
exceptionality of its multi leveled system of governance. Belgium consists of a dual
federal system where the regional government authority is parallel to that of the national
government's with no hierarchy existing between the two (Allen 1995). Belgium
includes the two cultural and economically distinct regions of the French speaking
Wallonia in the South and Flemish-speaking Flanders in the North with the bilingual
capitol region of Brussels in the centre of the Flemish region.' Regional mobilisation
has had a long history within Belgium since it broke away from the Netherlands in
1830. In the mid 19th century Flemish demands for language protection and status had
progessed while after the Second World War economic autonomy grew within
Wallonia. Today, the awkward partnership amongst the communities poses a unique
challenge to European integration.
France remained one of the most centralised states in Western Europe until the Socialist
reforms of 1981 when the regions gained further judicial status as well as the inclusion
of directly elected regional councils, although these councils did not become fu!.ly
4 Refer to Chapter I for definition of region as the unit of analysis for the dissertation.
S In Belgium the three language communities of French, Flemish and German have different privileges
than that of the economic regional governments. In Flanders, the Flemish community has been combined
with the regional government of Flanders while the French-speaking community has not combined with
the economic regional government of Wallonia as the region also includes a small German-speaking
community. For the purposes of this research the regions considered are the economic regions of
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels.
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established until 1986. Since the establishment of these regional political insitutions
some regions have found themselves to become more assertive particular in areas of
economic interests. An ideal example would be that of the Rhone-Alps region and its
trans-regional relationship with Catalonia, Lombardy and Baden- Wurttemberg known
as the Four-Motor Regions. Mazey (1995) however states that although the regions
attempt to orientate themselves towards Europe the central state still places restraints on
their ability to do so.
Germany's uniqueness rests in its federal structure with the Lander being the basis for
regional government. The Lander not only exercise their autonomy in regional
governance but also participate in national governance within the Bundesrat where each
Land is delegated a certain amount of votes dependent on population. The Lander also
maintain an effective role in European policy where all collaborate to maintain a
consensus for the German position within the Council of Ministers (Jeffery 2000). The
Lander also vary in levels of assertiveness from the culturally and politically distinct
Bavaria to the automotive economy participation of Baden-Wurttemberg in the Four-
Motors Region.
In Italy, the regioni are the regional level administrative bodies of government below
the nation-state. While Italy consists of 15 ordinary-regions there are 5 regions that
maintain a special stature allowing them to exercise further regional legislation such as
tax and regional cultural laws. These regions include Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto
Adige, the Aosta Valley and Friuli-Venezia Giulia.6 Not only are the regions of Italy
asymmetrical in terms of autonomy there is also a large cultural as well as economic
distinction in a heavily problematic divide between the wealthier northern regions and
poorer southern regions.
Spain's autonomous communities vary In terms of regional authority with strong
cultural and economic variations. Like Italy, Spain's 17 autonomous communities have
an asymmetrical balance of autonomy notably with the three historical communities of
Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. The different features of the communities
are known as "differentiating factors" and closely reflect the causes for popular request
6 Unfortunately due to Eurobarometer's regional coding the Aosta Valley and Piedmont have been coded
as the same region. Fortunately levels of regional assertiveness in these regions are the same value. In
addition Eurobarometer has coded Abruzzo and Molise as the same region which formally split in 1963.
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of further autonomy. Such an example is seen in the case of Catalonia where the status
of the Catalan language is used as a justification for regional mobilisation (Aja 2001:
238).
Lastly, the United Kingdom is the final member-state included in the analysis.
Remaining highly centralised throughout its recent history it was only in 1997 that the
newly elected Labour government enacted legislation beginning the process of
devolution allowing for the creation of regional autonomy in both Scotland, creating the
Scottish Parliament, and Wales, creating the Welsh assembly. Regional governance in
Northern Ireland has been a complicated narration due to its history with its modem day
functions created with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The Northern Irish
Assembly however still ran into further complications only to be suspended from
October 2002 to May 2007. Devolution has run more smoothly in Scotland where the
Scottish Parliament exercises a considerable amount of devolved powers including
taxation, education and health. The Welsh Assembly incorporates fewer devolved
powers perhaps reflecting the degree to which the Welsh public was further split on the
devolution question than Scotland (Loughlin 2001). In addition the regions of England
are a bit more ambiguous. Most currently exist for purely administrative purposes with
only the Greater London Assembly being directly elected. Nevertheless they will be
included in the sample as mobilisation has occurred in two of these regions: the
Northwest and Northeast.
The Dependent Variable
Most of the variables used in the models of this chapter were used in the previous
chapter's random intercept models. The dependent variable used in this chapter is the
same European integration index variable used in the random intercept models of the
preceding chapter. The variable was created by combining three questions relating to
support of one's country's membership to the European Union, overall image of the
European Union, and the extent to which the European Union should play in the
everyday life of its citizens. All questions were weighted equally and combined to
create an index score of 0 to 10.7 Those with higher index scores have higher support
levels of the European Union. Chapter 6 went into depth in exploring political and
7 Please refer to Chapter 6 for more details on the creation of the index scale for the dependent variable.
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economic indicators while this chapter focuses on regional assertiveness and identity.
These variables will be discussed in more depth in the following section as will opinion
leadership which is based on the works of Ronald Inglehart (1970b; 1970a).
The Explanatory Variables
The first newly introduced variable is the most imperative of the model. As mentioned
above, Michael Keating (1998) describes decentralisation as an asymmetrical process
amongst EU member-states. Furthermore, various levels of autonomy and mobilisation
within regions may influence strength in integration support. To help capture the
concept of new regionalism within my research, I have included the variable Regional
Assertiveness. Regional Assertiveness is based upon the research of Van Houten (2003)
in which he designed a model to help predict a region's level of assertiveness by
including various economic, political and cultural variables. Van Houten's dependent
variable was a 4-point category of regional assertiveness. The variable is based from
demands for taxing powers made by regional politicians. His concept is that taxing
powers would need a significant change to the state structure thus requiring further
regional autonomy. To capture regional assertiveness for my models I will apply the
variable created by Van Houten (2003: 124-125), using the same 4-point category as an
independent variable. The category and value coding of regional assertiveness is as
follows:
• High (value 3): Governing politicians demanding taxing powers
• Medium (value 2): Oppositional politicians demanding taxing powers, or
governing politicians demanding spending powers
• Low (value 1): Oppositional politicians demanding spending powers
• None (value 0): No autonomy demands
The above values are then assigned in accordance with Van Houten's evaluations for
each region that I have included in my model and are displayed in Table 7.1. Those
regions that do not appear on the table are regions without any level of assertiveness.
As van Houten's research captures levels of regional assertiveness in the mid-1990s,
upon further evaluation of the included regions at the time of the Eurobarometer survey
very little in terms of assertiveness has changed. While one can argue that after the
creation of entities such as the Scottish Parliament such demands have been met I would
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however contend that such entities would not exist if it were not for the level of
assertiveness that pursued its establishment. In these instances assertiveness has
transferred into the success of devolution.
As explained in Hypothesis 7.1, I would expect to observe a positive relationship
between regional assertiveness and EU membership approval. Hooghe and Marks
(2001) explain that EU policy making is no longer monopolised by the nation-state.
Policy and decision making powers are shared by several actors at different levels of
governance rather than simply the national level. Therefore regions that are more
mobilised and request further autonomy are more likely to involve themselves within
the structure of multilevel governance including at the EU level. These mobilised and
assertive regions will be more likely to transcend approval onto the public in supporting
European integration.
Cultural identity and its protection can be seen in various regional mobilisation
movements such as those in Catalonia, Wales and Galicia. The second regional level
variable underscored in this chapter, Language Difference, is designed to capture
cultural differences amongst regions within their respective member states. The
variable is identical to previous works by Fearon and Van Houten (1998) and Van
Houten (2003) to investigate regional autonomy movements. It is based on comparing
regional language families to the language family spoken in the nation-state's capitol.f
The larger the value a region scores on Language Difference, the more culturally
distinct in terms of language it is from the rest of the nation-state. Furthermore it is not
necessary for the language to be spoken by the entire regional population. It IS a
measurement of historical culture that helps facilitate historical identity. Such an
8 The values for each language are based on language families as defined by Grimes (1996) in Pieter van
Houten and James Fearon's (Fearon and Van Houten 1998; Van Houten 2000) research. Each language
is classed by sub groups, for example Castilian Spanish is categorised "Indo-European, Italic, Romance,
Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian" and Catalan is
categorised as "Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Halo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance,
East Iberian". A value is assigned at the level the regional language splits from the language spoken in
the capitol.. In this example Catalan splits from Castilian (as Castilian is the language spoken in Madrid)
after "Ibero-Romance" or the 8th level, thus Catalan receives a language family score of 8. Those regions
that speak the same language as that in the capitol receive a value of 10, the highest level of sub
categories. The language family score is then inversed to create a score between 0.1 and I measuring
language difference. In the above example Catalonia would receive a Language Difference score of
0.125 (I divided by 8) and Madrid a score of 0.1 (I divided by 10). Another example would be Basque, a
language so unique that it splits at the first level. The language family score for Basque would then be I
and its Language Difference score would also be I (I divided by I).
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Table 7.1 - Regions with Regional Assertiveness
Low (value 1) Medium_{_value 2) Hig_h_ivalue 3_l
Aquitane (Fra)
Brittany (Fra)
Languedoc ~ Rousillon (Fra)
Provence - Alpes - Cotes d' Azur (Fra)
North Rhine - Westphalia (Ger)
Sardinia (Ita)
Tuscany (Ita)
Balearic Islands (Spa)
Canary Islands (Spa)
Valencia (Spa)
North West (UK)
Wallonia (Sel)
Alsace (Fra)
Corsica (Fra)
Rhone - Alps (Fra)
Baden - Wurttemberg (Ger)
Bavaria (Ger)
Hessen (Oer)
Emilia-Romagna (Ita)
Friuli-Venezia Giula (Ita)
Liguria (Ita)
Lombardy (Ita)
Piedmont (Ita)
Trentino-Alto Adige (Ita)
Val d' Aosta (Ita)
Veneto (Ita)
Catalonia (Spa)
Galicia (Spa)
Navarre (Spa)
Northern (UK)
Wales (UK)
Flanders (Bel)
Basque Country (Spa)
Northern Ireland (UK)
Scotland (UK)
Note: The above table is derived from Van Houten's (Van Houten 2003: 124-125) work on regional
political assertiveness
example can be seen in Wales where only a small percentage of the population uses
Welsh. So long as the language is not extinct it is included in the model. A component
of new regionalism and European integration is that several regional movements
recognise the European Union as an element of cultural protection (Keating 1998). I
would expect this hypothesis to exist in regions that culturally differ from the rest of the
nation-state thus creating a positive relationship with EU membership evaluation.
National and regional identities are the first individual level variables to be analysed in
depth within this chapter. Carey (2002) analysed national, regional and European
attachment variables to test the effects of the terminal community hypothesis. Regional
mobilisation's largest obstacle is to overcome the nation-state not only in the
constitutional sense but also in building a collective identity of its citizens. If
individuals are more likely to identify with the nation rather than the region, the less
likely mobilisation will occur. Therefore national and regional attachment will be
analysed. The question asked in the Eurobarometer survey to measure these identities·'is
as follows:
People may feel different degrees of attachment to their [region/country]. Please
tell me how attached you feel to your [region/country]
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The possible response are coded as: 1 for 'not at all attached', 2 for 'not very attached',
3 for 'somewhat attached' and 4 for 'very attached'. If individuals are to follow the
perception of new regionalism, I would expect those that maintain higher levels of
regional attachment to be more likely to support European integration, as stated in
Hypothesis 7.3, while those that maintain higher levels of national attachment less likely
to support integration, as stated in Hypothesis 7.4. The notion behind this predication is
that individuals attached to their region may see Europe as a means of promoting
regional autonomy while those with higher national attachment may see Europe as a
threat to national autonomy.
In addition I will briefly examine Ronald Inglehart's (Inglehart 1970b; Inglehart 1970a;
Inglehart 1977) concept of opinion leadership, an individual's potential for political
involvement. This variable relates to Inglehart's concept of cognitive mobilisation
which is the process of the individual gaining political awareness. The more an
individual discusses politics and creates a political value system the more likely he/she
will gain familiarity with and approve of integration (Inglehart 1970a; De Vreese 2004).
In addition, Andersen (1998) demonstrated that individuals use domestic politics to
evaluate the European Union because it is the political entity of which they are most
familiar. The opinion leadership index variable created by Eurobarometer is a 4-point
scale combining two questions, the first asking a respondent how much he/she discusses
political matters with others and the second asking how often they try to persuade others
from their views. Those with higher scores will have higher levels of opinion
leadership, thus these individuals will be more likely to support European integration.
As Anderson (1998) demonstrates, individuals evaluate integration from the contexts of
which they are familiar. I would believe this to be reflected at the regional level in
which higher levels of assertiveness exist. Therefore opinion leadership effects should
remain positive so long as regional assertiveness is positive. This will also be tested
with a cross-level interaction variable described in the next section.
In addition to the above variables, several variables from the preceding chapter will be
re-evaluated. These include at the national level GDP, unemployment and regional
governance score, at the regional level GDP, unemployment, objective 1 region and
regional party, and at the individual-level democratic satisfaction,
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economic/employment expectations, gender and age. Furthermore, each region is likely
to have different mean levels of each individual level variable. Therefore to maintain a
comparable effect each individual level variable is grouped centred at the region mean."
This allows for a regional comparison when observing those who are below and above
the regional mean. This is also consistent with the data from the previous chapter.
The Results
I will first be examining the strengths of variance of the different levels in the analysis.
The structure remains identical as in Chapter 6 with individuals being the first level, the
region as the second level and country as the third level. The ANDV A model tests the
dependent variable, EU Support, with only the constant and no explanatory variables.
The equation for the empty model is as follows."
(7.4)
The results for the one-way ANOVA can be observed in Table 7.2
Table 7.2 - ANOV A - Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Spain and UK
Parameter
Modell
p (S.E.)
Fixed Effects
Constant 6.338 (0.290)
Variance Components
Country-Level var( VoOk)
Region-Level var( Vo.Jk)
Individual-Level var( Ryk)
0.467
0.276
6.267
(0.290)
(0.063)
(0.109)
-2 Log Likelihood 31166.610
9 The·centred variable is created by subtracting the region mean from the raw score of the respondent.
10 i = individual,j = region and k = country; Yooo = constant
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Observing Table 7.2 it is noticed that the country level variance in the above model is
statistically insignificant, likely due to the small number of countries included in the
analysis. The regional-level variance is larger than the EUI5 sample from the preceding
chapter. Where the regional variance for the larger sample in Chapter 6 equalled 0.173,
the selected country sample in this model is 0.276. When comparing the proportional
variance, the individual-level makes up roughly 89% of the accounted variance while
nearly 11% comes from higher levels. The regional proportion of the higher level
variance is slightly higher than the 30% proportion within the EUI5 model. The results
of the ANOV A model in this chapter should not necessarily be compared to the results
of the model provided in this chapter. Chapter 6 presented a model attempting to
explain a full cross-national explanation for the entirety of the EU 15. The models in
this chapter focus primarily on the effects in states where the regional dimension is
progressing. Where Chapter 6 helped discover the overall influence of new regionalism
European-wide, this chapter is meant to examine the effects of new regionalism and
regional assertiveness where they directly exist. The models in this chapter can
potentially expand into a larger sample size as new regionalism continues to develop
into the more centralised European Union member states.
The second section of the analysis includes the addition of the explanatory variables
explained earlier in the chapter in a random intercept model, including the addition of
the regional assertiveness variable. The equation used for this model is given below:
(7.5)
EU SUPPORTuk = Yooo+ YooPDPk + Y002UNEMPLOYMENTk + Yoo3REGIONAL GOVk +
YolOREGIONAL ASSERTIVENESSjk + Y020GDPjk + Y03oUNEMPLOYMENTjk +
Y0400BJECTIVE Ijk + Y050REGIONAL PARTY(REG) jk +
Y06oREGIONAL PARTY(NAT)jk + Y070LANGUAGE DIFjk +
YlOoDEMOCRATIC SATuk + Y2ooECON EXPUk + Y300EMPLOYMENT EXPUk +
Y4ooCOUNTRY AT1';jk + Y50oREGION AT1';jk + Y6oo0PINIONLEADERSHIPuk +
Y7ooGENDER'lk + YsooAGEUk + VOOk+ ti.; + RUk
The results are observable in Model 2 in Table 7.3.
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Table 7.3 - Random Intercept Model Including Regional Assertiveness
Model2 Model3
Parameter ~ (S.E.) ~ (S.E.)
Fixed Effects
Country Level
LogGDP -0.340 (0.296) -0.340 (0.296)
Unemployment 0.271 ** (0.111) 0.271 ** (0.111)
Regional Governance -0.010 (0.098) -0.010 (0.098)
Region Level
Regional Assertiveness -0.207* (0.099) -0.207* (0.099)
LogGDP 0.213* (0.088) 0.213* (0.088)
Unemployment -0.008 (0.024) -0.008 (0.024)
Objective 1 -0.307 (0.209) -0.307 (0.209)
Regional Party (R.A.) 0.203 (0.238) 0.203 (0.238)
Regional Party (N.P.) 0.578* (0.271) 0.578* (0.272)
Language Difference -0.124 (0.485) -0.124 (0.485)
Individual Level
Democratic Satisfaction 0.835** (0.039) 0.833** (0.039)
Economic Expectations 0.284** (0.051) 0.284** (0.051)
Employment 0.208** (0.050) 0.208** (0.050)
Expectations
Country Attachment 0.123** (0.048) 0.123** (0.048)
Region Attachment -0.143* (0.045) -0.142* (0.045)
Opinion Leadership 0.356** (0.032) 0.416** (0.044)
Gender 0.166** (0.059) 0.166** (0.059)
Age -0.007** (0.002) -0.007** (0.002)
Regional Assertiveness • -0.051+ (0.027)
Opinion Leadership
Constant 7.368+ (4.382) 7.368+ (4.382)
Variance Components
Country-Level var( VoOk) 0.122 (0.092) 0.122 (0.092)
Region-Level var( UO./k) 0.222 (0.054) 0.222 (0.054)
Individual-Level 5.491 (0.096) 5.491 (0.096)
var(Rijk)
-2 Log Likelihood 30276.910 30273.410
N 6642 6642
+p < .10, * P < .05,* * P < .01
- 139-
The coefficients are very similar to what was displayed in Chapter 6, however, some
variables that were briefly addressed in the preceding chapter will be explained in more
depth here. First, when observing the regional assertiveness variable, the direction of
the effect is opposite to that of Hypothesis 7.1. Individuals within regions of higher
levels of assertiveness are less likely to support EU integration. The variable maintains
a high level of statistical significance with a p-value below 0.05. Do individuals within
higher assertive regions view the European Union as a threat? When observing several
of the other regional indicators it appears that this may be possible. Interestingly
language difference is also displaying a negative effect. Although insignificant, thus no
hard conclusions can be drawn, it may be feasible that regions with an historic language
with a higher degree of difference from the country's primary language may see
integration as a possible threat to cultural identity. Furthermore, when observing the
two identity variables, regional attachment is indicating a negative effect while national
attachment is displaying a positive effect. The results appear to defy the predictions
presented by Hypotheses 7.3 and 7.4 respectively. Both variables demonstrate a
significant p-value. In addition, regions with elected regional party members in the
national parliament are more likely to view the EU positively.
Chapter 4 examined the positions of regional parties and their supporters towards EU
integration. The chapter concluded that although in the past regional parties would tend
to be Euroskeptic, today they are more likely to use Europe as a means to promote
autonomy within the context of Europe. Furthermore as regional parties were displayed
to show high levels of support for the European Union their supporters would tend to
display the same level of support. This may still be observed in the above model where
regions with a regional party within the parliament are more likely to support the EU.
This deviates however with assertive regions. While regional parties may be
influencing their supporters on their position towards integration, they may not be
convincing the overall public. Regional parties may be successful in fostering regional
identity for individuals that may even be non-supporters by bringing the issue of
autonomy into the public debate. As one starts to identify more with the region, he/she
may begin to find integration as a threat to regional identity, as demonstrated in the
above negative coefficient for regional attachment. As a variable for party support is no
longer available in recent Eurobarometer surveys, this regional party influence dynamic
will 'be explored further in the following chapter on the United Kingdom.
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Is the negative effect of regional assertiveness transcending to the public? Opinion
leadership in the above model demonstrates a significant positive relationship. This
direction remains consistent with Ronald Inglehart's (1970b; 1970a; 1977) theory that
the more one more participates in political discussion the more likely he/she will view
the European Union positively. In order to further investigate the effects of regional
assertiveness and opinion leadership I have created a cross-level interaction variable and
tested it within the above model. The concept behind this is to determine if individuals
with high opinion leadership index scores are conditioned by levels of assertiveness
within their region. II The results are displayed in Model 3 on Table 7.3.
The interaction variable observed in Model 3 in Table 7.3 displays a slight negative
effect while the p-value lies between 0.05 and 0.10, indicating although not highly
statistically significant it is still possible for the results to be analysed with caution. This
shows that opinion leadership may not behave as we traditional expect it. Traditionally,
opinion leadership has had a positive effect on EU support, as shown in Model 2. The
cross-level interaction variable however is indicating that those with high opinion
leadership scores within highly assertive regions are less likely to support the EU.
Regional assertiveness may possibly be conditioning the opinions of those that
frequently discuss and persuade political opinions. Though the direction of influence
contradicts that in Hypothesis 7.2, it has been demonstrated that a relationship does
exist between assertiveness and cognitive mobilisation.
Observing country and regional attachment in Models 2 and 3 in Table 7.3 it is noted
that both have a differing effect on public opinion towards integration. Whereas the
direction goes against the prediction in the hypotheses, the results remain consistent
with the other noted variables relating to regionalism within the model. Those that have
a higher level of regional attachment within their region are more likely to view
European integration negatively while those with higher levels of country attachment
are more likely to view integration positively. Perhaps this fixed effect for both ..
variables can be -attributed to what Van Kersbergen (2000) explains as double
allegiance. His concept derives in individuals basing their opinion of integration on a
II This cross-level interaction variable is simply created by multiplying the variables of regional assertion
, and opinion leadership. .'
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primary allegiance, typically the nation-state. The nation-state gains allegiance from its
public in exchange for providing social policy. The public will develop a secondary
allegiance, such as the EU, so long as it provides the means for the primary source to
continue providing social policy. In other words, if an individual believes that the EU
will threaten his/her nation-state from continuing its provision of social welfare then
he/she will be less likely to support integration. In the above models, individuals that
see the n.ation-state as their primary allegiance appear to be less likely to view the EU as
threatening the nation to conduct its realm of social policy. Conversely however those
with higher levels of regional attachment may view Europe as a threat to achieving
regional policy. Does this contrary effect of attachment remain consistent for each
region of the analysis? Attachment to country and region are likely to vary by region.
The hierarchical linear model should offer a better insight of territorial attachment at the
regional-level.
The hierarchical linear model will allow for the randomisation of the country and
regional attachment variables. This will allow the effect of the variable to become
group dependent. Two models will be analysed, the first randomising the country
attachment variable and the second randomising the regional attachment variable.
Randomising the effect of attachment at the regional level will allow the possibility to
observe the individual effect for each of the 86 regions. This will then make regions
within the same country comparable to determine if identity has a parallel effect for all
regions of a country. The equation below displays the first of the two models (Model
4).
(7.5)
EU SUPPORT;jk = Yooo + YOOIGDPk+ Yo02UNEMPLOYMENTk + YOOJREGIONAL GOVk +
YOJOREGIONAL ASSERTIVENESSjk + Y020GDP/k + YOJoUNEMPLOYMENTjk +
Y0400BJECTIVE Ijk + YosoREGIONAL PARTy(REG)/k +
Y060REGIONAL PARTY(NAT) ,k + Y070LANGUAGE DIFjk +
YJOoDEMOCRATIC SAT;jk + Y20oECON EXP;/k + Y300EMPLOYMENT exr; +
Y4ooCOUNTRY ATT;'k + YsooREGION ATT;,k + Y6oo0PINIONLEADERSHIP;,k +
Y700GENDER"k + YsooAGE,/k + VOOk+ UOlk + U1jkREGION AIT"k + Rijk
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Table 7.4 - Hierarchical Linear Models of Belgium, France, Italy, Germany,
Spain and UK
Model4 ModelS
Parameter ~ (S.E.) ~ (S.E.)
Fixed Effects
Country Level
LogGDP -0.340 (0.296) -0.340 (0.296)
Unemployment 0.271 * (0.111) 0.271 * (0.111)
MLG -0.010 (0.098) -0.010 (0.098)
Region Level
Regional Assertiveness -0.207* (0.099) -0.207* (0.099)
LogGDP 0.213* (0.088) 0.213* (0.088)
Unemployment -0.009 (0.024) -0.008 (0.024)
Objective 1 -0.306 (0.210) -0.306 (0.210)
Regional Party (R.A.) 0.202 (0.234) 0.202 (0.234)
Regional Party (N.P.) 0.578* (0.272) 0.578* (0.272)
Language Difference -0.124 (0.485) -0.125 (0.485)
Individual Level
Democratic Satisfaction 0.835** (0.039) 0.837** (0.039)
Economic Expectations 0.286** (0.050) 0.292** (0.050)
Employment Expectations 0.206** (0.050) 0.202** (0.050)
Country Attachment 0.114* (0.048) 0.147* (0.072)
Region Attachment -0.145* (0.057) -0.161 ** (0.046)
Opinion Leadership 0.359** (0.032) 0.359** (0.032)
Gender 0.164** (0.059) 0.174** (0.059)
Age -0.007** (0.002) -0.007** (0.002)
Random Effects
Region Attachment 0.067* (0.033)
Country Attachment 0.171* (0.053)
Constant 7.368+ (4.382) 7.36J+ (4.388)
Variance Components
Country-Level var( VOOk ) 0.122 (0.092) 0.122 (0.092)
Region-Level var( UOjk) 0.223 (0.054) 0.224 (0.054)
Individual-Level var( Rijk ) 5.460 (0.096) 5.411 (0.095)
-2 Log Likelihood 30268.420 30215.510
N 6642 6642
+p < .10, *p < .05, ** P < .01
- 143 -
Here, the regional attachment variable is included as both a fixed and random effect.
The random portion is represented byU1jkREGION ATTijk. The results are displayed in
Table 7.4.
In Model 4, the slope standard deviation for regional attachment is 0.52 (.J0.067)
while the mean slope for regional attachment is -0.145 (the fixed regression
coefficient). The values of the mean slope +/- two standard deviations creates a range
of -0.665 to 0.375 indicating that the effect is not necessarily negative in all regions.
This formula also gives us the range of -0.683 to 0.977 for the effect of country
attachment in Model 5. The slopes for each region can be observed in Figures 7.1-7.6
sectionalised by country.
In Figure 7.1, the two historic regions of Belgium appear to maintain the fixed effect of
both variables. Both Wallonia and Flanders show a positive effect for higher levels of
country attachment while maintaining a negative effect for regional attachment. In both
instances, the region of Brussels enjoys higher levels of integration support as well as
positive effects for both country and regional attachment. This may not come as a
surprise as Brussels is the capital of the European Union and benefits economically
from the abundance of administration that exists within the city-region. Those that feel
less Belgian for both Wallonia and Flanders show low levels of integration support
while the slopes begin to diverge from each other with Walloons showing a slightly
higher level of support than the Flemish. The divergence of these slopes may
demonstrate a different concept of Belgian identity as one feels more Belgian. For
Walloons, attachment to Belgium has a stronger positive effect than their countrymen in
Flanders. Those Flemish with a strong Belgian attachment are still less likely to support
integration than Walloons with strong Belgian attachment. In terms of regional
attachment however, both region slopes run parallel. Attachment to one's region has a
slight negative effect for both Wallonia and Flanders. The fact that both lines run
parallel shows those individuals may have a similar concept of regional identity as
opposed to Belgian identity.
In France the effects of country and regional attachment are mostly consistent with the
fi~ed effects of the variables with the exception of a few noted regions. Primarily the
more one feels attached to France the more likely he/she will support European
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integration. The most notable regions however that do not reflect this effect are
Champagne-Ardenne and Languedoc-Roussillon where a stronger French attachment
likely results in lower levels of support towards European integration. This differing
trend however remains unique only when observing national attachment as their
regional attachment slopes are similar to most French regions. In terms of regional
attachment only the region of Limousin displays a slight positive effect as one feels
more attached to the region. Limousin is both highly agricultural as well as culturally
distinct with Occitan as the regional historical language. It is possible that those within
this region view the EU as a means of advancing the social issues of the region.
Germany has one of the most dramatic effects of the attachment variables. The
difference of the effects can perhaps be attributed to the Lander federal structure of the
country. Saxony-Anhalt displays the most extreme effect of positive national
attachment while maintaining a positive effect with regional attachment. In the opposite
direction Bavarians, one of the most assertive regions of Germany, are less likely to
support the EU than those that are less attached to Germany. More extremely,
Bavarians that are highly attached to Bavaria are much less likely to support integration
than those that are not attached to the region. This shows that for Bavarians, the EU is
potentially seen as a threat to both Germany and the Bavarian state. Bavarians that
demonstrate higher levels of EU support are less likely to be attached to either Bavaria
or Germany.
In Italy a vast range of variation also exists. Quite remarkably, when observing the
angle of the slopes, it seems that attachment to Italy has a very strong effect in nearly
each of the regions. This shows that for most regions, those with lower levels of
attachment to Italy are less likely to support EU integration. Liguria and Piedmonte &
the Aoste Valley, two northern regions that border each other, are both showing the
most extreme effect of the variable while Emilia - Romagna appears to be the only
Italian region where national attachment has a negative effect. In addition Piedmonte &
the Aoste Valley is also the only region to have a positive effect from regional
attachment showing that multilevel attachment has a positive effect on European
integration support within the region. With the exception of Piedmonte & the Aoste
Valley and Emilia - Romagna regional attachment seems to have very little effect in the
Italian regions.
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Regions in Spain appear to hold to the fixed effect of country and regional attachment
with the exception of Castile-La Mancha having a negative effect for higher levels of
country attachment. Nevertheless we can observe the intensities that the effect holds in
a few of the selected regions. Country attachment seems to have a strong positive effect
in Catalonia while the effect is slightly less intense in the Basque Country and Galicia.
In comparison, regional attachment has a very strong negative effect in Catalonia and to
a lesser degree in Galicia. Surprisingly, regional attachment has very little influence in
the Basque Country where levels of EU support appear to maintain a steady level. This
perhaps demonstrates that the concept of the EU is uniform to the Basque despite their
attachment to region and country.
In the United Kingdom, the effect of national attachment acts quite differently than the
other six countries. Whereas most regions have demonstrated a positive effect from
national attachment, the regions of the UK all nearly display a negative effect with the
exception of Scotland and the Euroskeptic region of Yorkshire & Humberside. In
Wales there is virtually no effect from national attachment while in Northern Ireland
there is a strong negative effect. The differences again are likely due to each region's
concept of Britain. History has likely permitted contrasting views of Britain in each of
these regions which in tum can affect one's outlook on European integration. This may
again be due to Van Kersbergen's (2000) concept of double allegiance. The concept of
allegiance to Britain is different for each of these regions. In Northern Ireland for
example this concept has been at the forefront of the region's history in the past century
and is perhaps contributing to the strong negative effect present in the given figure. The
following chapter will examine an in depth analysis of regional effects in the United
Kingdom.
The hierarchical linear model allowed for the randomisation of the effects of national
and regional attachments acknowledging that national and regional identities can vary
by region. It was demonstrated that not all regions share the same effects of the
variables. While regional attachment had a less varied effect than national attachriient
this perhaps reveals that although national identity is more likely to have a larger effect
on one's support for integration, the concept of attachment to the nation varies by
region. In Germany and Italy country attachment significantly varied while in Spain the
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effect remained positive but to a different degree for each region. Regional attachment
varied most in Germany possibly deriving from the federalist structure of the German
Lander. In Spain however, regional attachment seemed to have no effect for many
regions including the Basque Country. The United Kingdom was the only country to
display strong negative effects for both national and regional attachment. Regarding
national attachment, Scotland and Yorkshire & Humberside were the only regions to
display a positive effect while for regional attachment all regions displayed a negative
effect.
Conclusions
This chapter investigated the effects regional mobilisation and identity have on public
opinion towards the European Union. Regional assertiveness was tested in a sample of
six countries. When the hypothesis predicted that assertiveness would have a positive
effect on integration support it was concluded to have a negative effect. This also
remained consistent with the fixed effect of regional attachment while national
attachment produced a positive effect. As demonstrated in Chapter 5 regional political
parties demanding more regional autonomy tend to support European integration using
it as a means to further their demands. Upon further investigation of regional
assertiveness' effect on the public it was concluded that assertiveness is possibly
conditioning those with high opinion leadership scores to have a less favourable opinion
towards integration. This counteracts the conventional view where opinion leadership
has a positive effect on EU opinion demonstrating regional mobilisation's strength in
influencing the public's assessment process.
In the analysis of identities it was surprising to discover regional identity to have a
negative general effect while national identity remained positive. This result can be
seen to coincide with regional assertion's negative effect, both contradicting Hypotheses
7.3 and 7.4. When randomising the effects of regional and national identity it was
revealed that although the individual region trends tend to follow the overall effect of
both attachment variables several regions within the same country act conversely. More
interesting was the wide variation of national attachment indicating that national
identity is different to peoples of different regions thus having varying influences on EU
support.
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This chapter broke away from the European-wide model in an attempt to gain a better
understanding of regional mobilisation's direct effect on public opinion towards
European integration. When it was expected that regional assertiveness would find a
common ally in the European Union, both having the common goal of moving authority
away from the nation-state, this was found not to be the case. Instead it seems that
those in highly assertive regions or have strong regional identity still see the European
Union as a possible threat to regional survival. Unfortunately, Eurobarometer does not
provide a survey question examining opinion towards devolution as it is not a
European-wide phenomenon. To gain an a better understanding of the devolutionary
process and its effect on EU support a case study of a member state where the
devolution experience exists would provide additional information. The United
Kingdom's history of internal and external relations makes it unique in understanding
its citizen's reflections towards European integration. Traditionally Euroskeptic,
elements of regional assertiveness and devolution have transformed its regions in terms
of politics, economy and identity. The following chapter will present a more in depth
case study analysis examining the United Kingdom using conclusions gathered from
this and earlier chapters.
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Chapter 8
Regional Reflections on Public Support for the
European Union: The British Experience
Introduction
This chapter attempts to link the themes of the previous chapters with an in-depth case-
study of the United Kingdom. The previous three chapters of this dissertation explored
the effects of economic, political and cultural variables on public evaluations of
European integration. In Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that regional parties, while
often being mistaken as fringe party groups, tend to have consistent and pro-European
views similar to the mainstream parties. Furthermore, supporters of regional parties
tend to share this level of support for European integration unlike the other minor party
families including the greens, far right and far left. This suggests that regional party
supporters may not necessarily support their regional party merely as a protest vote
when it comes to European integration. Chapter 6 explored evaluations of economy and
democracy within the regional perspective. It was found that economic evaluations tend
to be evaluated within the regional context while evaluations of democracy remain
evaluated at the national level. Lastly, Chapter 7 explored the effects of regional
assertiveness and national versus regional identity on support levels of the EU. It was
concluded, contrary to the predictions of the hypothesis, that high levels of regional
assertiveness had a strong and significant negative effect on levels of EU support.
Additionally, regional identity also had a negative effect while national identity had a
positive effect.
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the findings of the previous models to a case
study of the United Kingdom. It will attempt to measure the effects of regional
assertiveness in Scotland and Wales to determine if it maintains a negative effect on"EU
support levels. Furthermore the chapter will be able to provide an analysis on
evaluations of devolution. Do individuals that support independence in Scotland and
Wales reflect differently on European integration from those that prefer a multilevel
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system of governance in devolution? As levels of devolution are asymmetrical across
Europe, there is no European-wide survey that evaluates public attitudes towards
decentralisation. Therefore, a single case study and country-specific survey can provide
a more detailed analysis of the effects measured in the previous chapters in addition to
investigating regional opinion towards British devolution. In addition, the British
specific survey used in this chapter will provide an extension of the number of cases at
the regional level making regional variations easy to compare.
The chapter will begin by briefly explaining why the United Kingdom is the case study
chosen in addition to reviewing previous research that has addressed British attitudes
towards European integration. The analysis will begin by first investigating aggregated
regional support in the British regions from 1973-2002. The public data will also be
compared to the major British political parties including the regional parties of the
Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru. Lastly ordered logit regression models
for Scotland, Wales and England will be compared exploring the effects on EU support
of political party support, British and regional identity, in addition to evaluations of
devolution.
Britain, Devolution and the European Union
Britain's relationship with the European Community has been a long and complex
history. First opting out of the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in
the 1950s, then applying for admission of the European Economic Community in the
1960s only to have it vetoed by then French President Charles De Gaulle, and finally
joining the European Community in 1973, it is not difficult to observe elements of
Euroskepticism in past British policy. Stephen George (1998) has described Britain as
the 'awkward partn~r' in the European Community. The British public can easily be
seen reflecting cynicism towards integration. Why study such a Euroskeptic country?
First, Britain's "awkward" relationship with the EU provides a unique setting placed
upon its public. The United Kingdom is one of three EU15 member states yet to join
the Euro currency (the other two being Denmark and Sweden). In each of these
_.
countries the question of European integration has a stronger context as integration is
likely to mean eliminating the national currency a step other member-states took nearly
~ decade ago. The issue of integration is therefore likely to take a highly prominent role
in political discussion in these countries as the debate has a strong link with losing
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national sovereignty. Moreover it has been noted that during the 2001 British general
election 'Europe' was the leading policy issue covered by the media (Deacon and
Golding 2001). Here, the debate on integration surrounds the public possibly fostering
stronger viewpoints than Euro Zone members as the integration question still includes a
considerably large step.
Second,. new regionalism has played a prominent role in the transformation of
governance in the past 20 years. Throughout the duration of British membership to the
EU, the United Kingdom has been primarily a highly centralised state. The election of
the Labour Government in 1997 however brought forth new policies of devolution
granting a parliament to Scotland and an assembly to Wales. The dynamics of
governance in Britain is shifting from its once highly centralised form to a quasi-system
of multilevel governance. The concept of new regionalism (Keating 1998) is quite
strong, particularly in Scotland and Northern Ireland and to a lesser extent in Wales,
where regional elites have confronted the issues of globalisation, pushed for further
autonomy and to a more than modest degree have achieved it. The United Kingdom
maintains components of both multileveled and centralised governance where this
asymmetrical balance offers a unique opportunity for comparison within a single
member-state. Regional governments and interest groups now play a larger role in
European policy making, from influencing policy in Brussels to influencing national
European policy positions (Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk 1996; Jeffery 2000; Hooghe
and Marks 2001; Marks, Haesly and Mbaye 2002; Marks and Hooghe 2003). In
Scotland and Wales, the inclusion of the devolved bodies of governments have created a
symbolic as well as functional importance bringing interest groups to focus on the
subnational framework of politics (Keating and Loughlin 2002). Politically, a culture of
multi leveled governance with the regions at the bottom and Europe at the top is growing
in Britain. .
The issue of identity also has a major role in British politics. Issues of Welsh, Scottish,
Irish and English identities each confront the notion of British national identity. Figure
7.6 in Chapter -7 demonstrated the variation in EU support accounting for the effects of
both regional and British identities. This was noteworthy in Scotland, where British
identity had a positive effect towards support for integration differing from the other
British regions. In a country where the English contribute to the vast majority of the
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British population, concepts of British identity are bound to differ within the minority
regions. Identity, along with the process of devolution, permits a deeper investigation
of how these concepts are affecting the wider British public.
There are several noteworthy works that have investigated regional British public
opinion on European integration. In one such analysis Haesly (2001) uses Q-
method?logy and factor analysis to provide a better comparison between EU supporters
and Euroskeptics within Scotland and Wales. He argues that levels of support for
Europe can differ between true Europhiles and instrumental supporters who favour
integration for particular motives. Welsh European supporters of Europe tend to obtain
a modest level of European pride from distinguishing themselves from the English,
whom they perceive as being more Euroskeptic. Approving of the European Union may
assist in differentiating themselves from the English of which they see as the dominant
group within Britain. Furthermore these Welsh European supporters are less likely to
be concerned with Europe's threat over British sovereignty or British culture (Haesly
2001: 96). Scottish European supporters are more likely to support the EU because of
the economic benefits they perceive Europe to bring to Britain and Scotland. In
addition Haesly (2001: 97) finds that Scottish EU supporters have higher levels of
European pride than that of the Welsh and may be accredited for the Scottish observing
the European Union for the functions it was designed for rather than as a means of
differentiating themselves from the English.
Carmen Huici, et ai, (1997) devised a questionnaire to compare identifications with
one's region, nation-state and Europe in relation to European integration. The survey
was distributed to students in Scotland and Andalucia from which they concluded that
only for Andalucian students was European identification positively correlated with
national identification. Regarding Scotland, they found there to be a negative effect on
integration support for both Scottish and British identities although the effects did not
reach a statistical level of significance. In addition, they unexpectedly found that
European identification was neither negatively related to British identity nor positively
related 'to Scottish identity.
DardanelIi (2005) demonstrated the importance of Europe in his analysis of Scottish
assertiveness. He mentions that Scottish elites were able to use European integration as
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a method of persuading the public in favour of devolution. The Scottish public feared
complete independence however favoured the idea of independence within Europe. As
assertiveness continued to increase towards the 1997 referendum on devolution,
Scottish elites were sure to emphasise the role and positive implication of EU
integration. Furthermore, in contrast to opinions during the 1979 referendum, the
Scottish public in 1997 may have been less fearful of the idea of independence because
it was ~ithin the context of 'Europe' which was seen more positively than 18 years
prior (Dardanelli 2005: 129).
Lastly, Carey (2002) conducted a secondary analysis examining British and regional
identities and their effect on European integration support within the United Kingdom.
Through the use of an ordered logit model using the 2000 British Household Panel
Survey he found that the primary identities of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish had a
positive and significant influence on EU support while English identity had a negative
effect. In addition, he found that those with British as their primary identity were also
more likely to support the European Union.
There is much consideration to take in hand when defining the regions of the United
Kingdom. Throughout this dissertation I have defined the region as the first territorial
administration level below the nation-state. In the example of the United Kingdom, the
regions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are rather clear to observe within the
realms of the definition; however England is much more ambiguous than its other
British regions. The definition of "region" stated in Chapter 1 permits for the nine
administrative regions of England to be used as separate regions. The ordered logit
analysis of this chapter runs a single regression for England accounting for the variation
of the nine English regions. As no English region displayed significance each of the
analyses in this chapter will refer to England as a single entity for ease of comparison.
In addition, due to lack of available data, Northern Ireland will only be analysed in the
1973-2005 time-trend and not in the logistic regression models.
British Regional EU Support 1973-2005
The first analysis of this chapter will evaluate regional EU support over the time period
of 1973-2005. This will give an insight to the changes in EU evaluations between the
regions of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland by comparing the means of
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EU support over time. The data for this analysis is taken from the Eurobarometer
Mannheim Trend File 1973-2002 with the addition of Eurobarometer Surveys 60.1
(2003), 62 (2004) and 63.4 (2005). The variable used to evaluate EU support is
Eurobarometer's standard EU evaluation question used to measure EU support since the
early 1970s. The question is as follows:
Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the
European Union is a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad?
The variable responses were first coded to fit ordered form assigning the value 3 to 'a
good thing', 2 to 'neither a good nor a bad thing' and 1 to 'a bad thing'. All "don't
know" responses were coded as 'neither good nor bad' similar to the previous chapters.
In order to ease interpretation, I have also standardised the responses into a 0-1 scale. I 1
represents the highest level of EU support while 0 represents the lowest. The mean
public EU support of each region by year is displayed in Figure 8.1.
All four regions tend to follow a consistent trend with one another however there are
instances of differing opinion. The overall trend for each region starts with a decline in
support that reaches its lowest point by 1980. Much of this may be attributed to the
economic and labour crises of the late 1970s, a point where liberalisation of markets and
labour would be highly unpopular. Interestingly, through the 1970s Scotland appears to
be the most Euroskeptic of the regions. It can be noted that in Dardanelli's (2005)
research Labour and Nationalist party supporters were much more hostile to the concept
of Europe at this time. This sentiment appears to be transcending onto the Scottish
public as anti-EU sentiment would have likely been strong given the political
circumstances of the late 1970s influencing the results displayed.
After 1980 support tends to increase steadily each year until roughly 1991 where it
reaches its peak. By the late 1980s, it is notable that England's support becomes lower
than Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. While England's support is still increasing
I The formula for standardisation into a [0,1] scale is as follows:
z. = 1': -lower bound oj Y
I upper bound oj Y - lower bound oj Y .
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Figure 8.1: 1973 - 2005 Regional Public Support of EU Membership
1973 1977 1981 1985 1989
Year
1993 1997 2001 2005
--- Scotland
--- Northern Ireland
--- Wales
England
Note: Data taken from Eurobarometer Mannheim Trend File 1973-2002 and
Eurobarometer Surveys 60.1 (2003), 62 (2004) and 63.4 (2005). EU position
variable standardised to a 0-1 scale (1 being highest level of support) from 3-point
variable measuring country EU membership approval of 1 "a bad thing", 2 "neither
good nor bad" and 3 "a good thing".
until 1991, this change is mostly attributed to Scottish and Welsh support increasing at a
steeper rate. In Scotland, by the late 1980s the Scottish National Party took a dramatic
shift in changing its opposition to Europe in an attempt to produce support for
autonomy within the European context. The SNP shift in attitudes towards Europe also
came at a time when Labour was revaluating its stance due to the changing nature of the
European project. In Wales, Plaid Cymru had not yet taken a strong European stance
and was therefore not engaged in a debate over the issue with the other parties (Mitchell
1998). The- effect of Labour changing its stance however, may also explain the Welsh
boost as Labour was the majority party of the Welsh constituencies. England still being
a Conservative stronghold still had an increase in support but not as strong as in
Scotland and Wales.
Maastricht evidently was a treaty too far for most of the British public, as support in
England, Scotland and Wales decreases from 1992. Northern Ireland however resists
the trend as support remains much higher there than in the other regions. This is likely
due to the distinctiveness of the Northern Irish situation and past dilemmas between
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nationalists and unionists. The European Union may be seen as a potential mediator in
the conflict perhaps accrediting to the possibility of peace in the region. This is
speculation however and the uniqueness of Northern Ireland merits further research in
its own right. More interesting, after the 1997 election of the Labour government and
the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1999, support for
both Scotland and Wales tends to oscillate while in England it remains more constant,
perhaps. linking the European and devolution issues. As devolution becomes a reality,
the Scottish and Welsh publics are possibly shifting their attention to regional politics
pushing European integration to a less significant issue.
The trends shown in Figure 8.1 demonstrate that differences in EU support have existed
from 1973 through 2005 between the regions of the United Kingdom. Many of the
trends have been attributed to the current debate over the role Britain has played by the
political parties, particularly between the SNP and Labour parties in Scotland. The
subsequent section will expand the time line in comparing the regional public position
to that of the political parties.
Regional Public Support vs. Party Position
The following section will build on the previous analysis by comparing regional public
support for Europe~ integration with party positions towards integration. Observing
the trends of both public and party will determine if any of the political parties reflect
the public's sentiment towards integration. Two sources of data will be combined in
this section. Public support will again be taken from the Eurobarometer Mannheim
Trend File while the party positions will be taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey
discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. The Chapel Hill expert survey was chosen
over the Comparative Manifestos Project as the inclusion of evaluations of the Scottish, .
National Party and Plaid Cymru extended into the 1980s as opposed to the Comparative
Manifestos Project. The survey evaluates each political party for the years 1984, 1988,
1992, 1996, 1999 and 2002. The Eurobarometer data was also selected for the
corresponding years. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, Northern Ireland will not be
-
included in this analysis.
The variable used to evaluate public support is identical to the variable used in the
above 1973-2005 time-series analysis. The variable is once again standardised on a 0-1
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scale. The Chapel Hill expert survey asks a number of party experts to estimate the
"overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in [given
year]" on a 1-7 scale of the following: 2
1) Strongly opposed to European integration
2) Opposed to European integration
3) Somewhat opposed to European integration
4) Neutral, no stance on the issue of European integration
5) Somewhat in favor of European integration
6) In favor of European integration
7) Strongly in favor of European Integration
In order to make the party results comparable with the public's the party EU position
variable has also been standardised to a 0-1 scale. The results are presented in the
figures below for Scotland (Figure 8.2), Wales (Figure 8.3) and England (Figure 8.4).
When comparing the regional public's aggregate EU position with the political party
positions at first glance, it is noticeable that in not any of the three regions does the
public align completely with any of the parties. While it would likely be expected that
the public will never perfectly match support with that of a particular party, observing
the shifts in support is more useful to distinguish if any particular party corresponds to
the change in views of the public.
First, observing Scotland in Figure 8.2, the Scottish public lie between the EU support
levels of the Labour and Conservative parties throughout the 18 year period. The
steadiest increase in public support occurs between 1984 and 1992, the very years it was
mentioned above that the SNP brought the European issue to the forefront of Scottish
politics. Labour and the SNP also increase their support levels during this period while
the Conservatives are perceived to have marginally increased their favourability towards
the EU. This possibly supports the hypothesis that the debate and modification of EU
support by the parties may have influenced the Scottish public into strengthening
integration support. Furthermore, the public seem to follow the trend of the SNP with
small a decline in support from 1992 to 1996, to a small increase by 1999 followed a
2 Please refer to chapters 4 and 5 for more information on the design of the Chapel Hill Survey.
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Figure 8.2: 1984 - 2002 Scottish Public vs. Political Parties
-,_- ,-- ,-> -------,
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",
o
1984 1988 1992
Year
1996 1999 2002
- - - - - Scottish Public
--- Labour
--- Conservatives
--- Scottish National Party
Liberal Democrats
Figure 8.3: 1984 - 2002 Welsh Public vs. Political Parties
o
1984 1988 1992
Year
1996 1999 2002
----- Welsh Public
Labour
--- Conservatives
--- Plaid Cymru
Liberal Democrats
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Figure 8.4: 1984 - 2002 English Public vs. Political Parties
o ~ -, -, -. ,- ~
1984 1988 1992
Year
1996 1999 2002
----- English Public
Liberal Democrats
--- Labour
--- Conservatives
Note: For Figure 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4, public evaluations are from the
Eurobarometer Mannheim Trend File and party evaluations are from
the Chapel Hill expert survey. Both variables for ED position for
public and party have been standardised to 0-1 scale (1 being highest
level of support).
second reasonable decline by 2002. The support shifts of the other parties do not follow
the variation in support as strongly as the SNP.
Wales and England however have a slightly different interaction between the public and
political parties. In both regions, the public tends to follow the trend of the Labour and
Conservative parties with a small increase of support until 1992. After 1992 both
regional publics decrease their strength in support much to the trends of both the Labour
and Conservative parties though no party truly runs parallel with public support for the
latter half of the decade. This displays that through the 1980s and early 1990s English
and Welsh opinion were more correlated with party positions while both public and
parties begin to deviate from one another by the mid-1990s. In Scotland however
Scottish public opinion appears to strongly correlate with the position of the SNP. The
direction of causality however is still unclear. It is possible that the SNP is generating
the debate on European integration as a means to bolster support for devolution and
ultimately independence. Carruba (2001) however suggests that European policy
preferences of elites tend to be based on the preferences of the general public. Carruba
was able to test this theory by controlling for the party-cueing effect through examining
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non-party supporters and their positions towards integration. If this is the case, it may
be likely that the SNP as the only regional party of Scotland is better able to correspond
with the preferences of the Scottish people. Due to the small sample size of SNP
supporters in the Mannheim Trend File an analysis over time investigating party
supporters is not possible but will be examined in the ordered logit regression analysis
using the 2005 British Election Study in the following section of the chapter.
Approving EU Membership: Ordered Logit Regression Analysis
of Scotland, Wales and England
The following section will present ordered logit regression models for Scotland, Wales
and England. The models will give insight to the effects of several variables that were
explored in the previous chapters of this dissertation and provide models to build
estimations of support in the three British regions. More on the use of ordered logit
regression will be explained after the variable descriptions.
The Data
The dataset chosen for the analysis is the 2005 British Election Study (BES).3 The BES
is a survey conducted before and after each British election since 1964. The face-to-
face interviews provide researchers with a substantial amount of information useful for
determining the British public's opinion on various issues during the time of each
election.
There are several reasons why I chose to use the BES over a number of other surveys
including Eurobarometer, which was the primary source of public data in the previous
chapters. T?e chief concern with using Eurobarometer was a sample size issue. The
total sample size for the United Kingdom in the Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005) dataset was
only 1,318. While the sample seems large, the total for Scotland is only 83 and 26 for
Wales, thus eliminating the possibility for developing a reliable multivariate model for
either region." The BES survey is much more competent with a total sample size of
4,791, and 1,213 and 888 for Scotland and Wales respectively. In addition, the BES
3 Data is made available at www.essex.ac.uklbes.
4 While the sample size is too small for an ordered logit regression model it is large enough for a random
intercept and hierarchical linear model when part ofa larger sample as done in chapters 6 and 7. Due to
the lack of nested groups in a single country case study, neither the random intercepts nor hierarchical
linear models should be used. Please refer to Snijders and Bosker (1999: 140-154) for more information
on multilevel models and sample sizes.
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includes many variables that are nearly identical to those used in Eurobarometer making
the comparisons with the previous models much easier'
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used for the analysis asks the respondent to evaluate British EU
membership and is similar to the Eurobarometer variable used to construct the
dependent index variable in chapters 6 and 7. The BES question asks:
Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Britain's membership III the
European Union?
The respondent is then given the option to respond with 1 of 5 possible responses of:
1) Strongly Approve
2) Approve
3) Neither Approve or Disapprove
4) Disapprove and
5) Strongly Disapprove
The BES does not leave an option for "don't know" thus all none answers are coded as
missing and eliminated from the models. The dependent variable is different from the
index variable used in Chapters 6 and 7. The index variable is a combination of three
questions, one evaluating country membership similar to the dependent variable used in
this chapter. The scores were equally weighted to create a 10-point index scale
evaluating an individual's overall level of EU support that was compatible with using
the multi leveled models. As multileveled models will not be used in this chapter, the
BES variable measuring public EU evaluations will be kept in its original form. The
phrasing of the question, however, still measures the same fundamental dynamic of
which the additional questions in Eurobarometer measure thus will be valid for this
analysis (Deflem and Pampel 1996).
5 Other British specific surveys were also considered such as the British Household Panel Survey and
British Social Attitudes Survey. While both contained interesting questions regarding devolution and
identity, the remainder of the variables were limited when attempting to construct similar models of those
in the earlier chapters. In addition, due to lack of data available Northern Ireland will not be included in
the analysis.
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Table 8.1: Distribution of British Membership Approval by Region
Question: Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Britain's membership in the
European Union?
Total Percentage of Region
Scotland
Strongly Approve 67 6.8
Approve 360 36.4
Neither 288 29.2
Disapprove 210 21.3
Strongly Disapprove 63 6.4
Wales
Strongly Approve 43 5.8
Approve 273 36.5
Neither 214 28.6
Disapprove 151 20.2
Strongly Disapprove 67 8.0
England
Strongly Approve 146 6.3
Approve 763 32.8
Neither 621 26.8
Disapprove 580 24.0
Strongly Disapprove 211 9.1
Note: Data original source taken from BES 2005 survey. The above results are after recoding from the
original form and used for the constructed models for this chapter
The distributions of the dependent variable are shown in Table 8.1, revealing that
approval (when observing "approve" and "strongly approve") of British membership in
the EU is higher in Scotland and Wales than in England. Furthermore negative
evaluations of British membership are higher in England.
The Explanatory Variables
I have attempted to use several of the same explanatory variables used in the previous
models of Chapters 6 and 7. The prior chapters included several macro-indicators in
correspondence with the previous literature (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Duch and
Taylor 1997; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Kritzinger 2003). However, because this case
study analysis deals with single regions, the regional and national level indicators have
been eliminated. I will however maintain using the subjective indicators referring to the
overall national economy perception similar to those used by Gabel and Whitten (1997).
In addition, employment expectations were not available in the BES thus I have
included personal economic expectations to achieve a subjective evaluation of
economy. In addition to the economic evaluations I have also included a variable
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evaluating the satisfaction with democracy in Britain. The BES questions for the above
variables are as follows:
How do you think the financial situation of your household will change
over the next 12 months?
1) Get a lot worse
2) Get a little worse
3) Stay the same
4) Get a little better
5) Get a lot better
How do you think the general economic situation in this country will
develop over the next 12 months?
1) Get a lot worse
2) Get a little worse
3) Stay the same
4) Get a little better
5) Get a lot better
On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way that
democracy works in this country?
1) Very satisfied
2) Fairly satisfied
3) A little dissatisfied 6
I would ext:ect the economic evaluation variables to both remain positive as was the
case in Chapter 6. In addition, those more satisfied with democracy in Britain are also
expected to have positive evaluations of integration. Furthermore, I would also expect
democratic satisfaction to have a stronger effect in Scotland and Wales where citizens
are more accustomed to multilevel governance.
6 While both economic evaluations were left in their original ordered coding, the democratic evaluation
variable was recoded with 3 being "Very Satisfied" and 1 "A little dissatisfied" to keep consistency with
higher numbered response categories being the more positive outcome.
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To further investigate the effects of political parties I have included dummy variables
for voters of the Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat parties for each region and
additionally the Scottish National Party for Scotland, Plaid Cymru for Wales and the
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in England. To assess the effects of
political party supporters each of the party variables will be tested against non-voters as
the reference category. I would expect party supporters to share similar evaluations of
EU support with that of their political party of choice. Therefore using the results of
party preferences from the analysis above I expect Liberal Democrat voters, followed
by Labour voters, in all three regions to maintain the strongest EU support while
conversely Conservative voters, and UKIP voters in England, will demonstrate the
weakest support. Additionally, SNP and Plaid Cymru voters should also maintain
strong positive evaluations of EU support similar to that of Labour voters.
Exploring the effects of regional assertiveness has been one of the prime variables under
consideration throughout this dissertation. While Van Houten's (2003) regional
assertiveness variable would not be practical in a single case study, the BES does
include questions on evaluation of autonomy within Scotland and Wales. The questions
considering autonomy are as follows:
Scotland:
Which of the following Statements comes closest to your views?
1) Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK
2) Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected
parliament that has some taxation powers
3) Scotland should be part of the UK, without its own elected
parliament
Wales:
Which of the following Statements comes closest to your views?
1) Wales should become independent, separate from the UK
2) Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected
assembly that has some taxation powers
3) Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected
assembly that has no taxation powers
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4) Wales should be part of the UK, without its own elected
parliament
Options 2 and 3 for Wales have been combined as "maintaining a Welsh Assembly" in
order to remain consistent with the Scottish options. A dummy variable was created for
each category with option 3, maintaining a parliament at the national level only, used as
the reference category as it represents a discontent for devolution and multilevel
governance. I would expect those that support independence for both Scotland and
Wales are more likely to support the European Union due to cueing from regional
parties as they promote independence "within Europe". Furthermore those that support
the devolutionary bodies of government will also be more in favour of European
integration than those that believe in a UK centralised government. These individuals
are supporting a multilevel governance system within Britain and will therefore be more
likely than UK parliament only supporters to accept a third level of government in
Europe.
Variables evaluating identity will also be considered. Chapter 7 demonstrated that those
with higher levels of regional identity were less likely to support EU integration while
those that had higher levels of national identity were more likely to support integration.
I have created a set of binary variables representing primary identity from the following
BES questions:
Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?
1) [Scottish, Welsh, English] not British
2) More [Scottish, Welsh, English] than British
,3) Equally [Scottish, Welsh, English] and British
4) More British than [Scottish, Welsh, English]
5) British not [Scottish, Welsh, English]
I first combined options 1 and 2 to create a category referencing Scottish, Welsh, or
English as the strongest identity. I then did the same for options 4 and 5 to reference
British as the strongest identity. Option 3 remained equal regional and British identity.
I then included a dummy variable for Scottish, Welsh, or English in addition to British
identity in each respective model. Equal identity was then used as the reference
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category to get an understanding of the strengths regional and British identity plays in
Britain. I would expect regional identity to display a negative effect and British identity
to display a positive effect as it did in Chapter 7.
In both Chapters 6 and 7 I examined Ronald Inglehart's (1970b; 1970a; 1977) concept
of opinion leadership, an individual's potential for political involvement. The opinion
leadership index variable created by Eurobarometer is a 4-point scale combining two
questions, the first asking a respondent how often one discusses political matters with
others and the second asking how often one tries to persuade others from their views.
The BES does not include the same variable but does comprise of two similar variables,
the first rating an individual's political interest on a 1-5 scale, 1 being the least amount
of interest and 5 being the most, and a second variable rating the ability for an
individual to persuade how to vote, 1 for least likely through 10 for most likely. I have
left both variables in their original form and expect both to hold positive effects.
The next variable to be used is level of education, which indicates at which age level an
individual was last considered to be a full time student. Here we would expect that
those who discontinued their education at a younger age will be less likely to support
EU membership positively. Education contributes to access of information as well as a
more broad-based attitude of the world; therefore one who receives a higher level of
education should be expected to have a positive attitude on European integration (Kohli
2000).
Lastly Age and Gender act as control variables to optimise the effects of each model.
According to Deflem and Pampel (1996) age has a significant effect on EU integration.
This theory ~erives from democratisation of schooling in recent decades, where those of
a younger generations are more likely to have received further education than previous
generations and are more likely to support the unification of Europe (Deflem and
Pampel 1996). In addition gender will be included and is expected to show higher
support amongst men than women reflecting previous research (Liebert 1999; Nelsen
and Guth 2000).
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Explaining British Regional Variation
Ordered logistic regression is used to analyse the above described variables and their
effects on the five category variable measuring approval of British EU membership.
The previous chapters used regression and multi leveled models in order to predict the
outcome of support for integration. The given dependent variable in the BES is a five
category outcome where the categories are placed in order from least favourable to most
favourable EU support levels. The distance between these categories however is unclear
and needs to be taken into account when evaluating the effects of the explanatory
variables.i The ordered logistic regression model treats each response category of the
dependent variable independently when analysing the model. It will also provide the
opportunity to predict the probability of a particular category in the dependent variable
given the measurement of certain explanatory variables. In other terms, it will be able
to give the probabilities of each category of EU membership approval given an
observed response of any explanatory variable. For example, it would be possible to
predict the probability that an individual will strongly approve of EU membership given
he/she has the primary identity of being Scottish.
Table 8.2 displays the ordered logit models for Scotland, Wales and England. Each of
the models predicted roughly 40% of the cases correctly.i In addition to the explanatory
variables, a dummy variable for each English region was included to account for
variation amongst the English regions. As none of the regions displayed significance
they were not included on the table due to insufficient space. The coefficients for the
English regions are available in the appendix.
In each of the regions personal economic expectations had a positive effect, displaying
that the more likely one is to believe he/she will be economically stronger the more
,
likely they will be to support the EU. Although positive for each region, the variable is
only significant in Scotland. Furthermore the coefficient is much larger in Scotland
showing that personal economic well-being is a much stronger influence for the Scottish
than in Wales and England. When observing the general economic expectations for the
entirety of the United Kingdom, only England had a positive and statistically significant
7 Please refer to Chapter 4 for a detailed description on logistic and ordered logistic regression.
S Though this may seem low, identical models were produced using a recoded three category dependent
variable for comparison where the percent predicted correctly were roughly 55%. The reduction of 15%
is attributed to the higher number of response categories in the dependent variable. While recoding the
variable to three categories increases the percent correctly predicted, doing so may exclude information
thus it was decided to leave the variable in its original categorisation.
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Table 8.2: Ordered Logit Models for Public A~~roval of British EU Membershi~
Scotland Wales England
Independent Variables p (S.E.) P (S.E.) P (S.E.)
Evaluation Indicators
Personal Economic Expectations 0.255* (0.102) 0.158 (0.138) 0.090 (0.060)
General Economic Expectations -0.071 (0.106) 0.027 (0.130) 0.134* (0.057)
Democratic Satisfaction 0.463** (0.127) 0.371 * (0.151) 0.488** (0.071)
Political Party'
Labour . 0.323 (0.219) 0.136 (0.282) 0.426** (0.126)
Conservatives -0.242 (0.280) -0.856** (0.325) -0.342** (0.129)
Liberal Democrats 0.560* (0.270) -0.019 (0.321) 0.469** (0.143)
Scottish National Party -0.282 (0.254)
Plaid Cymru 0.274 (0.386)
UKIP -1.617** (0.369)
Autonomy'
Independent Scotland 0.174 (0.261)
Independent Wales 0.232 (0.385)
Scottish Parliament 0.338+ (0.200)
Welsh Assembly 0.829** (0.214)
Identity'
British -0.569+ (0.298) -0.075 (0.239) 0.172 (0.117)
Scottish -0.459* (0.181)
Welsh -0.223 (0.222)
English -0.446** (0.100)
Political Interest Variables
Political Interest 0.221* (0.091) 0.322** (0.107) 0.128* (0.050)
Vote Persuasion 0.054+ (0.030) 0.052 (0.035) 0.047** (0.016)
Demographic Variables
Gender (Male) 0.293+ (0.157) 0.197 (0.186) 0.341 ** (0.088)
Age -0.019** (0.006) -0.010 (0.007) -0.010** (0.003)
Age Completed Education"
16-18 0.045 (0.189) 0.402+ (0.243) 0.460** (0.108)
19 or Above 0.784** (0.249) 1.089** (0.312) 1.071** (0.139)
1'1 -1.094 (0.658) 0.305 (0.790) -0.016 (0.357)
1'2 0.971 (0.647) 1.907 (0.787) 1.940 (0.356)
1'3 2.255 (0.651 ) 3.284 (0.797) 3.213 (0.360)
1'4 4.949 (0.682) 6.152 (0.844) 5.909 (0.382)
% Predicted Correctly 42.4% 39.6% 40.6%
- Log Likelihood -804.518 -544.419 -2522.985
Z2(d.f.) 128.35(17) 105.97(17) 434.05(23)
N 615 419 1904
+P < .10, * P < .05, ** P < .01
Reference Categories:
I: Non-Voters 2: UK Parliament Only 3: Equal Identities 4: 15 or Below
Note: Dummy variables for each of the nine English administrative regions were also included however as none
were significant the~ are not included in the above table for concern ofsEace.
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effect while in Wales the effect was positive though minimal and insignificant. In
Scotland the effect was negative and not statistically significant. The two economic
evaluation variables show that the English tend to take account of the United Kingdom
as a whole when evaluating the European Union. The Scottish however have a stronger
effect when evaluating their personal economic situation while the Welsh tend to take
neither personal nor national economic evaluations into account. This indicates that in
economic terms, the English are more likely to reflect on the whole of the country while
the Scottish and Welsh are less likely to consider the economic evaluations of the
entirety of Britain. In addition, the Scottish are more likely to reflect on evaluations
closer to the individual level.
Democratic satisfaction displays a strong positive and statistically significant
relationship for each of the regions. The effect remains strongest in England and
Scotland, both comparable to their evaluations of democracy in Britain. In Wales
however the effect remains slightly lower though statistically significant. It remains
evident for all the British, those who evaluate democracy positively will be more likely
to transcend that satisfaction to the approval of an additional level of governance.
The inclusion of the political party variable helps capture the likelihood of EU approval
for supporters of each of the parties. Non-voters were used as the reference group for
all party supporters to be measured against. Labour supporters were more likely to
support integration in each of the three regions although the effect was only statistically
significant in England. The Conservatives unsurprisingly had a strong negative and
statistically significant effect for each of regions, where the effect was strongest in
Wales. Haesly (2001: 94) noted in his research that Euroskeptics in Scotland and Wales
tend to highlight the Conservative Party's concern that the EU acts as an institution in
which Britain competes rather than acts collectively. The Conservative Party's unease
over the EU is likely to be much stronger amongst Welsh Conservatives rather then
Scottish or English Conservatives. The Liberal Democrats had the most influence on
EU support in Scotland, followed by England, and a minimal and statistically
insignificant effect in Wales.
Surprisingly voters of the Scottish National Party had an extremely large negative effect
in Scotland, being the party least likely to support EU membership. However, the
- 175 -
results are statistically insignificant thus conclusions can only be approached with
caution. This may give an interesting insight to the voters of the SNP. While the SNP
promotes independence within Europe, the concept of "within Europe" may not be
necessarily important to SNP voters. In Wales, voters of Plaid Cymru show only a
modest positive effect towards EU support although statistically insignificant. The
negative coefficient in addition to the lack of statistical significance indicates that for
both nationalist parties the issue of Europe is not necessarily linked with the goals of
autonomy for the party supporters. The slogan of independence "within Europe"
appears to more likely be provided for non-party followers to support the ideology of
independence rather than the party itself. Lastly, UKIP predictably has a strong and
statistically significant negative effect being the only party formed on an anti-European
ideology.
In both Scotland and Wales, those supporting independence in addition to those
supporting the devolved governments displayed positive effects when compared to
those desiring only a central UK government. Support for the devolved governments
however maintained a much stronger and statistically significant effect when compared
to those that desire independence. This perhaps gives insight to the role devolution and
independence plays in evaluating Europe. The positive correlation between devolution
and EU support suggests that integration may benefit from individuals who support
multilevel governance within their member-state. Independence however is a step away
from multilevel governance only creating an additional centralised government. Both
supporters of independence and supporters of a UK centralised government may find
more in common in terms of European integration than with those supporting
devolution. Strong allegiances to single governments appear to deter support away
from Europe in both scenarios. For Europe, independence for subnational regions may
be a step too far while devolution within the concept of new regionalism may actually
promote integration support.
The effects of regional identity ran consistent with the conclusions of Chapter 7. In 'all
three regions, regional identity had a negative effect on approval of EU membership.
The effect was only statistically significant however in Scotland and England. In
Scotland the effect was strongest though comparable to England. In terms of British
identity, England was the only region to remain consistent with the results of Chapter 7
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showing that those who perceive themselves as primarily British over English are more
likely to support EU membership. In Scotland and Wales, British identity displayed a
negative effect though only statistically significant in Scotland. To explore the effects
of identity further I have created a probabilities plot for each of the three regions.
Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 display the change in the probability of an individual approving
of EU membership as identity moves from being equally Scottish/WelshlEnglish and
British to being primarily Scottish/Welsh/English or British. In other terms, the point
on the left of the figure shows the percentage probability of approving EU membership
for an individual who maintains a dual identity of both hislher region and Britain. The
two points on the right side of the represent the percentage probability of approving EU
membership for an individual whom maintains a stronger regional or British identity.
The probabilities are calculated accounting for identity while holding all other variables
at their means.
The difference in effects amongst the regions shows that the Scottish and the Welsh
reflect on identity differently than the English in regards to evaluating the EU. In
Scotland, both Scottish and British identities lower the probability of approving of the
EU by a large margin. Both identities have a similar effect demonstrating those that
maintain a dual identity are much more likely to support the EU. In Wales, Welsh
identity has a stronger impact in lowering the probability of approving the EU than does
British identity. In England, English identity decreases the probability of approval
while British identity increases the likelihood of approving the EU. Perhaps in Scotland
and Wales British and regional identities compete more with one another than in
England. Due to these conflicting identities Europe may be seen as yet another
territorial identity that regional and British identities perceive as a threat. In England,
Britishness may be seen as more of a multiple identity including all of the United
Kingdom rarely pitted against English identity thus those that see themselves as British
are more accepting to the possibility of a European identity. Those that feel any levels
of English identity, whether it be equal to British identity or fully English, are more
likely to perceive the EU as a threat.
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Figure 8.5: Scottish Identity Predicted Probabilities
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Figure 8.7: English Identity Predicted Probabilities
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Note: For Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 probability of approving British EU
membership is the combined probability of "Approving" and "Strongly
Approving" .
As expected, political interest has a positive and statistically significant effect for all
three regions. In Scotland and Wales however the effect was stronger than that of
England possibly indicating that the issue of European integration is more salient for the
Scottish and Welsh. In addition, vote persuasion had a minimal and statistically
insignificant effect showing that individuals persuading others how to vote were
unlikely using Europe as a means of persuasion. Males and higher levels of education
displayed a positive effect while Age showed that older generations are less likely to
support the EU as was predicted. None of the control variables used contributed any
unique explanations that differed from the previous literature.
Conclusion
This chapter was designed to evaluate perceptions of regional public opinion towards
European integration through the case study of the United Kingdom. It started by
exploring the regional trends ofEU support over time from 1973-2005. While the large
trends seemed to be parallel amongst the regions, there are instances where some
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regions deviate away from the other regions perhaps reflecting the European debate
amongst the political parties. This was expanded further by comparing the regional
public and the positions of the political parties. In Scotland, the public seemed to shift
positions in accordance with the Scottish National Party over time whereas in Wales
and England the public appeared more likely to be correlated with the positions of the
Labour and Conservative parties. This possibly illustrates the role the SNP plays in
Scotland when using Europe in its debate towards independence. The closeness of the
SNP and the Scottish public's positions on Europe indicate that a correlation between
the two may exist. The causal direction of this relationship however is not clear. The
SNP may possibly be shaping the debate in Scottish politics thus convincing the public
on supporting Europe. Conversely, the SNP may be taking cues from the public, being
the only regional party of Scotland having an advantage of being able to adapt the party
position on Europe to represent the general Scottish public. In Wales, Plaid Cymru did
not appear to have as comparable positions with the Welsh public. Both the English and
Welsh publics appear to have stronger correlations with the Labour and/or Conservative
parties.
The ordered logit models gave a cross-regional comparison on how several variables
influence EU support differently amongst each of the regions. The most notable
indicators were those' of political party and identity, particularly where the Scottish
National Party maintained a negative effect. This shows that although the SNP may
promote the European Union, its supporters still detach themselves from reflecting the
same evaluations towards integration. In the party and public comparison, however, the
SNP appeared to be the political party that best fits Scottish public attitudes on Europe.
This may indicate that the SNP are using the European issue to reach the general
Scottish public and attract support for their cause from non-party supporters rather than
influence their supporters alone. In Wales, Plaid Cymru showed a positive effect
though statistically insignificant. Conservatives, which had a negative effect, were the
only party in Wales to show statistical significance. This may demonstrate that .~n
Wales party correlation may be strongest for those that have a Euroskeptic sentiment.
In England all parties showed statistical significance including a very strong negative
effect from UKIP.
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When evaluating the economy, the English appeared to be more likely to evaluate the
whole UK when compared to the Scottish and Welsh. The Scottish however had
stronger evaluations when reflecting upon their own personal economic expectations as
opposed to the British economy. While this is not to say the Scottish are more
concerned about themselves than all of Britain, it may demonstrate that the English are
more inclined to think nationally when compared to Scotland or Wales. Identity also
had differing effects in Scotland and Wales when compared to the English. In Scotland
and Wales, British identity showed a different effect than in England possibly revealing
the confliction of identities in these minority regions. It appears evident, that British
identity has a different meaning for the Scottish and Welsh. For both these regions,
British identity may compete with the regional identities thus those that are able to
accept both will be more likely to identify with a third European identity. In England,
British identity may not be seen as threatening to English identity, as it is in Scotland
and Wales, thus those that see themselves as British are more accepting to the
possibility of a European identity.
Additionally, desire for independence had a weaker effect on ED membership support
when compared to support for the devolutionary governments. This may indicate that
public support for independence may offset support for European integration. However,
devolution and multilevel governance, including the regional level, demonstrate a strong
positive effect on EU support. European support appears to benefit greatly from support
of multilevel governance. Independence however can be seen as support for an
additional central state where authority may be threatened by European integration.
When evaluating the variables that contribute to new regionalism, such as economic
perceptions and identity, they each impact ED evaluations differently dependent upon
region. As ,the European question of integration is consistently debated in British
politics, and as Scotland, and perhaps someday Wales, moves towards the possibility of
holding a referendum on independence, the results of the above models may give insight
into the dynamics of what lies ahead in Britain's relationship with the ED.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
Introduction
The investigations of this dissertation attempted to establish explanations of regional
variation in public support for the European Union. The results suggest that the reality
of EU public opinion is much more complex than much of the previous literature
suggests. When observing public opinion data within the multileveled territorial context
of European states a more complete representation of public perceptions towards
support of European integration can be seen. As previous literature has found concepts
of politics, economy and identity all have significant implications on shaping opinion
towards European integration. A large extent of this earlier research however failed to
address much of the changing dynamics of multilevel governance and regional
assertiveness occurring within many of the EU member-states over the past 20 years.
Many of the notions' used to explain regional EU support within this research are
associated with the theme of Michael Keating's (1998) concept of new regionalism.
New regionalism is the subnational reaction to the ongoing globalisation in which the
European Union is a large part. Regions are pitted against one another in terms of
economic, political and even cultural competition. This in tum gives regions the
incentive to have a more direct influence on the management of policies that affect them
most thus a plea for further autonomy from the nation-state is made. A crucial feature
however is that this course of action is asymmetrical between countries throughout
Europe. Some regions have a higher degree of assertiveness, such as in Scotland or the
Basque Country, while others have little or no assertiveness. Furthermore each region
differs in their reasoning for autonomy. In some regions new regionalism can be seen
as contributing to the expansion of the multilevel governance structure in modem
Europe. As the regions attempt to pull authority away from the nation-state from below
the"European Union does the equivalent from above.
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Can the region and Europe find a common ground in moving authority from the nation-
state? The results of this research suggest that although regional elites may find
commonality with the motives of the European Union this sentiment has yet to fully
transfer to the regional public. In addition, the various elements which contribute to the
growth of new regionalism have varied effects on the regional public's attitude towards
European integration. These elements have been summed into four main themes which
will be reviewed in this final chapter. I will begin the dissertation conclusion by
discussing the contribution this research makes to the literature on public opinion
towards European integration. I will go on to re-evaluate the role of regional political
parties and their influence on the public. I will then review the investigation of
economic and political indicators' influence on integration support followed by the role
of identity, all taken within the regional context. Lastly I will look more directly at
regional assertiveness and its influence on European support. Thereafter I will conclude
by discussing the limitations of this research and how it can be expanded to give further
knowledge into understanding regional variations in public opinion towards European
integration.
Contribution to European Public Opinion Studies
The research in this dissertation was designed to build upon the works of previous
authors rather than discover a new explanatory variable that has astoundingly been
overlooked over the past decades of public opinion research. The unique approach this
research has taken accounted for the multi leveled structure of the data involved. Rather
than just hypothesising positive economic evaluations will lead to positive evaluations
on EU support, the contextual structure of how economic evaluations are constructed
was considered.
Individuals form their opinions on the contextual elements that surround them. Not all
regions react to the same variables similarly. This was highlighted in the complicated
effect that regional and more specifically national identities play. Accounting for these
effects was only possible by using the multilevel modelling approach. While multilevel
modelling is a rather new methodology it has been occasionally applied to other studies
see.king to explain public opinion towards the EU. Most of this previous research
however used country and political party as their chosen levels of analysis. While
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political parties may be a logical level it leaves out many of the components that make
up one's community that may contribute to shaping his/her opinion.
In addition, the multilevel model approach allowed for the observation of different
effects a single variable may have on EU support. While the individual effect of
national identity was positive overall, when permitting for the randomisation of the
variable per region we get a better glimpse of national identity within a single country.
This highlighted that national identity can have opposite effects in different regions
within the same country. The multilevel model allows for the examination of both an
overall cross-national effect as well as the possibility of examining particular regions.
The use of multilevel modelling in this research will hopefully reveal the significance of
accounting for the nested structure in which nearly all survey data exist.
Lastly, this research moves public opinion research away from examining countries as
homogenous states. It recognises the new direction which governance is taking on the
European continent. As new regionalism and devolution progress, the significance of
the region as a political actor at both the European and national levels will increase.
This role will establish a new political arena in which region specific policies will be
debated not only amongst the political elites but the public as well. If the European
Union is to ultimately reach its goal of a 'Europe of the regions' then this work is an
opening step into understanding the public's relation with this concept.
Regional Political Parties: What Do They Stand for and Are
They Influencing the Public?
The regional political parties are unique in terms of ideology when compared to nearly
all other political party families. Their commonality with one another lies not on the
traditional ideological political spectrum but rather in the shared goal of autonomy for
the territories they represent (Hix and Lord 1997: 44). As regional parties are seen
primarily as single issue parties they are often considered fringe parties as they rarely
partake in government. Some researchers such as Taggart (1998) claimed that as these
parties are less likely to participate in government, the European issue is seen as
secondary as integration is mostly an intergovernmental process.
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Chapter 5 demonstrated that the regionalist parties themselves are just as likely to be as
pro-European as most of the mainstream parties while the other fringe party families
tend to either be primarily negative towards integration, as in the case with the far left
and far right, or minimally in favour of integration, as with the greens. This was
demonstrated through the use of comparing party manifestos from the time period of
1990-29°3. In addition when observing the Chapel Hill expert surveys, this trend seems
to remain consistent with Keating's (1998) theory of new regionalism as regional party
support increases from the early 1980s. Furthermore by comparing the manifesto data
with the expert survey, regional parties' intentions in addition to their actions towards
support for Europe remain reliably positive.
The data also displayed that when regional parties are placed on the traditional political
ideology spectrum, the more conservative regional parties tend to favour European
integration. This is similar to the comparison of all party families where the
conservative parties displayed the highest likelihood of integration support (Chapter 5).
It was also shown that when observing cultural protection, classified as a "new political
issue", regional parties tend to go against Marks, Hooghe and Wilson's (2002)
ideological spectrum on new politics.' Those regional parties within culturally differing
regions are more likely to support integration than be Euroskeptic possibly seeing the
European Union as a means of protecting the minority regional culture (Chapter 5). The
above trends display that in terms of European integration regional parties do tend to be
consistent with one another and do not necessarily act like a fringe party. How does this
fare with regional party supporters?
In Chapter 5 when comparing the mean levels of public support for the EU for both
regional parties and their supporters with other party families, regional party supporters,
do remain consistently pro-EU in line with their party family. This trend can be
observed over time from 1984-2002. The other so-called fringe parties and supporters
of the far left, far right and greens do not follow the EU integration stance of their
parties. ·In addition, when evaluating member-states which contain regions with higher
levels of political assertiveness, the inclusion of regional parties within the national
parliament had a positive and significant effect on the public's support of EU
I Marks, Hooghe and Wilson (2002) label this second ideological spectrum the GALIT AN scale. GAL
(Green / Alternative / Libertarian) is on the left side of the scale while TAN (Traditional/Authoritarian /
Nationalist) is on the right side of the scale.
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integration (Chapter 7). This perhaps displays that the participation of regional parties
in national government helps reinforce a positive attitude towards multilevel governance
for these regions. When conducting a more in depth analysis of the United Kingdom
(Chapter 8), Scottish National Party supporters appear to be less likely to support the
EU than the other parties while Plaid Cymru displayed more of a positive inclination of
support. However, both of these findings were statistically insignificant perhaps
showing that the debate in Scotland and Wales on European integration does not
necessarily hinge upon party support. More interesting when following the support
trends between party and the regional public, Scottish public levels of support tend to be
more closely aligned with the SNP than the other parties. While the causal direction of
this support is unclear, there does appear to be a relationship between the SNP position
and that of the public. The SNP, perhaps having the benefit of being the only regional
party, have the ability to both follow the sentiment of the Scottish people and place the
European question within the Scottish context thus showing the importance of regional
party politics within the European debate. Here, while regional party supporters may
not inevitably follow their party's position on Europe the party instead correlates with
the wider public. This shows that both European-wide as well as regional specific
trends are worthwhile investigating.
Regional Economic and Political Indicators: Does Regional
Distinction Influence Public Opinion on European integration?
The research completed in this dissertation carefully took into account the previous
works on public opinion towards European integration. It was noted that a large
proportion of this work evaluated economic and political factors within the national
context in an effort to explain public support of integration. This research applied
several of the economic and political indicators used previously. However they were
analysed within the regional context in addition to the national context to determine if
the variation of these factors is as significant between regions within the same country
as they are between countries.
Chapter 6 presented an analysis of all EU15 member-states displaying how regional
economic and political indicators influence EU public opinion. It was shown that
regional GDP had a stronger as well as positive effect on EU support when compared to
national GDP "demonstrating that regional wealth may be more likely taken into
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consideration by the public when evaluating European integration. Unemployment
levels however remained insignificant at both the national and regional levels. To
further investigate public perceptions on the economy, evaluations of the economy and
employment situation were considered. At first instance both had a positive and
strongly significant effect on EU opinion demonstrating that those that perceive the
economy and employment situation more positively will more likely support
integration. An interaction variable was also created to determine if a cross-level
interaction existed between regional GDP and evaluation on the economy. The result
shown was a positive and significant interaction showing that high economic
perceptions in wealthier regions are more likely to have positive evaluations of the EU.
The random intercept model allows for a deeper analysis on how the public may
develop such evaluations and connect them to the EU. Each variable had a separate
coefficient created to account for variation within regions, between regions/within the
same country, between all regions and between countries. Economic evaluations
remained strongest at the regional level while employment evaluations only remained
strong at the individual level. In other terms, individuals seem to more likely evaluate
the economy on the level closest to them, the region, as opposed to the national context
while issues of employment remain a personal perception. When observing economic
evaluations in the United Kingdom (Chapter 8) two variables were used. The first
variable evaluated one's personal economic situation while the second evaluated one's
perception of the national economic situation. A striking difference between English
and Scottish perceptions was noted. While both evaluation variables had a positive
effect for the Scottish the relationship is only significant at the personal level while for
the English, the relationship is only significant at the national level. This may
demonstrate that at least for the Scottish, economic evaluations are based at levels lower
than the overall British level. The English are more likely to evaluate the entirety of the
,
national economic situation perhaps showing that English and Scottish national
perceptions differ.
Political indicators were also presented in the research. Multilevel governance has been
a recurring theme throughout the research and was tested in the form of a national level
variable measuring multilevel governance taken from Hooghe and Marks' (2001: 191-
212) attempt to quantify the level of regional democracy within the EU member-states
(Chapters 6 and 7). Surprisingly, while this variable had a significant impact amongst
- 187 -
the regional political parties, it seemed to have no significant effect on the public. This
does not undermine the effect of multilevel governance at the regional level however.
While this multilevel governance variable is a national level indicator the participation
of regional parties within the national parliament mentioned above may give better
insight to the regional context. Additionally democratic satisfaction was analysed in the
multilevel context as were economic and employment evaluations (Chapter 6). Initially
democratic satisfaction had the expected positive and significant effect. However when
observed within the multilevel context democratic satisfaction only remained significant
at the national level. This indicates that political perceptions are still only taken within
the national context.
Overall, economic evaluations may be a perception developed within the regional
context while political evaluations are still taken from the national context. This
demonstrates the importance the region plays in terms of economy. Individuals are
likely to interpret economic conditions on the territorial level closest to them. It is
possible they may even be aware of the variation of regional economic conditions
throughout their country and how the EU mayor may not benefit regional growth. In
sum, regional economic factors should be taken into account in understanding European
public opinion as regional disparities within countries may well have a large
contribution into influencing the public.
Identity: Do Regional Variations of Culture and Territorial
Attachment Influence EU support?
Regional identity is a major component in recognising the territorial space that makes
up the region. Regions can vary in terms of culture, having a different historical
language than the rest of the nation-state, or even have a different political history as in
the case of Scotland. Cultural identity has been on the rise within the sphere of new
regionalism. In many states language protection has been an increasing concern. For
some, the European Union can be seen as a champion for minority culture protection.
Identity has been an additional explanatory variable in many previous EU public
opinion studies. This dissertation attempted to benefit from the use of multilevel
modelling to gain a clearer understanding of this unique dynamic.
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In order to test the strength of cultural differences within regions a variable was used
which measured historical language difference (Chapter 7). While the variable did not
necessarily measure a modem spoken language it attempted to account for an historical
cultural difference that the region may have with the majority culture present in the
nation-state. The larger a regional language scored on the language difference scale, the
greater the difference the language has with the national language. The language
difference variable displayed a negative effect on EU support levels though not
statistically significant. Though the results may be inconclusive they may hint that it is
possible regional culture might produce a negative effect on EU support. These results
were reinforced when observing regional attachment levels.
Identity was further investigated by observing the strengths of attachment to both the
region and country (Chapter 7). Surprisingly, regional identity had a negative effect on
EU support while national identity had a positive effect, both statistically significant.
When investigated further through the use of the random slopes multilevel model it was
shown that both these variables can contrast significantly even for regions within the
same country. More interesting was the greater variation for national attachment. It
was shown that the concept of national attachment can be very different between
regions. This was further emphasised by the example of the United Kingdom (Chapter
8). For the Scottish, English and Welsh, regional identity had a negative effect on EU
support. In addition, British identity also has a negative effect in Scotland and Wales
when the effect was positive in England. This shows that the concept of British identity
is likely to be different for the Welsh and Scottish than for the English. This may be a
case where the English closely relate British identity and English identity thus there are
less competing identities with the EU. In Scotland and Wales however their regional
identities are also strongly competing with a national identity. Those in these regions
that see themselves as British as opposed to the identity of their region will more likely
see the EU as yet another competing identity. This demonstrates the importance of
taking regional variations of identity into account. Not only is regional identity itself
significant in shaping EU opinion but the relationship with national identity can be
much more complex than initially thought.
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Regional Assertiveness: Is Decentralisation an Obstacle to
European integration?
The last theme explained is the investigation of the final outcome of new regionalism,
the demand for further regional autonomy. Thus far it has been noted that regions that
are economically stronger are more likely to support EU integration. In addition regions
where regional parties are more likely to participate at the national level are also more
likely "to support the EU. Regional identity however has a negative effect towards
integration perhaps revealing that the regional public is more likely to view the EU
positively towards political and economic cohesion but negatively in terms of
threatening regional identity. Regional assertiveness was examined as a variable
representing the degree to which elites within a region are demanding further autonomy
where the highest levels of assertiveness are likely calls for independence. While the
reasons for autonomy may be a combination of economic, political and cultural issues,
the variable is designed to grasp a sense of how devolutionary demands may affect
public attitudes towards integration.
Regional assertiveness showed to have a strong and statistically significant negative
effect on EU support (Chapter 7). Furthermore there was also a cross-level interaction
with opinion leadership, the degree in which one partakes and influences political
discussion. Whereas opinion leadership traditionally has a positive effect on EU
support, when interacted with regional assertiveness the effect becomes negative. More
simply, those that have a high opinion leadership score within highly assertive regions
are less likely to support EU integration. This reiterates the impact regional
assertiveness can have on public support of integration. The question of devolution and
independence was analysed in Scotland and Wales (Chapter 8). For both the Welsh and
Scottish those that support a regional government while remaining a part of the United
Kingdom had a higher likelihood of supporting integration than those that want a
centralised United Kingdom. Support for independence was also positive though the
size of the coefficient was much smaller and insignificant. This may demonstrate that
in Scotland and Wales support for devolution may be having a positive effect" on
integration support while the effect for independence support is minimal and
inconclusive. The example of both the multilevel analysis in Chapter 7 and British
analysis in Chapter 8 possibly reveal that high levels of assertiveness from regional
elites including independence has a negative .effect on public EU support. In contrast
those members of the public that support an intermediate level of autonomy such as the
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devolved governments in Scotland and Wales will be more inclined to support a higher
level of governance in the EU.
Is New Regionalism an Advantage for European Integration?
Multilevel governance and new regionalism is creating a unique shift in policy authority
withinthe European Union. Autonomy is being transferred away from the nation state
in two directions. First authority is moving above through the integration of the
European Union and second from below through the process of devolution and the
advancement of new regionalism. It was revealed that many regional parties have
begun championing integration as it benefits the region by allowing it to take a deeper
role in shifting autonomy from the nation-state. Is this belief however shifting to the
public thus fostering greater support for integration?
The results seem to present a twofold answer. There is evidence that the public tends to
evaluate the economy from the regional level. This can be very beneficial to the
European Union as integration began and is still in many ways seen as an economic
experiment. The more economic benefits at the regional level individuals distinguish as
being a result of integration will perhaps result in stronger levels of EU support. As
regions seem to become wealthier the likelihood of supporting Europe also becomes
greater. Regional parties also gain benefits from partaking in the implementation
process of EU structural funding thus have much at stake in attempting to convince the
public on the European question. As with the evidence of the SNP in Scotland, regional
parties have a significant role in raising the debate over European integration within
their regions. As regional parties attempt to persuade their public on the EU they are
also persuading the public on recognising the exceptionality of the region. This in itself
may lead to Decounter productive in promoting EU integration.
Both regional assertiveness and regional identity are the foundations of regional parties.
In this. research it was shown that both can have a negative effect on European
integration support. Greater regional distinctiveness in terms of identity and politics
could backlash on the European Union. There is some evidence however that multilevel
governance does influence integration in a more positive light. This would be
multilevel governance in the form of further regional autonomy which stops short of full
independence .. ' Devolution but not independence, the foundation of new regionalism,
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could be the "happy median" Europe is in search for. The regions have the ability to
bring Europe closer to the public.
Limitations and the Future of Regional Public Opinion Studies
Unfortunately, as with any research, there is always a series of drawbacks which limit
the analysis from perfection. The most considerable restraint in this work primarily lies
within the survey data. As explained in Chapter 4 on methodology, no perfect dataset
exists to answer the research questions at hand. The goal is to find the best suitable
survey out of many that address the issues pertaining to the research. I believe the
datasets used in this dissertation were adequate in attempting to explore the regional
dynamics of European public opinion. There is however always room for improvement.
Creating a set of uniform questions attempting to capture regional variation can be
extremely difficult. As repeatedly mentioned the forces of new regionalism are
asymmetrical throughout Europe. Some questions may be suitable for some
countries/regions while not so in others. A sequence of questions however relating to
individuals' perceptions and evaluations on multilevel governance and devolution
would be extremely useful and should be considered by researchers of comparative
European public opinion.
In addition, as the European Union expands so should the scope of public opinion
research. This dissertation has been limited to the EU15 due to the dynamic nature
presented over the past two decades. Data on the 12 newly joined member-states has
been limited in the past. This is not to say that regional elements do not exist in the
additional central and eastern members. As more data becomes readily available on
perceptions of the new member-state public within their regional context, as well as data
on regional political parties, this research can continue to expand eastwards. The
unique political experiences of the new member-states would also add to an enriching
investigation of new regionalism.
The concluded research demonstrated that the emergence of multilevel governance and
a sense of political, economical and cultural identities at the regional level are changing
the way Europeans evaluate integration. It is still important to consider however that
new regionalism is an asymmetrical phenomenon, Each state is unique in its system of
multilevel governance, some highly federalised as in Germany and others more
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centralised as in Sweden or Ireland. In addition, the emergence of new regionalism can
be developed as a response to. varying unique regional motives. Due to this, creating
cross-national models can become difficult however by applying the multilevel model
technique researchers can overcome this challenge.
The future of Europe and integration will continue to progress. The course of
devolution will also persist on an unpredictable scale. All levels of government will
need to recognise the opinions of their citizens as both these processes persist within the
evolution of European democracy. If Europe leans towards further cooperation with
regional elites it may find a way in bringing the Union closer to the people. This
divergence from within the nation-state can help achieve the goal of establishing a true
'Europe of the regions'.
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Appendix
Table 5.3: Party Acronyms for Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6
BNG
CiU
EA
FDF
PA
PNV-EAJ
SNP
SF
VU 10-21
Galician Nationalist Bloc (Spa.)
Convergence and Unity (Spa.)
Basque Solidarity (Spa.)
Francophone Democratic Front (Bel.)
Andalusian Party (Spa.)
Basque Nationalist Party (Spa.)
Scottish National Party (UK.)
Sinn Fein (UK.)
People's Union (Bel.)
CC
DUP
ERC
LN
PAR
RKP-SFP
UUP
VU
Canarian Coalition (Spa.)
Democratic Unionist Party (UK)
Catalan Republican Left (Spa.)
Northern League (Ita.)
Aragonese Regionalist Party (Spa.)
Swedish People's Party (Fin.)
Ulster Unionist Party (UK)
People's Party (Bel.)
Table 5.4: OLS Regression of Manifesto Year Dummies
Year p (S.E.)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
0.400
1.355
-0.272
-2.075
-0.490
-0.470
-1.044
0.026
-0.615
1.27Q
-1.416
-2.232+
0.598
1.200
0.977
1.324
1.451
1.005
0.943
1.325
1.368
1.053
0.944
1.576
1.336
0.962
+p < .10, '" p < .05, "'* p < .01
Note: 2003 dropped due to collinearity
Table 5.6: Descri~tive Statistics: Com~arative Manifestos Project 1990-2003
Variable Obs. Mean . SD Min Max
EU Position 375 1.95 3.66 -13.70 25.70
Socialists 375 0.19 0.39 0 1
Liberals 375 0.15 0.35 0 1
Christian Democrats 375 0.15 0.36 0 1
Conservatives 375 0.09 0.28 0 1 ..
Greens 375 0.10 0.31 0 1
Far Right 375 0.05 0.22 0 1
Regionalists 375 0.12 0.32 0 1
Sweden 375 0.08 0.27 0 1
Finland 375 0.09 0.29 0 1
Belgium 375 0.10 0.30 0 1
Netherlands 375 0.08 0.27 0 1
France 375 0.05 0.22 0 1
Italy 375 0.12 0.33 0 1
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Table 5.6 Continued
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Spain 375 0.08 0.28 0 1
Greece 375 0.05 0.21 0 1
Portugal 375 0.06 0.23 0 1
Germany 375 0.05 0.22 0 1
Austria 375 0.06 0.24 0 1
Great Britain 375 0.05 0.22 0 1
Ireland. 375 0.05 0.21 0 1
Parliamentary Seat % 375 0.14 0.15 0 0.64
Left/Right Ideology 375 -1.84 19.99 -45.95 64.71
Free Market Economy 375 3.74 4.94 0 28.64
Labour Class + 375 2.39 2.68 -3.35 13.59
Farmers + 375 2.17 2.67 0 20.26
Middle Class + 375 0.35 0.80 0 9
Internationalism 375 1.34 1.86 0 12.20
Multiculturalism 375 0.41 2.58 -15.07 20.16
National Patriotism 375 0.82 2.47 -4 25
Decentralisation 375 2.94 3.99 -2.44 20.29
Regional Governance 375 3.93 3.33 0 10
1990 375 0.05 0.22 0 1
1991 375 0.09 0.28 0 1
1992 375 0.06 0.24 0 1
1993 375 0.06 0.23 0 1
1994 375 0.11 0.32 0 1
1995 . 375 0.08 0.27 0 1
1996 375 0.07 0.26 0 1
1997 375 0.05 0.22 0 1
1998 375 0.07 0.26 0 1
1999 375 0.08 0.26 0 1
2000 375 0.04 0.20 0 1
2001 375 0.07 0.26 0 1
2002 375 0.11 0.32 0 1
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics for Random Intercept Models, Eurobarometer
63.4 (200S}
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
EU Opinion Index Score 14978 6.248 2.596 0 10
National Log GDP 14978 12.962 1.132 10.203 14.607
National Unemployment 14978 7.410 2.338 4.5 11
Regional Governance 14978 4.280 3.377 0 10
Regional Log GDP 14978 10.953 1.030 7.452 13.082
Regional Unemployment 14978 7.557 3.792 2.9 21.6
Objective 1 14978 0.262 0.440 0 1
Regional Party in Gov.
No Party in Gov. 14978 0.800 0.400 0 1
Regional Assembly 14978 0.062 0.241 0 1
National Parliament 14978 0.138 0.345 0 1
Language Difference 14978 0.161 0.135 0.1 1
Democratic Satisfaction 14978 2.671 0.796 1 4
Democratic Satisfaction (Centred) 14978 0 0.741 -2.323 2
Economic Expectations 14978 1.815 0.712 1 3
Economic Expectations (Centred) 14978 0 0.680 -1.329 1.611
Employment Expectations 14978 1.751 0.738 1 3
Employment Expectations (Centred) 14978 o . 0.700 -1.269 1.75
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Table 6.4 Continued
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Country Attachment 14978 3.478 0.682 1 4
Country Attachment (Centred) 14978 0 0.642 -2.783 1.25
Region Attachment 14978 3.376 0.753 1 4
Region Attachment (Centred) 14978 0 0.721 -2.814 1.268
Opinion Leadership 14978 2.390 0.926 1 4
Opinion Leadership (Centred) 14978 0 0.888 -2.027 2.154
Gender- 14978 0.464 0.499 0 1
Gender (Centred) 14978 0 0.495 -0.778 0.85
Age 14978 47.216 18.015 15 97'
Age (Centred) 14978 0 17.735 -42.85 48.929
Note: All centred variable means are values rounded to zero as the first non-zero integers are beyond
seven decimal Elaces.
Table 7.5: Descriptive Statistics for Hierarchical Linear Models, Eurobarometer
63.4 {200S}
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
EU Opinion Index Score 6642 6.333 2.622 0 10
National Log GDP 6642 14.008 0.669 12.576 14.607
National Unemployment 6642 8.649 2.121 4.7 11
Regional Assertiveness 6642 1.058 1.149 0 3
Regional Governance 6642 6.877 2.602 3 10
Regional Log GDP 6642 11.576 0.836 8.737 13.082
Regional Unemployment 6642 9.044 4.514 2.9 21.6
Objective 1 6642 0.237 0.425 0 1
Regional Party in Gov.
No Party in Gov. 6642 0.583 0.493 0 1
Regional Assembly 6642 0.108 0.310 0 1
National Parliament 6642 0.309 0.462 0 1
Language Difference 6642 0.231 0.178 0.1 1
Democratic Satisfaction 6642 2.538 0.795 1 4
Democratic Satisfaction (Centred) 6642 0 0.761 -2.077 2
Economic Expectations 6642 1.781 0.723 1 3
Economic Expectations (Centred) 6642 0 0.704 -1.207 1.611
Employment Expectations 6642 1.731 0.737 1 3
Employment Expectations (Centred) 6642 0 0.709 -1.237 1.75
Country Attachment. 6642 3.332 0.739 1 4
Country Attachment (Centred) 6642 0 0.709 -2.68 1.25
Region Attachment 6642 3.339 0.757 1 4
Region Attachment (Centred) 6642 0 0.736 -2.574 1.182
Opinion Leadership 6642 2.336 0.945 1 4
Opinion Leadership (Centred) 6642 0 0.914 -2.027 2.154
Gender 6642 0.463 0.499 0 1
Gender (Centred) 6642 0 0.493 -0.778 0.85
Age 6642 46.887 18.278 15 97
Age (Centred) 6642 0 17.945 -38.846 48.929
Note: All centred variable means are values rounded to zero as the first non-zero integers are beyond
seven decimal Elaces.
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Region {3 (S.E.)
Table 8.3: England Administrative Regions Dummy Variables
EastMidlands
East of England
Northeast
Northwest
Southeast
Southwest
West Midlands
Yorkshire and Humberside
0.286
0.224
0.145
0.262
-0.051
0.117
0.266
0.101
(0.202)
(0.185)
(0.258)
(0.180)
(0.196)
(0.238)
(0.198)
(0.198)
Note: The region of London is used as the reference category
Table 8.4: Descri~tive Statistics for Scotland Logit Model, BES (200S~
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
EU Membership Approval 615 3.132 1.050 1 5
Personal Economic Expectations 615 3.007 0.848 1 5
General Economic Expectations 615 2.902 0.875 1 5
Democratic Satisfaction 615 2.759 0.644 1 4
Party Voted For
Labour 615 0.356 0.479 0 1
Conservatives 615 0.145 0.352 0 1
Liberal Democrats 615 0.140 0.347 0 1
Scottish National Party 615 0.158 0.365 0 1
Did Not Vote 615 0.202 0.402 0 1
Scottish Autonomy
Independent Scotland 615 0.216 0.412 0 1
Scottish Parliament 615 0.561 0.497 0 1
UK Parliament Only 615 0.226 0.419 0 1
Political Interest 615 3.176 0.947 1 5
Vote Persuasion 615 2.111 2.808 0 10
Gender 615 0.444 0.497 0 1
Age' 615 53.488 16.399 18 93
Identity 615
More British 615 0.088 0.283 0 1
Equal 615 0.281 0.450 0 1
More Scottish 615 0.631 0.483 0 1
Age Completed Education 615
IS or Below 615 0.405 0.491 0 1
16-18 615 0.382 0.486 0 1
190r Above 615 0.213 0.410 0 1
Table 8.5: Descrietive Statistics for Wales Logit Model, BES (200S~
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
EU membership Approval 419 3.124 1.076 1 5
Personal Economic Expectations 419 2.921 0.789 1 5
General Economic Expectations 419 2.826 0.884 1 5
Democratic Satisfaction 419 2.745 0.670 1 4
Party Voted For
Labour 419 '0.353 0.479 0
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Table 8.5 Continued
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Conservati yes 419 0.184 0.388 0 1
Liberal Democrats 419 0.177 0.382 0 1
Plaid Cymru 419 0.103 0.304 0 1
Did Not Vote 419 0.184 0.388 0 I
Welsh Autonomy
Independent Wales 419 0.086 0.281 0 1
Welsh Assembly 419 0.589 0.493 0 I
UK Parliament Only 419 0.325 0.469 0 I
Political Interest 419 3.136 1.001 I 5
Vote Persuasion 419 2.332 2.980 0 10
Gender 419 0.492 0.501 0 I
Age 419 53.852 16.736 19 91
Identity
More British 419 0.277 0.448 0 1
Equal 419 0.358 0.480 0 I
More Welsh 419 0.365 0.482 0 I
Age Completed Education
150rBelow 419 0.317 0.466 0
16-18 419 0.449 0.498 0
19 or Above 419 0.234 0.424 0
Table 8.6: Descri~tive Statistics for England Logit Model, BES {200S}
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
EU membership Approval 1904 2.996 1.077 I 5
Personal Economic Expectations 1904 2.889 0.816 1 5
General Economic Expectations 1904 2.789 0.892 1 5
Democratic Satisfaction 1904 2.729 0.662 I 4
Party Voted For
Labour 1904 0.283 0.450 0 I
Conservatives 1904 0.291 0.454 0 I
Liberal Democrats 1904 0.165 0.372 0 I
UKIP 1904 0.015 0.123 0 I
Did Not Vote 1904 0.246 0.431 0 I
Political Interest 1904 3.134 0.970 I 5
Vote Persuasion 1904 2.303 2.913 0 10
Gender 1904 0.465 0.499 0 1
Age 1904 51.492 17.369 18 97
Identity
More British 1904 0.196 0.397 0 I
Equal 1904 0.497 0.500 0 I
More English 1904 0.307 0.461 0 I
Age Completed Education
150rBelow 1904 0.328 0.470 0 I
16-18 1904 0.460 0.498 0 1
19 or Above 1904 0.213 0.409 0 I
East Midlands 1904 0.089 0.284 0 1
East of England 1904 0.145 0.353 0 I
London 1904 0.086 0.281 0 I
Northeast 1904 0.041 0.199 0 1
Northwest 1904 0.134 0.341 0 I
Southeast 1904 0.181 0.385 0 1
Southwest 1904 0.113 0.317 0 I
West Midlands 1904 .0.101 0.302 0 I
Yorkshire and Humberside 1904 0.108 0.310 0 1
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